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Military Affairs

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Alksnis Calls for State of Emergency

91UM0470A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 14 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with V. Alksnis by Czechoslovak newspaper LIDOVE NOVINY in Prague; date not given; prepared by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent Ye. Chernykh: "The Army Will Play First Fiddle"]

[Text] *That is the headline under which the Czechoslovak newspaper recently published a big interview with V. Alksnis.*

In comments in this publication the editors say that they categorically disagree with most of the opinions expressed in the interview, and that they condemn his [Alksnis'] conservative attacks on the democratic forces in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Here is an abridged version of the interview.

V. Alksnis believes that the USSR can get out of the crisis by using extraordinary measures—specifically, by creating a public salvation committee, but not in the way it was done in Lithuania or Latvia. The committee should only be organized by constitutional means. Only the USSR Congress of People's Deputies has the right to create it. The committee must be formed on a coalition basis: the left, the right, and the center. From Sobchak to Nazarbayev. It would include influential people, who have the authority and the support of certain public circles. However, V. Alksnis does not see B. Yeltsin or M. Gorbachev as committee members, because the conflict between them has gone so far that they can no longer work together.

Such a congress may be called during the next few months, when complete chaos sets in and millions of people take to the streets. With the creation of the public salvation committee, a state of emergency would be imposed, and the work of soviets of all levels—from the Supreme Soviet to the rural settlement soviet—would be suspended. The same goes for all parties, including the CPSU. This will be a temporary transition period in order to normalize the economic and domestic political situation in the country.

We used to have a one-party system, in which the party structures carried out the role of the state organs. We have demolished these party structures, but by doing so we have also liquidated state structures. We have not created anything to replace them, however. That is precisely why the public salvation committee is needed—to create a normal pluralistic system.

V. Alksnis maintains that there are forces in the country that are capable of imposing a state of emergency: the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the KGB, and the Army. The Army will play the main role, the first fiddle.

A state of emergency should ensure political stability for the implementation of economic reform and the introduction of a market economy, which is the main goal. The transition period may last a year, or two, or five,

until the store shelves are full. When we come to the point of being able to feed our people, the market itself will demand the democratization of public life. Then the formation of a pluralistic democracy will begin, and free elections will be held.

V. Alksnis realizes that a number of political parties will go underground. But this will become an illegal activity, and legal actions will have to be taken against them. The colonel is not afraid that the international community will object to such a system. When the world comes to face the chaos that will reign in a few months, it will do anything to avoid it. Otherwise this chaos will become a threat to the entire world. In Poland, the state of emergency created the conditions for a transition to democracy. Jaruzelski fulfilled his historic role and saved Poland from civil war in 1980.

Civil war is possible in the larger part of USSR territory. It is unlikely that it will flare up in Siberia, but it is already going on in the Transcaucasus, and the danger of it is quite real in Moldova, the Baltics, and the central part of Russia. This will not be a war between communists and noncommunists. Ideological arguments are now on the back burner. The main argument right now is between the separatists and the federalists. To a certain degree it resembles the United States, when the South was fighting the North.

The colonel reaffirmed the statement he made in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY that the national salvation committees in the Baltics were created at M. Gorbachev's initiative. However, he refused to provide any details, fearing that it may do harm to some people in the Kremlin. He himself is not afraid, but thinks that this information so far is sufficient. Alksnis himself participated in the national salvation committee in Latvia. He joined it, although he knew it was not a constitutional organ. He did so because he had friends there. Not only communists. Simply like-minded people. They were united by the same goal. I know how the committee worked, but the time has not come yet to tell about it. There were about 40 people on the committee, four of them military.

V. Alksnis countered journalist M. Stetina's question about the preservation of the Soviet Union as one entity with a question: "Is President Havel worried about what is happening now in Slovakia? Is he concerned about the possibility that Czechoslovakia will disintegrate? Yes. Then why does the Czechoslovak leadership welcome the Baltics' desire for independence and does not welcome Slovakia's desire for independence?" There are economic and national roots that tie us together. Most importantly, we have so-called Soviet people, 75 million of whom live outside the borders of their national territories. They are an object of discrimination in most Union republics. These people will be the first to take up arms to protect their interests. Therefore the disintegration of the country should not be permitted. These people can be either destroyed or deported. Something of that nature has already happened in the Transcaucasus!

Armenia kicked out the Azeris, Azerbaijan the Armenians. Armenia has become ethnically pure and eliminated national problems inside the country. But it got a war in return. This is what will happen to all the republics if the process is not stopped. Belorussia will be at war with Lithuania, Estonia with Russia, and so on.

It is known how the West talks to us now. They use crude pressure, the language of ultimatums, since they do not consider us equal partners. The time when we had to be reckoned with is gone. Now we have lost superpower status.

I am Gorbachev's man and fully support the goals he has set. And the idea of a democratic, law-based state. I agree with Gorbachev's goals, but I see now that he cannot find the way to reach them. That is why he is criticized.

...I am from a simple family. My father worked in the mines from childhood. My mother is also a simple woman. She worked in the mines, and later as a seamstress. But our name is celebrated. Latvians in Latvia are proud of the name Alksnis. In Stalin's time my grandfather was among the top 20 people in the country. He was chief of the Red Army's Air Force, Voroshilov's deputy.

"What do you think, will you be remembered as somebody to be proud of or to be damned?"

"As somebody to be proud of, I think. You know what gives me strength? There is a monument to my grandfather in Riga. People bring flowers there, but in the past this happened mostly on Air Force Day. Now there are flowers there almost every day. This says a lot."

Anti-Yeltsin Campaign in Army Denied

91UNI073B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 13 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Letter to Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, from Major V. Nagornyy: "Protest of Tank Crewmen From the Kaliningrad Garrison—This Is an Outright Lie"]

[Text] In your interview on Central Television on 19 February of this year, speaking of the beginning of "attacks" on you, you declared that "this campaign is developing very rapidly in the Army and there are special questionnaires, and I was in a tank division in Kaliningrad, and, so, it is interesting, they showed me how exactly by platoons, meaning the platoon commander comes up and signs, and then the rest sign, a protest to Yeltsin that he really, so to speak, is against the Army."

I categorically declare: This is a downright lie.

There was no such fact in our tank unit. By declaring this publicly, you are thereby throwing not a pebble at the Army, but a bomb. You say, look, good people: There are tanks in Vilnius and tank crewmen against the chairman

of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], that is, against B. Yeltsin, the fighter for democracy.

I was in the headquarters when a regimental commander reported to you and indicated on a map where and in what place every subunit is located, and what training task it is fulfilling. I was next to you, Boris Nikolayevich, when you inspected the barracks, the bays with combat equipment, and the soldiers' mess hall. I was also in the club of the division staff, where your meeting took place with servicemen of the Kaliningrad garrison. And I did not see any lists, much less soldiers stepping up briskly "by platoons." Indeed, where would they come from, if some were on the training ground, some were maintaining equipment, and still others were on detail. Incidentally, you did not say anything about this fact in the club or in the meeting with Kaliningrad residents in the House of Political Education. You only said that the military gave you a somewhat cool reception, but that you parted normally. Moreover, I am confident that if you actually did see "soldiers signing a protest," then your meeting with the servicemen would not have taken place.

At the meeting, you accused everyone and everything: "He," "they" are to blame, and the mass media are reporting on you in a biased way and incorrectly. You say, it is "he" and "they" who deceived the people. But how does one treat these facts? In the unit club, representatives of Russian nationality from Klaipeda came to you, and you took a note from them and put it in the pocket of your jacket, promising to study it later. In the House of Political Education, one of eight Russian workers who arrived from Latvia addressed you at the end of the meeting. You did not even let him say a word, but you invited 800 persons to Moscow (that is how many fit in your hall) and promised to look into things there. But even if they did come to Moscow, they would have to wait at least two months for a meeting with you (every one of your days is scheduled for two months—these are your words).

After all of this, how are you to be believed, the zealot for Russians and for Russia? And how are your words about Russian soldiers serving in the USSR Armed Forces to be assessed, when you were unable to say anything intelligible concerning proposed measures for the social protection of servicemen? And how is your appeal to the UN to be understood? You told us that you cannot legally appeal to the international organization, but, you say, you had no other choice. Some among us assessed this as blackmail, and others, as adventurism.

It is apparent from some of your speeches, especially from the television interview, that it is you who are deceiving the people. The fate of the USSR, the fate of Russia, and the fate of Russians absolutely does not trouble you and interest you. You made your way to power in order to settle your own scores through the help

of the people, and you are thereby pushing it into an abyss of chaos and the division of USSR. But this is adventurism!

Neither Gorbachev, nor Yazov, nor the party compelled me or asked me to write this letter. Your deception compelled me to do this. And in this letter I express the opinion of the Russian soldiers of the tank division who declare: A deceiver must not stand at the head of Russia.

Tank crewmen support the policy of the USSR president!

[Signed] Major V. Nagornyy

From the editor. The protest of tank crewmen soldiers of the Kaliningrad garrison, signed by 353 soldiers and officers, is attached to Major V. Nagornyy's letter.

Pacific Sailors Back Gorbachev Over Yeltsin

91UM0452A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Our Correspondent": "Words of Support"]

[Text] Sailors, petty officers, warrant officers, and officers of ships and units of a command of the Pacific Fleet in operational readiness decisively supported at their general meeting the political statement of a group of deputies of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet set forth in the speech by S.P. Goryacheva, deputy chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, at the session on 21 February.

"The policy course aimed at undermining the Union treaty and confrontation chosen by B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and supported by the so-called 'democratic wing' of the Russian parliament cannot fail to disturb each of us," a telegram from the Pacific sailors sent to the president of the USSR and to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet says. "It is clear today that the highest legislative body is becoming an arena of struggle for power and a settling of scores with the center...."

"B.N. Yeltsin's calls for the replacement of the legitimately elected highest organs of power and the immediate resignation of the president of the USSR are manifestly at odds with the USSR Constitution and are creating an extraordinary situation in the Russian Federation and in the country as a whole."

The participants in the meeting supported the all-Union referendum. Only the signing of a new Union treaty, they believe, is a practicable basis for the country's emergence from the economic and political crisis. The telegram emphasizes that the reason for the appeal to the deputies of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet was not someone's prompting, but natural concern for the families back home and for near ones and dear ones living in different

republics and pain for the fate of the Fatherland and for the Soviet people, whose peaceful labor the servicemen are protecting.

Officers' Assemblies Created at Various Levels

91UM0449C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Mar 91 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed article: "Social Organization of Officers"]

[Text] It is known that *Regulations on Officer Assemblies in the USSR Armed Forces have been in effect since 1 January of this year.*

Why do they not create such Officer Assemblies in the chief and central administrations of the Ministry of Defense? Is it that they are not needed there?

[Signed] Lieutenant Colonel A. Biryukov, Moscow

As we were told at the Main Cadre Administration, in keeping with Order No. 480 of the USSR minister of defense dated 14 December 1990, officer assemblies should be created in regiments, on vessels, separate battalions (squadrons) and their equivalents, administrations of large units (large strategic formations), offices, military educational establishments, enterprises and organizations of the Ministry of Defense. United officer assemblies may also be created in garrisons that include an insignificant number of officers.

The above order does not include a ban on creating officer assemblies in the central and main administrations.

For example, an officer assembly operates continuously in the Administration of Affairs of the Ministry of Defense. Chief of the administration Lieutenant General L. Ivashov believes that the Officer Assembly helps to develop the feeling of honor and dignity of officers, rallies the collective, and increases the involvement of people.

Primary Party Unit Secretaries' Role Explained

91UM0449B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Mar 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Major General V. Lashtabegu, department chief in a unit of the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy, by the editorial office of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA; place and date not given: "Confidence Imposes Obligations: On the Issue of the Status of Secretaries"]

[Text] Many letters concerning the status of secretaries of primary party organizations have been received by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA after the united January plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. There are more than 54,000 secretaries of primary party organizations and organizations equated with them in the USSR Armed Forces.

The editorial office asked Major General V. Lashtabegu, department chief in a unit of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy to answer various questions pertaining to this topic.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Viktor Petrovich, our readers are interested in details. For example, what is behind the brief communique: *Regulations on the Status of Secretaries Were Adopted at the Plenum?*

[Lashtabegu] Previously, we did not have such a document that covers the status, responsibilities, rights, and social protection of a category of numerous party functionaries. To be sure, fundamental provisions concerning the activities of the secretaries of primary party organizations are, of course, in line with corresponding items in the CPSU regulations, instructions, and resolutions of the Central Committee.

It is characteristic that the development of the *Regulations on Status* proceeded on the initiative of many primary organizations. We interpret this fact as the assertion of greater independence of the party organizations, their responsibility for the state of affairs in the CPSU, and an enhancement of the role of the personality of the secretary. The regulations make it possible to concentrate efforts on the main avenues of work, proceeding from the well-known requirements of the USSR law "On Public Associations."

It is no secret that the CPSU has been under attack for several years now. In this overall stream of abuse and criticism, the most fundamental blows have been struck at the foundation of the CPSU—primary party organizations and their leaders. Just look at the unruly campaign to defame the army and its heroic traditions! As I see it, the fact that individual party organizations have displayed certain passivity and that an appropriate response to slander has been absent is also attributable to a certain confusion on the part of the secretaries and their being unsure of the future. By now, the regulations, which fully apply to the secretaries of CPSU primary organizations in the USSR Armed Forces, have resolved many previously accumulated acute issues.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] At present, a reports-and-elections campaign is under way in the Army and the Navy. How does the status of the secretary make the dynamics of the campaign new?

[Lashtabegu] I believe that it will influence first of all the qualitative reinforcement of primary elements with cadres. Here is a detail: An overwhelming majority of secretaries are elected directly at party meetings, on a competitive basis from a field of two or three candidates. Businesslike, principled people capable of working under contemporary conditions are deservedly valued. In 65 percent of the primary organizations, the terms in office of elected executive organs and their secretaries have been extended by two or three years.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Viktor Petrovich, the chapters of the regulations that refer to social benefits, social security, and legislative acts on labor also appear significant in principle...

[Lashtabegu] At one time, this issue bothered many comrades. Being human, we can understand them. Servicemen elected to party positions have now been guaranteed the right to remain on active military duty by a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers dated 30 December of last year. They retain all rights, preferences, and privileges envisaged for the servicemen by the legislation in effect.

The following aspect is also important. After their term in office in elected organs ends, they are assigned through established procedures to a position not inferior to the one held by them before their election to these organs. The resolution of the government specifies other guarantees of social protection for secretaries just as clearly. I am convinced that this will make it possible for the party leaders to act confidently in the current complex situation.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Being mindful of Lenin's phrase to the effect that there are no responsibilities without rights, some of the readers are interested in this dimension of the document...

[Lashtabegu] Secretaries of primary party organizations are fully responsible for organizing the work and performing the functions of a primary party organization set forth in the CPSU Regulations. There is no need to dwell on this in detail, but I would like to specifically emphasize the following: There are many provisions on the list of responsibilities of the secretaries that point toward working with real people rather than papers, and toward facilitating an atmosphere of creativity, camaraderie, and openness in the collectives—in a word, nonofficial approaches and asserting the power of party masses. This will provide a good, creative foundation for the processes of renewal. The secretaries themselves are called upon to set good examples in combat training and discipline.

We should refer to one more "unconventional" responsibility. It is associated with efforts to prepare and nominate candidate people's deputies at all levels. By now, several thousand servicemen—people's deputies have been elected to the organs of state power. An overwhelming majority of them are CPSU members.

The regulations determine a system of mutual ties between superior party structures and secretaries of primary party organizations. This is especially essential for army and navy party organizations in which radical changes are under way and new relationships are being formed on the basis of the CPSU regulations and the Instructions on the Operation of CPSU Organizations in the USSR Armed Forces. These relations, first of all, rule out dictation and the tone of command.

In summation, I will stress that the Regulations on Status affect the lives and activities of thousands of secretaries in the USSR Armed Forces. You would agree that this is a large combat detachment of party aktiv in the Army and the Navy.

Committee Member On Reform Of Political Organs

*91UM0328A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Jan 91 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Major General A. Gorbachev, member of the Coordinating Committee on Reforming Party Agencies and Preparing for the All-Army Party Conference: "Timely Interview: Logic Of Choice"]

[Text] **Party organizations in the Armed Forces are completing preparations for reforming party agencies. They are setting about the practical implementation of the decisions of the 28th Party Congress, the CPSU Charter, and the USSR Law "On Public Associations."**

Army and Navy communists have sent many questions to the Coordinating Committee on Reforming Party Agencies and Preparing for the All-Army Party Conference.

At the editors' request, Major General A. Gorbachev, a member of the coordinating committee, replied to some of them.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Aleksandr Vasilyevich, how could you characterize the present stage of the reform of party structures in the USSR Armed Forces?

[Gorbachev] As the final stage. In keeping with the 28th CPSU Congress resolution "On Basic Guidelines for Party Military Policy At the Present Stage," the USSR President's decree of September 8 of this year, and the USSR law "On Public Associations," efforts to delimit the functions of political agencies and party organizations and to reform party structures in the army and navy are nearing completion. A concept has been drawn up that calls for the preservation of a network of party organizations in subunits and units and aboard ships and for the creation of party committees in combined units, military educational institutions, scientific research and other institutes, districts, groups of forces, fleets and Armed Forces branches and combat arms. Plans also call for the creation of an all-army party committee.

The coordinating committee was set up in order to promptly and efficiently resolve issues pertaining to the holding of report-and-election and organizational meetings and conferences. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has reported on this in detail, incidentally. I would only emphasize that the committee includes members of the CPSU Central Committee, delegates to the 28th Party Congress, People's Deputies, and commanders and political officers, at the request of primary party organizations. The committee has been confirmed by the party Central Committee. It is headed by CPSU Central Committee Secretary Yu. A. Manayenkov.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What is unique about the preparations for and the holding of party meetings and conferences in connection with the radical change in party structures?

[Gorbachev] The reform of party structures will be carried out from top to bottom. Report-and-election and organizing meetings and party conferences will be held in January through May of 1991. These meetings and conferences will form new party bodies—party bureaus and committees and control commissions. The all-army party conference will be held in late March in Moscow and will elect the all-army party committee and control commission.

In response to many questions, I should say that this does not mean that reports and elections have to be held in all party organizations. The communists themselves will decide in each individual case. For example, in some battalions (divisions) it will apparently be correct to hold report-and-election meetings in order to hear reports from full-time secretaries (bureaus), to evaluate their performance, and to elect new party bodies. It must be borne in mind that the number of staff positions for full-time party bureau secretaries is being reduced here.

Where party committees, in accordance with the CPSU Charter, have been elected for two or three years, communists may decide to hold report-and-election or organizational meetings. The number of positions for full-time party bureau secretaries will for the most part be left intact in these committees. These same meetings will elect delegates to the party conferences of combined units and large strategic formations and nominate delegates to the all-army party conference. They will also nominate candidates for the aforementioned party committees.

In our opinion, the party conferences of combined units, military educational institutions, institutes, districts, groups of forces, fleets, and Armed Forces branches and combat arms should hear reports from their corresponding organizing committees on the results of reports and elections in the party organizations and on preparations for the conference. They should also discuss practical tasks and the draft statute on the control commission and form elected party agencies by nominating candidates to superior party committees. It is important to carefully prepare every meeting and every conference in order to formulate constructive decisions and to enhance communists' activity and responsibility in combat training, discipline, and work with people.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The editors have received quite a few letters about the procedure for electing delegates to party conferences.

[Gorbachev] First and foremost, this measure is to be implemented on a broad, democratic basis in keeping with the CPSU Charter. We must also take into account the experience of nominating delegates on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress. Delegates to the party conferences of combined units and all the way up to the Armed

Forces combat arms are elected at meetings of primary party organizations, in accordance with representational norms set by the organizing committees. The elections are to be contested.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And what about delegates to the all-army conference?

[Gorbachev] The candidates will be nominated by the primary party organizations, one delegate for every 1,000 communists. They can be elected both for party districts and at corresponding party conferences. In the course of preparations for the conferences, delegate candidates should have the opportunity to meet with people and to set forth their position on fundamental party issues. I want to emphasize that one can campaign for "one's candidate" in other party organizations as well, thereby ensuring the election of the most authoritative, creatively thinking communists.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Aleksandr Vasilyevich, fundamentally new structures—the party committees of combined units, districts, and fleets—will be created in the near future. What is the procedure for forming them?

[Gorbachev] As in the party as a whole, all leadership bodies in army and navy party organizations are elected following broad-based discussions of the candidates and with due regard for communists' opinions.

We believe that the most acceptable procedure for forming elected bodies would be direct nomination of party organization representatives to the party committees, up to and including the all-army party committee.

The report-and-election meetings and conferences will set the number of members of party bureaus and party committees. The conference delegates have the right to put on the discussion list as many candidates as they consider necessary. During the discussion, the candidates can present their programs. This will make it possible to choose the most worthy candidates by secret ballot.

I would like to say a few things about party committee secretaries. They are elected directly at meetings (conferences). Communists elected to the position of party bureau and party committee secretary automatically become members of these bodies. Incidentally, the same election procedure applies to the members of control commissions.

All elected officials, from the combined unit party committee on up, are elected for no more than two consecutive terms.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How will the staffs of elected party bodies be put together?

[Gorbachev] The members of all party leadership bodies in the army and navy are to be elected. And the number of full-time employees of party committees must be kept to a minimum. Just how many such positions there will be and where has been determined. For example, the

party committees of combined units and large strategic formations will have no more than two to three full-time workers.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Many KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers are interested in the salary that party workers will receive.

[Gorbachev] The problems of social and legal guarantees for servicemen elected to party work are addressed in a special resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers. The salaries of full-time party workers in the army and navy are to be paid from party funds.

Servicemen elected to party work remain in military service. They also retain their service seniority, since through their work they are promoting improved combat readiness in units and aboard ships and the solution of many other pressing questions. We must maintain these officials' professional skills on a high level and enroll them in commander training classes, drills, and service. This will undoubtedly have an effect on party and combat work. Officers and army and navy warrant officers elected to full-time party work receive all types of allowances—for military rank and number of years served—and other benefits. They will enjoy medical, food, and clothing allowances at the expense of the USSR Ministry of Defense. This also applies to pensions.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Finally, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, a few words about the draft instructions "On the Work of CPSU Organizations in the USSR Armed Forces."

[Gorbachev] The draft published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has been widely discussed in party organizations.

The draft was examined at a session of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and is being submitted to a combined plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Committee.

Belorussian People's Front Accused of Inciting Desertsions

91UM0307A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Col. V. Zhitarenko: "Instigators, or Certain Secrets of the Anti-Army 'Machinations'"]

[Text] There have been more than a few reports of some soldiers leaving their units. Mentioning the forces that provoke such crimes, while themselves remaining unpunished, is another matter.

...A leaflet written in the name of the Belorussian People's Front appeared in the military construction detachment commanded by Lt. Col. V. Antsiferov and garrisoned in the city of Kmelnitskiy, which is in the Ukraine. Its sense: Belorussians facing military service should serve only in their own republic. Compatriots looked the

paper up and down, then passed it on to the company commander, Sr. Lt. I. Baybuz. That was in September.

On 14 October military construction personnel Privates A. Bogdanovich, S. Borisov, and V. Slepakov went AWOL. Inquiries from the detachment were quickly made at their place of residence. "Messengers" were then dispatched. The searches brought no success. In Minsk only one thing was told them: all three fugitives were under the "protection" of certain officials of the BNF [Belorussian People's Front].

On 18 October, a group of people's deputies of the BSSR, Ye. Novikov, V. Radomylskiy, and others, went to the Main Military Procuracy with information about the reasons why the above military construction personnel had left the unit: ridicule and harassment of Belorussian service members. The newspapers ZNAMYA YUNOSTI (an organ of the LKSM Central Committee of Belorussia) and "7 DNEY" (BSSR Telegraph Agency) published materials on this same topic in which they gave a more concrete interpretation of the reasons: unbearable living and working conditions in the military construction detachment, the continued "hazing" there, and interethnic hostility.

The Main Military Procuracy reacted immediately. Through effective investigative measures it was learned that one of the fugitives, Borisov, had in fact once been beaten by his fellow service member Private I. Pastelyak. Pastelyak was subjected to criminal prosecution. But something else also turned up: the reaction of the latter was the consequence of the fact that Borisov had often been sought high and low by the entire squad, and even the platoon, after regular formations at which he failed to appear. And indeed this was not his first flight from the unit. He also went home in early September and for several days the detachment was in a turmoil, there was no sleep or rest for the men because they were looking for the young construction worker. Privates M. Titov and A. Khakiyev were not restrained in their emotions, although this did not take the form it did with Pastelyak.

However much they tried, the investigators found no other information testifying to ridicule and harassment of Belorussians in the unit. And indeed, they were not at all convinced that what they did find had anything directly to do with Borisov's leaving the unit. Soon afterward he himself confirmed this when he was "returned" to the unit by his mother. Raisa Demyanova was upset as soon as she learned of the incident from a telephone call from the detachment's chief of staff. She sought out her son in Minsk. She had a meeting with people's deputies of the BSSR who were representatives of the BNF. But even after hearing those same promises of granting her son a place of service closer to home, she saw things her own way: he would serve where he was ordered.

Perhaps she also decided this because she herself had recently visited the detachment? She saw that the military construction workers were living much better than

in other families, that the barracks were quite comfortable and the food was good. And the work conditions in the plant where the detachment worked, which produced reinforced concrete items, every civilian construction plant should have it so good, as they say.

And one other thing became clear: her son had been exposed to the same verbiage from the creators of the aforesaid leaflet, as well as the agitation of his two pals, Bogdanovich and Slepakov. Thus the earlier he returned to the unit, the better off he himself would be. Going to the procuracy of the Carpathian Military District, she demanded only one more thing, that the assailant of her son, that same Pastelyak, not escape responsibility. They convinced her that he would not. She saw her son off [saying] serve, don't fool around!

In consideration of this and other circumstances, a criminal case was not instituted by the military procuracy against Borisov for AWOL.

A different fate awaits the two other fugitives. Their fault? Indisputably. Irresponsibility of their parents? This too is inescapable, for even when unit representatives traveled to Belorussia and appealed repeatedly to them, the parents of Bogdanovich and Slepakov did not disclose the addresses where their sons were hiding. But there is also a third party responsible for the military crime committed by the fugitives, the extremist portion of the Belorussian People's Front.

After all, it was with their blessing that the "canard" of the unbearableness of service in a military construction detachment made the rounds of the Belorussian newspapers.

On 22 October a detachment commander hastened to Minsk in readiness to explain all the absurdity of the accusations put forward. He also met with a representative of the BNF, Z. Poznyak, and with People's Deputy of the BSSR V. Gribanov, incidentally a service member who could and should immediately have distinguished the "grain from the chaff," for the absurdity of a whole group of accusations was obvious at once. But the named BNF officials did not want to listen seriously to Lt. Col. V. Antsiferov and did not consent to meet with his subordinates. The detachment commander had to operate in a manner which seemed strange at first glance. He had color photos made of the attributes of the military camp and sent them to Minsk in order at least to prove that the living conditions of the military construction personnel were better than normal. They asked the Vitebsk oblast military commissariat to send representatives to the unit. They came, including the assistant of the oblast military commissar for legal work, Soviet Army employee M. Rodin. They looked into all the questions and spoke with officers, warrant officers, and with all Belorussians. At departure they gave their opinion: the campaign started by the extremist wing of the BNF was no better than nonsense.

Well, what was the upshot of all this? Nothing. The "popular front" people continued their campaign. Was it

not with their "example" that Slepennkov wrote a letter to the detachment, saying everything is fine, they are letting me and Bogdanovich serve in Belorussia, so follow our example! One of them "took the bait" then, military construction worker Private A. Dvorniyakov. After running away from the unit—incidentally this was not the first time for him either—he made his way to Minsk. The soldier lived in one conspiratorial apartment, then at another, then at third. A "sweet life," it must owned: he didn't do a thing, but every day received ten or twenty rubles. Why such a varying "rate"? Was the twenty for when he distributed leaflets?

Aleksandr Dvorniyakov related something else as well to the author of these lines. Those who sponsored him and supplied him with money for some reason categorically forbade him to visit home even for an hour. But only his aging father remained at home after the death of his mother, and the trip was some two hundred kilometers. Didn't they forbid him because they did not expect "solidarity with them" on the part of Dvorniyakov's father, because they most likely feared that the latter would force his son immediately to return to his unit?

Nonetheless Dvorniyakov decided to visit his father.

There is yet another circumstance which probably influenced this decision. The fact is that Dvorniyakov was cruelly beaten. The crime was committed at one of the conspiratorial apartments.

They lived together, Bogdanovich, Slepennkov, and Dvorniyakov. One day they did not simply use alcohol, they clearly misused it (they were allowed to be extravagant with the presents of their sponsors practically every day). And "scores" were settled: by all appearances, about who was "earning tips." Alas Dvorniyakov could not compete with his partners when it came to lying, and he was beaten soundly. All the more so because his criminal skills were not like those of Bogdanovich and Slepennkov.

... From a report: "I Bogdanovich, A.Ye., use narcotics..." In the autumn of last year, V. Slepennkov wrote the same. But they were inducted into the Army in the summer. One could of course put a good face on it, telling journalists that they got addicted to drugs in the barracks. But the facts say otherwise: from their first days of service they combed the district villages looking for cannabis. And wasn't that also the reason they went AWOL, to obtain purer narcotics?

Slepennkov had already had conflicts with the law before induction. As had Bogdanovich. Incidentally, soon after his "political flight," a so-called individual instruction arrived in the name of the Orsha municipal department of internal affairs of the BSSR, asking to interrogate Bogdanovich regarding the facts of his crime. Back on 10 October 1989 he and an unidentified individual had threatened citizen R. with a knife and stole his things—a warmup suit, books, a radio, tape player, cassettes... A fact indicating not only the moral aspect of this individual. In the words of the deputy commander of the

military construction detachment, Capt. V. Semen-chatenko, it is not absurd to think that the person who sent the BNF leaflet to the detachment could have warned Bogdanovich also about the threat of impending arrest for his pre-induction crime.

But here is something which is quite beyond argument: those who invited these two "rights defenders" to Minsk—if not immediately then after the arrival in Belorussia of the detachment commander, as well as the unit political officer Captain A. Artamonov, and Sr. Lt. D. Ulitov, and Sr. Warrant Officers M. Oros, V. Rudnitskiy, and V. Utkin—had a very good idea of whom they were turning into all but "national heroes. So is it possible that the detachment command was not right in drawing its own conclusion: other officials of the BNF, unable to find persons for their anti-army propaganda who were truly suffering from disorganization and disorder in the army ranks, would clutch at anyone, not shrinking even from such as Bogdanovich and Slepennkov.

And indeed, ultimately the BNF gave up the services of Bogdanovich and Slepennkov. Allegedly after they beat up Dvorniyakov. But perhaps again the detachment commander was right in assuming that they gave them up only after these two had "exhausted their usefulness" and become expendable, when they were unable to provoke a mass flight of Belorussians from the unit? And the statement that Bogdanovich and Slepennkov had been promised they would "serve only in Belorussia"—this was simply deception. The BNF has no legal basis nor authorization for this. They were only hoodwinking others.

I want to talk of something else, the current status of officers and warrant officers, including those of this military construction detachment. You see, they are sparing no efforts to ensure that their subordinates are healthy and suffer no inconvenience in service and work. In a conversation with the procurator of the garrison, Col. of Justice V. Mayborodoy, I learned that while two years ago there really was "hazing" in the detachment, now the incident with that same I. Pastelyak was really a one-time occurrence. If drug addiction is penetrating the barracks, it only arrives with the regular conscription.

But that is not the only thing that comes from the "civilian world." Before induction every seventh young military construction worker had undergone criminal prosecution. But if some continue to "go their own way" in the process of service, these are isolated instances, while others, thanks to the close collective of officers and warrant officers, have come to their senses, so to speak, and are discharged to the reserve as truly reliable people.

But how much the negative tendencies occurring in our society influence the life of the detachment! I am not even mentioning the fact that stories like the above damage the honor and dignity of commanders and chiefs—after all, undeserved accusations that "hazing,"

interethnic hostility, violation of legal rights of subordinates, and inattention to their needs are flourishing in the detachment are simply insulting. Very well, if two years ago there were non-regulation relations here, one can accept the present criticism as a retribution for past sins. One can even understand it thus: it is good that criticism for deficiencies has touched the army first of all, and that it has been the first to start putting itself in order. And if order exists at present, it is simpler to respond to tardy criticism by saying, why bother heaping abuse on us, it is better to come to the detachment and see how things really are!

But it is much more difficult to react when they do not come, but go their own way, and not simply that, but try to shake those foundations which the army long ago laid down and has recently strengthened.

Certain BNF officials are trying this, as we see. As are politicians from other regions of the country, the Baltics, Transcaucasus, and Moldova.

Recently the head of Russia, B. Yeltsin, all but called for disobedience of service members conscripted from Russia. A certain portion of the mass media rushed to "support" this campaign, including once again by means of various kinds of conjectures and fabrications.

...Only the weak in spirit, or those who have acquired some experience in shady dealing before induction, leave their units. Is there damage to combat readiness? Of course. And one must also consider that even a trip by one platoon commander in search of a fugitive forces the other officers and warrant officers to do their duties and his as well. Again there are traveling expenses...

And what's the point of the platoon commander, if the chief of staff of the detachment Major V. Novchenkov is forced to act in the role of the senior vehicle officer in order to bring the deserting solder to the unit when it is more than two hundred kilometers away. Go by train? Captain A. Artamonov tried that, and two ran off. The same Bogdanovich and Slepakov—old hands! Bring them back in handcuffs? By what right? And as for legality and observance of the rights of subordinates, these are now sacred to the officer and warrant officer.

But if this is so, then why can legal demands not be imposed on those who introduce dissension in the army, who do not shrink even at outright lies and deliberate provocation for that purpose? Why are our moral losses, and financial ones too, not compensated?

Why not file suit, for instance? Why not obtain compensation at least for the travel expenses of unit officers and warrant officers for their numerous trips to Minsk and Vitebsk, out of the pocket of that same BNF? After all, if this front was prepared to pay up uncontrollably for everyone who is ready to bring false charges against the army (and incidentally, where does such easy money come from, anyway?), there must be very precise financial documents...

Perhaps this will sober up, at least to some degree, the reckless heads of those who are fond of impugning the prestige of the army.

Lithuanian WGF Parents Visit Sons' Units

91UM0307B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Major S. Popov: "Parental Instruction"]

[Text] A delegation of parents of soldiers conscripted from Lithuania visited the Western Group of Forces. For a week, divided into several groups, the fathers and mothers visited the garrisons where their sons were serving and became acquainted with the living and working conditions of their children. The delegation, which was headed by the first secretary of the Kupiskis Rayon of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) A. Petronis, was received by a member of the military council, the chief of the political directorate of the Western Group of Forces, Lieutenant General V. Grebenyuk.

On the last day of their stay in Germany, the parents adopted an appeal to all soldiers of the group. Its main thrust was that the soldiers, whatever their nationality, should let nothing divide them, that their duty was to honorably serve the Fatherland. The parental instruction was published in the group newspaper, SOVETSKAYA ARMIYA. Incidentally, this was not the first visit of delegations from the Baltics to the WGF. The first time such a group visited here was in the middle of last year. Judging from the responses of the fathers and mothers, impressions from the trip were basically positive. In any case, after examining the lives of their sons with their own eyes, they were convinced that many rumors about the "oppression" of soldiers from the Baltics which are being spread in some areas do not correspond to the truth.

Naturally, the reader will say, it is better to see once than to hear a hundred times. Although it is not so easy to arrange such a trip, especially abroad. But as we see, it was worth it, for one such "parental mission" counts more than ten articles distorting the reality of Army life.

Tajiks Verify Kievan MD Treatment of Draftees

91UM0449A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Mar 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by TASS correspondent S. Ergashev: "They Serve and Get Along Well"]

[Text] A public delegation from Tajikistan returned home satisfied with its visits to the units of the Kiev Military District. The delegation was led by Tajik SSR People's Deputy Colonel M. Mamadzhanov, military commissar of the republic.

Colonel Mamadzhanov said in an interview to a TASS correspondent: "Our delegation spent one week familiarizing itself with the service and living conditions of our young fellow countrymen in ethnically diverse army collectives. There is a reason why we selected the Kiev District: Thousands of draftees from Tajikistan serve there."

Veterans Back Referendum On Preservation Of USSR

*91UM0328B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 29 Jan 91 First Edition p 2*

[Appeal From the All-Union Council of War, Labor, and USSR Armed Forces Veterans: "Veterans' Appeal"]

[Text] A plenum of the All-Union Council of War, Labor, and USSR Armed Forces Veterans has adopted an appeal in connection with the upcoming referendum on the question of preserving the USSR, slated for March 17, 1991. Among other things, the resolution says that the Soviet Union's citizens will have to answer the question as to whether they consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal union republics in which the rights and freedoms of people of any and all nationalities will be fully guaranteed.

The plenum of the All-Union Council of Veterans supports this decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet as an essential and urgent step on the path of extricating the country from its crisis and of saving our dear fatherland from the shame of disintegration and destruction of the centuries-old ties among the peoples inhabiting it.

It is the patriotic duty of each of us to take part in the referendum and to vote in favor of the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The All-Union Council of War, Labor, and USSR Armed Forces Veterans

New Military Supreme Soviet Deputies Profiled

*91UM0328C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Jan 91 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Supreme Soviet Deputies Captain Sergey Vyacheslavovich Yastrebtsov and Lieutenant Colonel Vadim Nikolayevich Urvant: "New Names In The USSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] The fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies underwent a parliamentary rotation. Those elected to it included servicemen.

What are their views on the most pressing questions of their work as Deputies? We think that this is not without interest to our readers. Therefore the editors asked the new Supreme Soviet members to answer three questions:

1. How do you assess the performance of the previous parliament? What didn't you like?

2. What kind of military reform concept do we need, in your opinion?

3. What should the parliament do this year?

Today we publish the answers of the first two Deputies.

On Paper and in Real Life.

Captain Sergey Vyacheslavovich Yastrebtsov was born in 1960. He is a Russian. He did his compulsory service in the Airborne Forces. As a soldier he enrolled in the Ryazan Higher Airborne Forces Command School. He served in Afghanistan and was awarded two combat decorations. He is deputy commander of a battalion and is taking correspondence courses from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy.

On the eve of the fourth congress, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article he wrote entitled "My Hopes and Concerns." He is a Deputy from the Izmail Territorial Election District No. 501 in Odessa Province. He hasn't decided yet whether to work in the Supreme Soviet full-time or not. He is not inclined toward the first option.

1. As for the work of the Supreme Soviet, I am mostly concerned by its inefficiency. Furthermore, Deputies have paid more attention to concepts at the expense of practical steps. Nor have they always taken into account the rapidly changing situation within the country.

2. Quite a few draft concepts of military reform have now appeared. Among the authors and most active discussion participants are military Deputies. This is to be expected. It is also to be expected that the drafts and proposals vary. I think all this is happening because military Deputies often make use of their own experience—the conditions in which an officer has served or is serving, his specialty. This leaves a certain imprint on a person's views.

I personally have served in the Airborne Forces since the time I was a soldier. Throughout this time, my work has involved people and their fates. This allows me to look at the impending reform from the standpoint of actual life. One cannot be divorced from reality, and hence one cannot be divorced from the army's top-priority problems, although this is to be observed in certain drafts. All the programs require money and material resources. But the country is lacking a lot of things today. This is obvious!

But the initial steps should be taken despite all this. I have in mind the more pressing problems: the lack of housing, social disorder... This also applies to the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe.

I think we need to talk about professionalizing the army. I am not against a professional army—on the contrary, I am in favor of increasing the number of professionals in the line units. But I am convinced that we can do this only gradually, with due regard for the special features of the Armed Forces branches and combat arms. It will take

time. Suppose the Supreme Soviet decided today to switch to an army manned only with professionals. We wouldn't be able to do anything to implement such a decision.

For example, how should enlisted men be quartered? Some soldiers will have families. We are obliged to provide them with housing. That's just one example. And there are so many more.

3. I am concerned by the lack of a legislative package on the Armed Forces. I am referring above all to laws on defense, the status of servicemen, and so forth. There are many reasons why such draft laws are not under consideration at present. But the main one is the lack of a Union Treaty. This is going to impede the Supreme Soviet's normal functioning.

This year the parliament should do everything in its power to stabilize the situation in the country. There is a lot of talk about order and the need for it today. I personally do not have in mind Stalinist order, which fettered initiative and even people's freedom. But it is essential to create a certain legal foundation and to strengthen guarantees of personal safety and of the safety of society as a whole.

Military Reform Is Overdue.

Lieutenant Colonel Vadim Nikolayevich Urvant is a Deputy from Sheptovskiy Territorial Election District No. 534, Khmelnitskiy Oblast.

He was born in 1951 and is a Ukrainian. He is a graduate of the Kamenets-Podolsk Higher Military Engineer Command School. He belongs to the category of officers who shouldered the main burdens of service in the 1980s. He fulfilled his internationalist duty in Afghanistan, was a battalion party organizer, and was gravely wounded. He helped relieve the effects of the disaster at the Chernobyl atomic power station.

At present he is a political department senior instructor. He intends to work in the Supreme Soviet full-time.

1. What didn't I like about the old Supreme Soviet? Probably the Deputies' inconsistency in their work on laws. I therefore believe that we need to show more consistency in two areas. First, in the adoption of laws that determine economic development and promote stabilization in the country. After all, we're going through an extremely difficult period. Second, the members of the Supreme Soviet were completely dependent on the presidium, particularly when it came to drawing up the agenda. We need to avoid this. A policy of appeasement by the Deputies has a negative effect on the parliament's authority. Things haven't changed: The Supreme Soviet considers one set of issues, while life poses completely different ones. And the Presidium should have more collegiality—and not pressure—with respect to the other Deputies.

2. We are overdue with military reform, very much overdue. Military reform entails practical steps to implement our defense doctrine. And that doctrine, as we know, was adopted almost four years ago.

And what kind of military reform concept do we need? I don't think we should have the one proposed by Deputy V. Lopatin and his group. Nor do I agree with many provisions of the Defense Ministry's draft. The fact is that it deals primarily with issues linked with army reform. And that's not enough. Military reform encompasses political, economic, and military steps to improve our defense amid the new conditions.

3. We must consider a military reform concept without fail. We can't put it off any longer. But the Supreme Soviet's primary efforts must be aimed at stabilizing the economy. Without stabilization, there will be no movement forward—and this applies to military development. It's time that everyone understood this. In the meantime we must at least take a stand somewhere and stop the country from sliding into an economic abyss, which is where we are headed now.

What should be done this year before all else? Our task is to adopt sensible laws. I repeat: sensible. For example, take the law on the enterprise. The current law is riddled with shortcomings. Even our finance policy adopted for 1991 only shows these shortcomings; it hardly does anything to help rectify them. Enterprises are deprived of the ability to build new facilities and to expand their production space. This means that we ourselves are obstructing their development and failing to give them autonomy. I think that our job is to create a sensible taxation policy that will provide incentives for producers, not stifle them.

I want to cite a small example. The Zaporozhye Automotive Plant had a new model car 10 years ago. The new car never made it to the assembly line because the production space was insufficient to allow the installation of new equipment. The model has "survived" both stagnation and five years of perestroika.

True, it is said that the harsh measures now being taken with respect to enterprises are one-time measures, for a one-year period. But "missing" one year in technological development can set us back for a long time.

Commission Seeks End to Nagorno-Karabakh Draft-Dodging

*LD0503155991 Moscow TASS in English
1522 GMT 5 Mar 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Stepanakert March 5 TASS—Work with draftees has been adversely affected by events of recent years in Nagorno-Karabakh. Few young men manifest the wish to fulfill their duty under the constitution, Lieutenant-Colonel S. Gunko, military commissar for the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region told TASS.

The commissar said that there were 96 deserters from the Soviet army in the autonomous region at present. Neither the interior agencies nor the command of units take measures against them. Meanwhile, the military commissariat has limited means.

The commissar said that his subordinates and himself come up against various problems, ranging from fuel shortages to provocations and armed raids. A helicopter with 23 draftees came under fire in December. Luckily, nobody was hurt.

The commissar expressed hope that a political solution to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh will be found and Azerbaijani and Armenian youths will be able to do their military service.

Social Psychologists in Place of Political Officers

91UM0475A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 10,
4 Mar 91 p 8

[Interview with Rear Admiral Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Korovin conducted by Aleksandr Glagolev; place and date not given: "New Specialty in the Navy: Social Psychologist"]

[Text] The Kiev Higher Navy Political School will for the first time this year graduate social psychologists instead of political officers. This is described by Rear Admiral Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Korovin, head of the school:

[Korovin] Previously we graduated political officers with the "teacher in history and social science" qualification, which it was difficult to make a part of their daily practice. Now they will be officers with higher education and the "social psychologist and teacher" qualification. Our school is the first among similar military schools of the country to take such a step. Our reprofiling program has been approved by the USSR State Committee for Public Education.

[Glagolev] Does this mean a departure from the customary standards of political study and Marxist-Leninist training?

[Korovin] From the viewpoint of the forms and methods of work, yes. We are having to renounce what is outdated and what is manifestly failing to produce the desired results and to take account of the pluralism of opinions, the tumultuous changes in the nature of society, and multiparty conditions. But in implementing the reform

we are adhering to the socialist choice and the international nature of the formation of the Armed Forces and the defense of the country.

We need to work not with postulates and dogmatic tenets but with live inquiring people, seek and reveal the truth from scratch, as it were, and formulate and adjust criteria. I believe that this renewal is a good democratic characteristic and the path of genuine, not formal, reform in the Army and Navy.

[Glagolev] What are the innovations in the training system?

[Korovin] There has been an increase in the amount of time spent on the teaching of the social sciences and such new disciplines for such a higher educational institution as social psychology, the physiology of higher nervous activity, political science and others. Some departments have been reformed; the History of the CPSU Department, for example, has been converted into the Political History Department, and the Scientific Communism Department into the Scientific Socialism and Political Science Department, and the formerly leading Party-Political Work Department has become the Military-Political Work Department. A Culture and Art Department has been created from in-house reserves, without a staff increase (other military-political schools do not have such as yet).

As a result of the military reform the political authorities will be called military-political authorities, and their chief task will be to carry out official policy in the defense sphere and the education and social protection of the servicemen. And, for example, the priority functions of political, military, moral, and legal training and responsibility for the state of discipline.

To judge by everything, the influx of those wishing to enroll in our school will increase. The new specialty could find an application in science and production also—in various fields.

New Weekly To Focus on Deaths, Injuries Among Servicemen

PM2203132191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 91 p 1

[“Own Information” report under the general heading: “Have You Heard? Have You Read?”]

[Text] The first edition of the independent weekly PLACH YAROSLAVNY [Yaroslav's Lament] has been published in Moscow. The new publication intends to be the mouthpiece of relatives of servicemen who have died or sustained injury in peacetime. The initial print run is 9,000.

Pervyshin Offers Open Source Comparative Evaluation of Defense Sector

91UM0324A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 19 Jan 91 p 2

[Article by V. Pervyshin: "The Military-Industrial Complex of the USSR: Yes, I am Strong; why Hide It...". From the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA dossier.]

[Text] *This is not a secret report of the CIA: All data were collected by the author from open sources.*

When cannons speak—they kill; when they are silent—they bankrupt their creators.

From an economic point of view, weapons are never inactive, even in peacetime. Created for destruction, they already destroy simply because they come into existence. They destroy the economy and hope for a rich and successful life. Yes, for the time being weapons are necessary for us, but at what great cost!

The Stockpile Way

The total number of men in the Armed Forces of the USSR at the end of 1989 was 4.5 million. Even the Chinese have fewer people in their army—only 4.1 million men, but we should not forget that China's population is nearly four times as large as the population of the USSR. Thus the number of servicemen per 1,000 Chinese is only 3.8; but in the USSR, it is 15.6 servicemen per 1,000 population. In the USA it is 8.9; in the FRG—8.3; in Great Britain—5.5; in Canada—3.0; and in Japan—2.0.

Huge armies, by number of men, exist in India—1.5 million; Iraq—1.0 million; Vietnam—1.0 million; and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (KNDR)—800,000 men. However, from the point of view of proportional indices for the number of military men per 1,000 population, the most "military" and militarized countries are Iraq—57.5; Afghanistan—50.0; Israel—47.8; Syria—38.8; KNDR—38.5; Cuba—33.3; Nicaragua—23.5; Albania—20.6; Greece—19; and the USSR—15.6.

Let us remember that at the point of greatest danger for our country, in June 1941, the Red Army had only 5.3 million men.

One can ask, then, why do we need to keep such a large number of healthy, strong men under arms in peacetime?

Who is it who can explain the exact meaning of the term, "defensive capability at a level of reasonable sufficiency"?

According to the Ministry of Defense, on January 1, 1990 the Soviet Union had:

1,398 ICBM launchers, 924 SLBM launchers, and 162 heavy bombers. Altogether, the number of nuclear warheads on strategic delivery systems is 10,000.

In addition to these frightening systems of destruction capable of killing every living thing on earth ten times over, we also have the following basic types of ordinary weaponry:

Combat aircraft of the Frontal Aviation of the VVS, and the air arms of the PVO and the Navy—8,207; combat helicopters, including navy—4,014; tactical rocket launchers—1,723; tanks, including amphibious (PT-76)—63,900; armored personnel carriers—76,520; rocket systems for salvo fire, guns, and mortars (100mm and higher in caliber)—66,880; submarines (except those with strategic ballistic missiles)—260, including nuclear submarines—113; large surface ships (aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, large ASW ships, and landing ships with a displacement of 1,200 T and larger)—157, including aircraft carriers—4 and landing ships—41. On the 22nd of June 1941, the German army with 4,300 tanks posed a great danger for even such a huge country as the USSR and wreaked havoc in all of Europe.

On January 1st of this year, 63,900 tanks protected our peaceful lives. And why do we need 76,520 armored personnel carriers? Perhaps we want to put the entire adult population of the country into them? How many millions of tons of diesel fuel are needed annually just to move this armada 100 km or so? Now we understand why hundreds of thousands of agricultural tractors and combines are just standing in the fields and not working. We understand why we purchase wheat abroad—from the USA, Canada, and Australia. Simply put, they have neither such a large quantity of tanks nor those unproductive expenditures that no one wants for the manufacture and proper maintenance of combat equipment.

It could be argued that the pauper-like existence of millions of Soviet citizens shows that our government cannot afford such colossal military expenditures. They have completely bankrupted us and are still bankrupting us. This unrestrained race to increase nuclear and conventional weapons began immediately after the Khrushchev thaw, during the famous stagnation period. Beginning in 1965, the enterprises of the military-industrial complex of the USSR began increasing their production. It has just become known that enterprises of the chemical industry produced 50,000 tons of poisonous substances by the beginning of 1990. But in order to poison the population of the entire earth, all that is needed is 100 tons of mustard gas (yperite) or Lewisite. Now, in order for the Soviet Union to destroy these gigantic supplies of chemical weapons, according to military chemical specialists, at least ten years will be needed and tens of billions of rubles.

Comparing the production of basic types of military equipment, armament, and ammunition in the USSR and USA for 1988, according to data given in the American book, *Soviet Military Power*, which in 1990 was in its fifth edition, Americans cannot be compared to us at all with their military-industrial potential and production of combat equipment:

Tanks (USSR/USA)—3,500/775; armored personnel carriers—5,250/1,000. Field artillery—2,000/225. Salvo firing systems—500/48. Air defense artillery—100/0. Bombers—45/22. Fighter aircraft (attack aircraft)—700/550. Helicopters—400/375. Large surface ships—9/5. Submarines—9/3. Intercontinental ballistic missiles—150/19. Ballistic missiles on submarines—100/0. Intermediate range missiles—50/0. Short range missiles—450/0. Sea-launched, long-range cruise missiles—200/280 and short-range—900/400.

And so during peacetime we are producing annually 3,500 tanks, 4.5 times more than the US. We produce 5 times more armored personnel carriers, 9 times more artillery weapons, and 3 times more submarines..

Our Mark

Beyond the borders of the Soviet Union alone, at military bases in Mongolia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Germany were 672,000 Soviet enlisted men and officers (status as of April 16, 1989). Let us note that during this same period there were 305,000 American servicemen stationed at numerous US military bases overseas.

Fifty thousand Soviet servicemen are stationed in Hungary. They have 860 tanks, 600 self-propelled guns, 1,500 armored personnel carriers, and 560,000 tons of ammunition. This entire arsenal, by demand of the new government of Hungary, has to be transported back to the USSR prior to June 30, 1991. They will need 950 freight trains, 30 trains with containers, and 100 passenger trains!

And what kind of expenses are we looking at in order to transport our troops from Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia? How much of our "good stuff" will remain behind?

The cost-price of just our garrison housing, built for our forces in the Warsaw Pact countries, comes to 4.0 billion rubles. This includes the Western Group of Forces (GDR)—2.3 billion rubles; Northern Group of Forces (Poland)—0.6 billion rubles; Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia)—0.3 billion rubles; and Southern Group of Forces (Hungary)—0.8 billion rubles. And what is the cost of airfields, service buildings and housing, defense equipment, shelters, warehouses, garages, fences, towers, communication cables, signaling apparatus, etc.?

Annual Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and Vietnam to support the existing regimes, according to CIA data, amounts to over 15 billion rubles. These are our direct losses, because this military assistance is provided gratis. A. Shevardnadze, in his report to the 28th Congress of the CPSU said that our "IDEOLOGICAL LOSSES" OVER A TWENTY-YEAR PERIOD AMOUNTED TO

700 BILLION RUBLES. Let us note that these free military supplies did not turn out to be very effective in our foreign policy.

Egypt, Somalia, and Ghana, having gone a little way "along the path of socialist orientation," returned once and for all to the path of capitalist development. In February 1990, as a result of general free elections and the defeat of the Sandinistas, Nicaragua left "our" path. Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Kampuchea are on the verge of leaving the "right" path, and ... goodbye to our money.

However, in addition to free military aid, there is also the sale of arms, where the Soviet Union has been firmly holding on to first place in the world for the last thirty years, beating out France, China, and the USA—the acknowledged arms dealers. Annual deliveries from the USSR comprise at least 12 billion dollars.

Soviet export of arms, according to Western sources, varies from one-third to one-half of the world total, and includes various combat equipment and armament. At the beginning of the 1980's, 25% of all armament and combat equipment produced in the USSR was exported. In addition to the famous Kalashnikov submachine guns, which are in "great demand and are loved" by insurgents in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in the 1980's, according to American data, the USSR delivered to "third world" countries 7,925 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces, 20,470 artillery weapons, 17 submarines, 2,620 aircraft, 1,705 helicopters, and 32,210 "ground-to-air" missiles.

An overwhelming majority of countries that received weapons (Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua, and South Yemen) took them on credit, and these debts total billions of dollars!

The expense part of the budget of the USSR for 1990 provides for paying out "26.4 billion rubles to finance foreign trade, expenses for government, bank, commercial operations, free assistance to foreign countries, and other expenses for international relations."

According to this very same item of expenses, citing Ministry of Foreign Affairs data, military assistance to foreign countries was over 12 billion rubles in 1989! And this comes at a time when we ourselves have nothing to eat!

In addition to selling arms to "third world" countries, The Soviet Union is also constructing grandiose military installations and structures. For example, naval bases in Somalia, gigantic airfields in Grenada, and centers for nuclear research in Iraq(?!). The senselessness of these ventures is becoming evident, first, because we know "how long it takes us to build," and second, because we know about the instability of local governments. For example, in both Somalia and Grenada foundations were poured while one government was in power, and in the middle of construction, when a new government came into power, it turned out that these "buildings and builders" were not needed.

The Budget

For decades the Soviet people were told that annual expenses for defense were "exactly" 20.2 billion rubles. Now it has been announced that military expenditures for 1989 were 77.3 billion rubles. The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London gives another figure—200-220 billion rubles, that is, at least 43-48 percent of total expenditures (459 billion rubles) of the state budget for 1989. So, how much is it really? According to, let us say, the most conservative figures, it turns out that for the last twenty-five years one and a half trillion rubles were hidden from the Soviet people. And with that, these were only direct military costs: maintaining army and navy personnel, utilization of military equipment, purchases of arms and combat equipment, construction of air force and naval bases, scientific research and experimental design work of a military nature, etc. In addition, there were indirect military expenditures by different ministries and departments which financed military production in civilian factories, built roads and communication lines for military needs, built storage areas to keep strategic reserves of materials and energy resources, etc. We did not simply live under conditions of a military economy, but under conditions of a wartime economy. In 1943 the share for military expenditures in the state budget of the USSR was 52%.

For a person's normal life in comfortable surroundings, at least 20 square meters of living space is needed. The cost-price of building one square meter of such housing reached 200 rubles in 1990. Consequently, 4,000 rubles are needed to house one person, and for 100 million people—400 billion. Thus, for 800 billion rubles it would be possible to guarantee superb housing for 200 million Soviet people, and the rest of the 700 billion rubles could be directed to agriculture and industry, so that all people would be fed, clothed, and provided with shoes. This is arguable, but...

It is no secret to anyone that in 1989, military aviation alone, supplied by the USSR Gosnab, burned three times more fuel during its training flights than all Aeroflot aircraft. And during 1989 Aeroflot could not fly 20 million passengers due to lack of fuel.

And how much fuel does the Navy require...

Conversion

The colossal amount of arms and combat equipment manufactured yearly in the USSR requires huge labor, material, and financial expenses that we, in our poverty, can no longer afford. But can we afford disarmament?

One version of conversion, proposed by the USSR Gosplan for 1989, plans for increasing the production of consumer goods in 1995 to a total of 71 billion rubles. But in order to do this, defense industrial enterprises are asking that no more and no less than 74 billion rubles be directed to defense. Of this amount, 37 billion rubles are for capital investment, 35 billion for scientific research work, and 2 billion rubles for purchasing equipment. If

"conversion" requires much massive investment with such a small return, is it worth it? For one ruble spent, the amount of goods produced will be worth less than one ruble. Again, this is extensive and ineffective development of production by a "leading" military-industrial complex, no less, where no one ever counted money.

The share of consumer goods in the total volume of production of the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) will grow from 40% in 1989 to 60% in 1995. In 1990, enterprises of defense branches will produce a total of 39 billion rubles of consumer goods. The increase due to conversion will be around 2.5 billion rubles. For a period of seven years, from the pre-conversion year of 1988 to 1995, total civilian production will increase and will reach 110 billion rubles. In front of us is that very same open source version of the Gosplan plan for conversion which requires "pouring into" defense industries 74 billion rubles for capital investment!

The habit of controlling billions is a corrupting one. Here is a telegram sent to Tynda (capital of the Baykal-Amur Main Railroad Line [BAM]) from the administration of the railway troops, signed by Colonel-General Makartsev: "Legitimate complaints from the people are continually received, regarding the barbaric attitudes of our units during the process of transferring and destroying small towns occupied by us in Berkhnezaysk..."

It turns out that after the completion of the glorious "construction of the century," many military construction subunits began to be transferred out of the places they had occupied for a long time. Leaving, they burn road bridges, abandon and bury hundreds of road construction machines, and even burn stores of foodstuffs that have become a burden to them. They destroy dining halls, steam baths, and buildings. After departing, these Sons of the Fatherland left only a banner on the burned out site: "Soldier! Safeguard the people's money!"

If the USSR has more tanks than all the rest of the countries of the world put together, if it has more armored personnel carriers..., if it has more nuclear submarines..., if it has more intercontinental ballistic missiles..., if it has more generals..., then we can ask how we can live well if we go ahead and burn half of our wealth and throw it into the bottomless black pit of armament.

Yes, we love our army. Yes, we are proud of it. But if things go the way they are now, shall we have other reasons to be proud?

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FROM THE EDITOR: Many countries spend significant sums for arms. Many countries, including the USA, deal in arms.

Yes, the USSR is forced to spend and will spend a great deal of money for defense and will deal in arms. But let us remove the veil of excessive "secrecy" from this subject, and let us discuss and debate it. Can we agree with everything that today's author has written about? Are all his sources always accurate? We hope that this discussion will continue in the language of numbers, facts, and arguments. It is important for us that no one remain neutral about the problems that were raised and that we all strive to figure out and understand how our military-industrial complex should evolve. This military-industrial complex belongs to us and to you!

Lt Gen N.I. Zvinchukov New Transcaucasus Chief of Staff

91UM0456A Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 90 p 56

[Unattributed biographical sketch on the appointment of Lt Gen Nikolay Ivanovich Zvinchukov to the post of chief of staff of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District]

[Text] Lt Gen Zvinchukov was born on 12 August 1945 in the village of Novo-Pavlovka in Sokulukskiy Rayon of the Kirghiz SSSR in a peasant family. He worked at the Agricultural Machine Building Plant imeni M.V. Frunze in the city of Frunze and simultaneously studied in the evening worker youth school.

After completing the Tashkent Tank School imeni MSU P.S. Rybalko (1965) he served in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (the Western Group of Forces) and was in command of a tank platoon and company. In the Leningrad Military District, he commanded a tank company and battalion. In the Moscow Military District, upon completing the Military Academy of the Armored Forces imeni MSU R.Ya. Malinovskiy, he commanded a regiment. Later he was the chief of staff of a division. For three years in the Southern Group of Forces, he commanded a division.

In 1987, he completed the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and was appointed the first deputy army commander and 18 months later became the army commander.

He is a Russian. He has been a member of the CPSU since 1967.

He has been decorated with many medals.

The ranks of captain (1971), major (1974), lieutenant colonel (1978) and colonel (1982) were awarded ahead of time. He received the rank of general at the age of 39 and five years later became a lieutenant general.

He married in 1966. His wife, Valentina Ivanovna, was born in 1945, she is Ukrainian and comes from the village of Timki in Orzhitskiy Rayon of Poltava Oblast. She is a medical worker. The elder daughter is a student on the biological faculty of Gorkiy State University and the younger is studying in secondary school.

From Answers to Questions Asked by KVS [KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL]

[KVS] What qualities do you particularly value in a military man?

[Zvinchukov] Professionalism.

[KVS] What is the chief task you set for yourself in assuming the new post?

[Zvinchukov] First of all, to carefully analyze the situation as it is very complex here and influence it in a balanced manner. At present, this is far from easy.

[KVS] What in your opinion produces a greater effect in educational work: punishment or commendation of subordinates?

[Zvinchukov] Commendation. But reprimands...I prefer to convince others, as they say, down to the last. Even when in the heat of things it seems that it is useless to convince a person and it would be better to apply a penalty to him. From my own experience I know that if it is possible to persuade a person or to change his mind and he has understood this, there is no need to resort to punishments.

[KVS] What spoils your mood?

[Zvinchukov] The unreliability and inefficiency of certain officials and there as yet are still many of them. But something well done, the realization that you are understood improves your mood.

[KVS] And if you were to have a motto?

[Zvinchukov] In order to set to work you must study the question well!

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Lt Gen Yu.K. Kuznetsov New Deputy Commander, Odessa MD

91UM0456B Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 90 p 57

[Unattributed biographical information on Lt Gen Yuriy Kirillovich Kuznetsov, appointed first deputy commander of the Red Banner Odessa Military District]

[Text] Lt Gen Kuznetsov was born on 26 February 1942 in the town of Leninakan in Armenia in a military family. He began work at the age of 17 in the garage of the Sovkhoz 40 Let Oktyabrya. In 1965, he completed

the Odessa Higher Combined-Arms Command School with a gold medal and was appointed to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (the Western Group of Forces). He commanded a platoon and a company and was admitted to the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze. After completing it he served in the Transcaucasus Military District as the chief of staff, he was the commander of a motorized rifle regiment and later the chief of staff and commander of a division. Then in other districts he was in command of an army corps and a combined-arms army. He was the first deputy commander of the Transcaucasus Military District. As an external student, he completed the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1985).

He is a Russian. He became a member of the CPSU in April 1964. He has been elected a deputy of the city soviets.

He has received the Orders of the Labor Red Banner (1989), Red Star (1990), for Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces 2d Degree (1989) and 3d Degree (1982) as well as numerous medals.

He received the ranks of lieutenant colonel (1978) and colonel (1981) ahead of time.

He was awarded the rank of major general in April 1984 and became a lieutenant general in April 1988.

He married at the age of 24. His wife, Nadezhda Ivanovna, was born in 1946, she is a Russian and is a native of Odessa.

From Answers to Questions of KVS [KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL]

[KVS] Who, in your opinion, is to blame for the reduced prestige of army service?

[Kuznetsov] I am of the opinion that the roots to this negative phenomenon go back to the first reduction in the Armed Forces. At that time, at the beginning of the 1960s, many officers were discharged without any pensions, as they say, without house or home. They had to begin their lives all over again, under the hardest conditions. And so now, when the situation of the simple people has deteriorated and some of the mass information media have wrongly let it be known that the army is to blame for all of this as it is supposedly consuming everything, the dissatisfied have been taken in by this provocation and have become the instigators of

antiarmy moods. I have been repeatedly convinced of this at meetings in the labor collectives.

[KVS] For whom, in your view, is it harder to serve: for the general or for the lieutenant?

[Kuznetsov] In terms of service I would not make such a distinction as each is responsible for a range of tasks defined by the position. But all the same, there is a difference. From the viewpoint of material conditions, available facilities and the physical stress it is harder for the lieutenant. As for the moral stress and responsibility for the decision taken, of course, it is harder for the general.

[KVS] What printed organs do you prefer?

[Kuznetsov] The newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA as the newspaper which most correctly reflects the processes in the army and society and boldly defends the interests and authority of the officer personnel. I am also fond of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

[KVS] How do you organize your workday?

[Kuznetsov] Since the time I was a lieutenant, I have not been able to regulate it. I may be at work 12, 18 or even 20 hours, depending on the amount I have to do. A lot of time is taken up by the shortage of personnel as it is difficult to organize the carrying out of tasks with the forces available to us.

[KVS] What is your favorite pastime?

[Kuznetsov] Books. I love Kuprin and Pikul. I also am fond of volleyball and this is a school involvement in sports and I still have it.

[KVS] Do you have any childhood friends?

[Kuznetsov] I do. As well as school friends. I keep up contact with them, we correspond and occasionally meet.

[KVS] Are you happy?

[Kuznetsov] Undoubtedly. I feel that I have not erred in my choice of profession. I am very fond of service and at times I give myself completely to it, even to the detriment of my family.

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PVO Response to KAL-007, Rust defended

91UM0463A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13, 14, 15, 20 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Serialized article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev: "On Boeings, Cessna, and Others: Military Professionalism—Researching the Problem."]

[13 Mar 91, p 2]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Belyayev's voice trembled and vibrated:

"How can one live with this? People still point fingers at us—here are the guys who landed Rust on Red Square. We did not land him there, but the "play-it-safes" among our high brass did. IZVESTIYA, for instance, recently started an attack from the flight route of the Boeing—look at these bloodthirsty people: They destroyed a plane carrying people seven years ago. Again, we are the ones taking the beating. Why do you not look at what kind of time it was and the situation that existed then. Even now there is no insurance from a major mishap and an international scandal..."

I was working at the command post of this border-zone formation, and I could not put the officer's words out of my mind. The thoughts about the renewed frontal assault on the PVO [Air Defense Forces] and the Armed Forces had led me into researching the process of deciding to intercept the flight of aircraft that violate Soviet state borders.

I.

Yes, Lieutenant Colonel Belyayev—deputy chief of the formation's command post—was right, a thousand times so. The routes followed by transgressor airplanes have served for a decade as starting points for the "attacks" on our warriors guarding the state borders. The reviewing angle is chosen depending on His Highness the Time. First the events were evaluated this way; then, apparently, our eyes were opened. Then it starts to appear that in almost all such cases the specialists on the PVO command posts were making wrong decisions. Is that the case?

Let us look at the concrete facts, the situations where aircraft flights have been terminated—or could have been terminated—during the last two decades, and let us look at the different aspects of these tragic stories. Let us take the cases of the Boeing-707 on 20 April 1978, the Boeing-747 on 1 September 1983, M. Rust's flight on 28 May 1987, and the tragedy of the A-300 airliner that was destroyed by the Americans on 3 July 1988.

It seems to be appropriate to start with the events that took place over Sakhalin on the night of 31 August to 1 September 1983, because now they are again at the center of mass media attention. The command post alert duty team sees an unidentified plane that does not respond to a fighters' signal and is flying in the air space over Kamchatka where the most important base of the

USSR strategic nuclear forces is located. Plus, at the same time—as the American side later admitted—an U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane RS-135 was in the same region. As it approaches Sakhalin, the transgressor plane is again intercepted by a fighter but does not respond either to its signals, its actions, or the warning shots, and continues its flight.

What should the command post specialists do under such circumstances? Especially if we take into account that the potential enemy (I do not put this word in quotes because at that moment it corresponded to the circumstances) had been daily engaged in frenzied activities near our borders and many times violated the borders of Soviet territory.

Not too many people now want to take the trouble to analyze the situation that existed then in the Far Eastern region, and this also goes for IZVESTIYA which has undertaken the investigation of the Boeing-747 demise. The focus of attention is on the dynamics of the alert duty team's actions. But to study any events out of the context of specific conditions is the same as, let us say, making conclusions on the way a fish behaves in the ocean by observing it in an aquarium. During 1982-1983, reconnaissance and combat planes from U.S. carrier groups had been terrorizing our antiaircraft defenses in the East, repeatedly approaching the USSR borders in combat formations typical of war conditions.

The Soviet fighter pilots, including those based at the air field from which, on 1 September, Colonel G. Osipovich took off and terminated the flight of the Boeing-747, quite often had to take off to intercept violators of the state borders. In those cases when the Americans approached the areas that were "reachable" by our fighters but from which they could not return home, even with extra fuel tanks, they were permitted to eject after completing their combat tasks and using up all the fuel. Such was the situation. The pilots, the antiaircraft missile launcher crews, and the command post specialists of the Far-Eastern Military District PVO were practically in a state of war.

The Americans were increasing the attacks on our air space borders. In 1982, they violated Soviet borders five times; in 1983, by the beginning of September, it was 10. On 4 April, they undertook a provocation unprecedented in its insolence. U.S. military planes, after taking off from the Midway and Enterprise aircraft carriers, entered our air space in the area of the Kuriles, penetrated it two to 30 kilometers deep, and conducted... a dry bombing run. They made several approaches for ground target attacks. What did we do? The commander of the Soviet Air Force division did not send the fighters to intercept the transgressors. Why? There were many reasons. This is the conversation that took place after the fact of the border violation was established between the formation commander and the military district commander, Army General I. Tretyak (I quote from the district commander's report at the military councils' meeting and at the district conference of propagandists).

[Tretyak] Why did you not engage?

[Formation commander] I did not want to start a war. The combat could have grown into a military conflict, and I did not have the authority to start it.

[Tretyak] Were an experienced combat veteran in your place, he would have sent the fighters to intercept the Americans. You deserve to be fired.

Of course, it is possible that the district commander, in his rendition of the conversation with the division commander, could have made it more expressive and colorful. After all, the purpose of his speech was to impress upon the command cadres the necessity for resolute action in extraordinary situations. By the way, the division commander did not get fired—he had some other arguments as well to defend his decision. But, as is known, officers and generals do not get decorations for being hesitant. The minister of defense reprimanded the air formation commander—as well as others involved in the incident of letting American combat planes inside Soviet territory—and demanded that resolute actions be taken in similar situations. An appropriate document was issued and read to all officer-level personnel of the Air Force and the PVO troops. The leader of the Soviet state Yu. Andropov personally followed the analysis of this incident. Thus, a situation of super-vigilance was created. But the primary reason was not Andropov's warnings, or Marshal Ustinov's or Army General Tretyak's strict orders (this was the consequence), but the actions of the U.S. Naval Aviation and U.S. Air Force.

On the night of 1 September, one of the members of the alert duty team that issued the resolute destroy-the-target order was the same formation commander who had many times encountered various enemy provocations, including the one on 4 April. Let us for a minute imagine ourselves at the command post. The transgressor plane is crossing the state border, the inviolability of which you are responsible for. What to do? Let it through? Let it continue? Or shoot it down, as the law "On the USSR State Borders" demands, in which it is clearly written: "Whenever halting the violation or interception of the violators cannot be accomplished by other means, PVO troops are to use armaments and combat equipment."

Had the situation in September 1983 been less tense, the information Soviet command post specialists possessed would have been perceived quite differently; the conclusions would have been different, and so would the result. The proof of that is an incident that took place on 2 September last year, when an Iranian Air Force plane violated our southern border. It was not fired upon, and it landed at Nakhichevan airport. After the investigation, the aircraft was returned to Iranian authorities.

Then there is the incident with M. Rust who, on 28 May 1987, landed his Cessna-172 in Moscow on Red Square. All those accusations that were poured then on the PVO personnel—they were accused of carelessness, negligence, and inability to intercept the flight of a sports

plane. Some experts, including foreign ones, stated that this fact may be explained by the "blindness" of the ground radar stations in regard to small planes, flying low at low speeds. Others believed that technology had nothing to do with it, that it was the relaxation in international tensions, and that the people had become relaxed. To spare us the guessing, let us look at the documents. It is possible to do it now.

Here is the transcript of the command post's commands and conversations that shows how the events developed and what were the intentions of Major General G. Kromin (he was in charge of the alert duty team on 28 May from 1530 on). I should note that some episodes of little interest to the reader have been omitted; I should also note that the Cessna-172 was detected at 1429.

1531:

"What altitude is he flying? Duty forces, aviation—readiness level one."

1541:

"Repeat... Who is accompanying target 8255?" (This was the number assigned to Cessna-172.—Author.)

1542:

"...0735—return to your base; let 0736 go to the target area, guide him there. Raise the reinforcements in combat readiness." (It follows from the conversation that Maj. Gen. Kromin ordered the first fighter—which was running out of fuel—to land and ordered the second one to work on the target, as well as to raise a fighter to intercept a combat plane of a foreign power that had approached the border).

1616:

"Report what you have seen. All right, I read you. Thank you. It passed at a distance of 700 meters. Shall we shoot it down? The pilot reports it is a Yak-12 class."

As we can see, there was a concrete proposal to shoot the violator down. It would not have been difficult to force it to land, either. Lieutenant Anatoliy Puchkin, who had conducted the target identification, was later asked at the official meeting: "If you were ordered to stop the violator either by forcing him down or by destroying him, could you have carried out this order, given the capabilities of your plane?" Puchkin, who was flying a MiG-23, said: "I could have pushed the violator into the ground without any difficulty, but my actions would have endangered the life of the light plane's pilot."

So why was not either the former or the latter done? What the PVO specialists saw was not a military plane, and they understood it. From Lieutenant Colonel I. Karpets' explanation report:

"Since the target did not present a real danger, I have tried on my own to determine its characteristics, and for 16 minutes have not reported it to a higher level command post...."

It was not possible to take any active steps—it is forbidden to open fire on passenger and transport plane-transgressors. Maj. Gen. Kromin had to take all of that into account. If a scandal broke out in 1983, what could be expected in 1987 when the "cold war" was in retreat? Therefore he was trying, methodically and logically, to find out what kind of target was in the air, without taking any other actions. That cost him his job.

"Of course, Kromin could have used a maneuver known since the 1960's," explained one of the commanders of the PVO air command, Air Force Major General V. Yelchaninov, "that is, to knock the Cessna over by the jet-powered MiG's exhaust stream, and, with the pilot dead, nobody would have found out that it was the result of the interceptor's action. Ostensibly, he would have crashed because of his own negligence—and that would be it. But would it be right to do this? Many pilots remember training attacks on the plane-target Yak-25 RV (it imitated the flight of the high-altitude reconnaissance plane Lockheed U-2), and the pilots of the ultralight aircraft could feel the MiG's stream five kilometers away; they were not permitted to come closer. Lt. Puchkin used that part of his experience in identifying the target—not the one that made it possible to spear the sports plane on the pine trees.

Perhaps, it was for the better. Otherwise, it would be the death of the pilot, and then a major scandal, about the same kind as the one that broke out after the destruction of the Boeing-747. It would be said that they killed a young kid who was flying with a message of peace to the Soviet people. Or something like that.... I am convinced that under different circumstances Maj. Gen. Kromin's decision would have been different.

The international situation has a direct—sometimes decisive—influence on the way PVO services make their decisions. On 3 July 1988, a terrible tragedy took place over the Persian Gulf. The situation then, by the way, was far from simple—the result of the Iran-Iraq war and the tense relations between the United States and Iran. The American destroyer Vincennes opened fire at the Iranian airliner A-300 en route from the city of Bender-Abbas to Dubai Emirate. The airbus carrying 298 passengers—66 of them children—blew up in the air. Why was a civilian aircraft fired upon? This is the subject for the next material.

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[Text]

II

To continue: On 3 July 1988, over the Persian Gulf, the Americans shot down an A-300 airliner with 298 passengers on board. The commander of the destroyer Vincennes stated that they had shot down an Iranian F-14

fighter plane that was approaching in a "hostile manner." Teheran refuted this by saying: "No Iranian F-14s were airborne at the time of the incident." Soon, however, President R. Reagan himself acknowledged: A passenger plane had been shot down by two missiles. The reason? The Navy "had taken a defensive action" and "had opened fire to defend itself from a potential attack." It would be a blasphemy to suggest that the ship commander, Mr. W. Rogers, thirsted for blood. No, the situation had played a cruel joke on American air defense specialists, and they had committed a major error. Our PVO warriors, however, have to work under even more difficult conditions than the Americans. Each year, PVO troop operators "track" on their screens between 170,000 and 200,000 airplanes near the USSR borders; out of them, about 3,000 are combat and reconnaissance planes—mostly, the Air Force and the Navy of the United States and NATO. We do not make this kind of trouble for the NATO.

Figures, received from one of the PVO formations, also speak of the intensity of our specialists' work. During the last two years they detected and "tracked" 44,487 foreign airplanes; 3,716 of them were combat planes, and 594, reconnaissance (RS-135, Orion, Nimrod, U-2, SR-71) planes. The 25-kilometer border zone was entered by 1,138 aircraft. Air Force Major General A. Marenkov commented on these figures this way:

"As is known, quantitative indicators eventually grow into qualitative ones. Thousands of times during these two years we had to put sub-units of antiaircraft missile troops on alert, and to scramble our fighter-interceptors. This means that for thousands of times awesome armaments were a source of danger..."

This is a logical place to take note that it is only our warriors who have to deal with cases of deliberate violations of the country's air space. According to the author's data, since mid- 1950's the U.S. Air Force violated Soviet borders about 500 times; in 10 or 12 instances the intruders flew hundreds of kilometers deep into the Soviet territory. This includes the 1954 overflight by the American bombers of the Leningrad-Minsk-Kiev line and the Lockheed U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance plane overflights over Siberia, the Baltics, and Central Asia.... In the same Far East region, in 1968, Soviet fighters forced an American military transport airplane DC-8—which had entered our air space over the Kuriles—to land on Iturup.

Active probing of our air borders had been going on in other regions of our country as well. This was forcing our warriors to work, as they say, at their limit. On November 28 1973, Captain Gennadiy Yeliseyev took off to intercept an unidentified target. The situation in the air was developing not in our pilot's favor, and there was a danger that the transgressor plane could escape with impunity. Then Capt. Yeliseyev turned on the after burners, approached the target at maximum speed and rammed it, thereby destroying the target. Our pilot died in the collision.

There are some suspicions that the flights of the Cessna-class planes on 28 May 1987, 28 and 29 May 1988, and 9 June 1990 are not simply a case of showing off by young people, but the result of purposeful work with them. Why such a conclusion? Rust did not reveal everything in court. He stated, for instance, that he had been flying on the same altitude—600 meters—without ascending or descending, without maneuvering or making any landings. The radars showed a completely different picture. Detailed study of the circumstances related to the Cessna flight over Soviet territory gives reason to believe that the German pilot had certain information about the Soviet PVO system and was acting on the basis of this information.

Such train of thought gets another boost from listening to the radio conversation between Kirkenes [as transliterated] airport (there are NATO specialists working from it, too) and Rust's instructor Andreasomer who intended to make a trip to Murmansk on 29 May 1988.

1332: "This is Kirkenes, what is your position?" "I am at the Soviet border."

1335: "This is Kirkenes, increase your altitude so I can see you."

1347: "This is Kirkenes. You are working at a very low altitude; time to finish up. What is your position?"

After all that had been said it would be right to ask a question: Have our airplanes flown, and do they fly, into the air space of other countries? Unfortunately, it happens. Sometimes it is pilot error; sometimes—faulty equipment. The same reasons for which aircraft from neighboring countries sometimes cross Soviet borders. But who could give examples of Soviet planes going deliberately, in radio silence, into the air space of the United States, or, let us say, France or England? I have searched for such facts in the staff headquarters of the Air Force, in the PVO troops, and in the Navy, in the press, among the experts on airborne incidents, and, finally, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—and I could not find any.

Now let us go to another topic: To what degree of precision can the type and country of origin of an aircraft be established under extreme circumstances. This is a major factor in the decision of whether the violator's flight will be terminated or not. James Oberg, a NASA expert and the author of the book "Uncovering Soviet Disasters," to whom journalists often refer, maintains that it is enough to look at the radar screen, and everything will be clear. What is, however, the situation in real life? Let us go back to the transcript of commands and conversations at the command post from which the military work on Cessna-172 (piloted by M. Rust) was coordinated by Major General G. Kromin.

1617: "Give me General Melnikov. Sergey Igorevich, Kromin here. I have just talked to the pilot that landed. He says: 'I passed him at a distance of 700 meters. It is a

Yak-12 class.' He said this: 'It is a lightweight. There is some haze there, clouds... Hard to figure out.' He has just reported to me.

"Now the other one is on the approach. Yes! Passed by, 700 from him, did not see any identification markings. Now, the one that was on the approach—could not see it. The target is being steadily tracked by the ground radar station, but he cannot see it. Yes, he continues to climb. Yes, on mine, too. One second."

1655: "Kromin here. Pilot 0716 detected the target on his radar. Now trying to identify it. Will report momentarily. All right."

1659: "What can a pilot report from the first sighting? He needs at least one more pass. He can only observe the target through his sights. The target is in the clouds. Cannot be detected visually. Remainder 2,400, bring him back. Send the next one..."

Reading the transcript of commands and conversations of the command post, one arrives at the conclusion that, with the major general's arrival, a lot was done to identify the target—I emphasize, identify—but, for all practical purposes, the type of airplane was not established. Various factors were at play here: the weather, differing speeds of the airplanes, the military pilots' training to work only with combat aircraft, etc.

Says Anatoliy Puchkin:

"After gaining altitude, I was given the task of conducting a visual search. Soon I received information: 'The target is on your course, 60 kilometers ahead.' Then: 'Target changed course, altitude 500 to 600 meters.' I increased speed to 500 to 600 kilometers an hour and received information that the object was three kilometers to the right. I saw to my right, about three or four kilometers away, an aircraft against the background of the clouds. Could not identify the type. Its shape looked like a helicopter. I reported to the command post: Observing low-speed target that resembles a helicopter.

"Several minutes later I was directed to a course of 210 degrees, then 120 degrees, and received information that the target was eight kilometers ahead. I detected it at a distance between 600 and 800 meters, on a parallel course and below me, at an altitude of 550 to 600 meters. It was a lightweight plane, white, with a light blue stripe on the fuselage—which I immediately reported to the command post..."

How convincing was pilot Anatoliy Puchkin's report on the type of the plane? Why, having received the information from the pilot, had Maj. Gen. Kromin not taken steps to terminate its flight? Here is the general's official explanation:

"Lieutenant Puchkin's report that he was observing a helicopter type target in the break between the clouds (first report), and then a Yak-12 class target (second report) was not very convincing. The pilot saw the target in the clouds and very briefly. He reported upon landing: Observed white sports plane, Yak-12 class, with a blue stripe. Did not have time to see the identifying markings. Nevertheless, I took the following steps for the flight termination. I raised three more fighters and identified the air fields to be used for forced landing. However, because the airborne target was flying in the clouds, it did not seem possible to force the violator to land by way of the established signals of changing aircraft altitude..."

The reality showed once again that it is extremely difficult to determine precisely the type of target, its country of origin, and the intentions of a crew that does not want to establish contact.

Let us analyze several more specific situations.

A Korean Air Lines Boeing-707, with a 13-member crew and 97 passengers, was making a scheduled flight on the route Paris-Anchorage (Alaska)-Seoul. Before reaching Greenland, the plane made a sharp 91-degree turn and flew first to the east; then, over Spitsbergen, it gradually started to veer south, took a course for the Kola Peninsula, and at 2119 on 20 April 1978 entered Soviet air space in the area northeast of Murmansk.

Soviet fighters demanded, by various maneuvers and flashing lights, that the intruder follow them to the nearest air field. The intruder was not responding to the signals and continued its flight into the Soviet territory. The fighters opened fire, and then forced the plane to land near the Karelian city of Kem, 300 kilometers away from the northern coast. It would be interesting to discuss this landing in light of new facts being made public, including those related by the participant of those events, Colonel Anatoliy Kerefov, who is now a flight navigator in a PVO formation:

"On 20 April, I was on duty at one of the northern airfields. Approximately at 2145, right after Captain Aleksandr Genbert, I received the command: 'Take off.' I took off and was given a course—330 degrees—and altitude—8,000 meters. The task: to cover the border. At the same time I heard the radio conversation between the neighboring command post and two pilots. Command post: 'Have you found him? How is it going?' The leader: 'Where would he go? He is barely trudging on.' I realized that my efforts would not be needed. The tension subsided; the radio exchange went on. Command post: 'Your actions?' The leader, about five minutes later: 'We have lost him...' And then immediately: 'Little fuel left, have to return to base.' Command post: 'Return.'

"I stayed in the air, one-on-one with the target that our fighters from the neighboring squadron had been leading somewhere. Started visual search. Approaching the area of Loukhi I noticed a plane with turned-off lights. Reported it to the ground. The command post tells me:

'Approach the target, identify it and report characteristics.' Now I know that the object was a Boeing-707, and that by that time it was already damaged by the two missiles Captain Bosov had fired at it, but it nevertheless continued the flight trying to escape from the fighters. But then?

"It appears that the command post did not have clear information about the target in the air, either. I carry out the order, reduce my altitude, approach the stranger, and see a large plane. I could not find out anything else. It was night, and he had turned off the lights—anybody would have done the same after being shot at. I report: 'The object is large, course 270, altitude 500 to 600.' The command post: 'Bring the object to the airfield.' I close on the airplane and show him: Turn left and follow me, course 180. He complies. Then 15 seconds later, the plane makes a 90-degrees turn—that is, he went in another direction, inside the country.

"I reported to the command post: 'Object did not follow the command.' I made three approaches, and every time the pilot of the intruder plane also made a maneuver. I started to think: He does not see my commands and is maneuvering, as they say, just in case. So I went in front of his nose with the after burner on. Now he had to notice me and follow where I tell him. But my 'charge' again makes a turn in another direction. I am desperate, and that is when I blurted out: 'He is not following the command, request permission to destroy the target.' From the command post: 'Wait a minute.'"

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[Text]

III

The officer Kerefov asked the command post whether he should open fire on the intruder. But the command post responded, "Force it to land."

"I climbed directly over him so that my wings were immediately over his," said Colonel Kerefov, "and I turned on my lights and began to push him down. In front of us was a white spot—I realized that it was a lake. The target began to descend, but he did not turn on his lights and seemed to be waiting for something. I kept on pressing him down until there were only 30 meters left, and he finally turned on his lights. Just afterward he landed on the lake. He coasted about 300 meters on the ice. I did not notice any fire or smoke. I reported, 'I forced him to land, azimuth 350, distance 140 km from the population center of Loukhi.'" The story came to an end on 20 April 1978.

"I desperately wanted to know what kind of target I had forced down. I found out only in the morning when passengers of a Boeing-707 were driven from the area of the landing aboard a bus. As far as recognizing the target in the air... Sometimes it is impossible, especially when there is no time and the intruder does not make contact..."

Lieutenant Colonel Gennadiy Osipovich, who intercepted the target on 1 September 1983, agrees. This is what he said in a conversation with me:

"People often ask what I saw that night and why I was unable to identify it—after all, in front of me on my course was a Boeing, an enormous machine. But only a dilettante would ask that question. Let us figure out whether I had the opportunity. I was put on alert, and soon I received the 'take-off' command. My heading was the Sea of Okhotsk. I thought that we would be dealing with an intercept target for grading performance, a regular training mission. The next operation was vectoring to the target. And if it had not been for a small snag I never would have seen whom I was dealing with. I would have locked on with my sight as usual and... But I had to complete a maneuver. Once I was on the bearing of the target I saw something flying in front of me and... a flashing light. I reported back on the vectoring post. But you cannot tell much by a flashing light. Even military planes use one in peacetime."

"I locked on the object, and I was given a new command: As soon as it crosses the border, shoot it down. And just afterwards: 'The target has penetrated the country's border... Destroy it!' As of that second it was no longer an aircraft in front of me but a target—I stress that it was a target that had penetrated the border of our country. All further actions were determined by the situation—in front of me was an enemy, and I simply did not try to determine the type of aircraft. But I am getting ahead of myself. After a few seconds I was given a new command: 'Cancel destruction. Force the target to land.' I maneuvered near the aircraft with my lights and fired four bursts of armor-piercing rounds. It seems that they noticed me, judging by the reduction in the speed of the target that followed. When the intruder was to leave the bounds of our territory, I received the command, 'Destroy the target.' I never did realize what kind of aircraft went down..."

The assertion of James Oberg [name as transliterated], a NASA expert, to the effect that it is easy to determine the type of an aircraft by radar has been quoted by many journalists; in real practice it is not so easy and the assertion looks quite unconvincing.

Incidentally, when an A-300 was shot down by the cruiser Vincennes the press immediately took the offensive. Some accused W. Rogers of intentionally opening fire on a passenger aircraft. Others accused the ship's air defense specialists of lack of professionalism. "The cruiser Vincennes was outfitted with the United States' most modern electronic equipment intended for the identification of air targets," the ABC television company commented on the case. "According to the opinion of experts, it is difficult to understand how a passenger aircraft could be taken for a fighter. On the radar screen their images are very different."

Of course if there were a competition to detect and identify targets, then the Aegis system of the cruiser, able

to detect dozens of targets simultaneously, would prove itself. But the existing situation on 3 July 1988 was not conducive to precise identification of targets. In a matter of seconds the operator came to the conclusion that the aircraft was descending, and the commander of the cruiser decided to open fire. He simply could not wait for the system to tell him that it was not a descending fighter but a passenger airliner gathering speed—a war was on. The decision, made under the pressure of existing circumstances, turned out to be fatal.

I will note that military systems as a rule serve for detection and designation of targets and for fire control. This is the opinion of Lieutenant Colonel A. Novoseltsev, chief of staff of a PVO formation:

"Under regular conditions using radar facilities it is possible to establish the type of target. Especially when several radars are following it. But in extreme situations... Of course, if a passenger aircraft has lost its way and the crew takes action to broadcast some kind of signal, they and we have, as they say, a thousand and one means of finding a common language. But if it is carrying out a purposeful action and flying under radio silence, at night, and in clouds, it is difficult to identify it. By the way, both here and abroad there is equipment coming on line which uses a so-called analog principle of action. That is, the screen does not carry a target return but rather a digital image [tsifrovoye izobrazheniye]—now you do not determine anything by fixes. We have all-weather interceptors, but in mist or at night you cannot see much with them either..."

In order to confirm the opinion of Lieutenant Colonel Novoseltsev, the author conducted a small poll among the most experienced pilots of a fighter aviation regiment (Su-27 aircraft): Is it possible to determine the type of an aircraft that is travelling at night, in mist, and under radio silence? Lieutenant Colonel N. Ovechkin, expert pilot-marksman, Colonel R. Nocheynyy and Lieutenant Colonel N. Meleshkin, both military pilots first class, and others expressed their opinion. They said that it would be difficult to identify an aircraft "when we are both flying in mist and cannot see one another." In addition, noted the officers, we are not professionals at determining types of passenger and sporting aircraft..."

Indeed, in the military service schools, at the academies, and on the training grounds they are taught quite different subjects.

"The PVO forces together with the USSR air traffic control agencies are charged with controlling the use of the country's air space and the flight procedures of aircraft," said Colonel Viktor Demedyuk, who handles operational-tactical investigations. "But their main task is different. In the event of an outbreak of war they, as a branch of the Armed Forces, are tasked with covering the main forces and the air and naval forces, important administrative centers, and the most important facilities of the country's economy from strikes from the air. Our main opponent is modern combat aviation and cruise

missiles. Based on this, we are carrying out organizational development of the armed forces and training of specialists. Is it worth it to us to retrain the main body of officers for the passenger and especially sporting aircraft which are increasingly beginning to trouble us? Perhaps the time will come when we will carry out purely peaceful activities, but for the time being... Permit the PVO forces to train to defend the country from possible attacks from the air. Especially when war has just recently broken out in the area of the Persian Gulf—near our borders. If an American B-52 had to drop its load under emergency conditions not far from Italy, then we cannot help but anticipate similar situations in the southern regions of the country; it is possible for combat aircraft to deviate from planned routes. Our task is to ensure that no bombs fall on Soviet cities and villages. We need to determine the obligations and legal responsibility of the PVO forces..."

"To determine legal responsibility," I recalled these words when I was working at a formation at the border. Colonel Vladimir Chaptsev glanced over the hall of the command post and said, "This is where Major General Tsarkov oversaw the interception of the Boeing-707." I looked around. There were map cases and displays... Did they help the general at the decisive minute? The commander of the combat crew acted in accordance with the letter of the law. At that time everything went more or less favorably. Almost all the passengers remained alive; two people died. Recently Colonel General Vladimir Tsarkov talked about how events developed afterward:

"As soon as the Boeing was forced down, the commander in chief of the PVO Forces telephoned: 'How far did the aircraft penetrate our air space?' 'Approximately 150 km,' I answered. 'You will be removed from command, general,' he snapped out. No sooner did we familiarize ourselves with the radio intercept (the search is on for a South Korean Boeing with hundreds of passengers on board), the commander in chief again telephoned. I reported on the radio intercept, and I heard, 'Tsarkov, an international tribunal is going to try you...' And our commander in chief is not easily frightened..."

The reader will recall the conversation between the commanding general of the Far East Military District and the commander of the formation in whose zone of responsibility U.S. combat aircraft violated the border on 4 April 1983. It was almost exactly the same.

Colonel General of Aviation Tsarkov concisely related the problem that has troubled and still troubles officers on combat alert under conditions of an absence of clear, established normative acts and guidance for the conduct of the highest echelons of power. At a decisive instance an officer, Colonel Chaptsev explained, often does not think about the correct way to force an aircraft to land or how, finally, to destroy it; he worries instead about whether he will be punished. In his view our officers may have come up against this dilemma, as applied to today's generation of weapons, in July 1960, also in the north,

when Captain Vasiliy Polyakov destroyed an American PB-47 reconnaissance aircraft that had violated the Soviet border not far from the cape of Svyatoy Nos. One of the senior officers of the regiment directed Polyakov to the target. When he heard from the pilot, "The target is leaving, what should I do?" he lost his head. And, according to the testimony of witnesses, he could not come to his senses for several minutes. The decision to open fire was made by Senior Lieutenant A. Kotlyarov, who was nearby.

Why did that officer delay so long? For the very same reason—it is difficult today to determine what kind of object is in the air, and it was even more complicated then. A syndrome acquired on 1 May 1960 also had an effect. At that time the flight of a Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by F. Powers was intercepted, but in the dust of one-on-one combat a MiG-19 Soviet fighter was also shot down—Senior Lieutenant Sergey Safronov died. The appropriate orders were published and the guilty were punished severely—they were reduced in post and rank... An order was announced at PVO units. But the most weighty reason for the confusion was that there were no legal procedures for border security by the PVO forces. The combat crews of the command posts functioned on the basis of orders; the Law on the State Border was only adopted in November 1982. None of the officers knew how the supreme leadership would behave.

Further events developed this way. Showing the tape (photographic target hit verification had been carried out), one of the specialists suggested, "It looks like a Tu-16." A commotion started at the unit. But photographs were printed, and the silhouette of a PB-47 was clearly made out. A little later rumors made the rounds of the regiment—the aircraft should not have been shot down, talks had begun with the Americans, and the brass were displeased. Three days later Captain Polyakov was ordered to go to Moscow. Vasiliy Amvrosevich himself said, "My wife was crying. She said they would jail me. My fellow officers patted me on the shoulder and said, wait and see: You will either return with a Hero's Star or they will put you in jail immediately..." As it turned out, he returned with the Order of the Red Banner.

Judging by the recent articles of several publications, we still have not come to a final decision on the actions of the servicemen of the PVO forces concerning the Boeing-707 and the Boeing-747. Luckily no officers of the PVO forces, who acted in accordance with the demands of the appropriate orders and instructions, were punished.

However on 1 October 1987 a military tribunal of the Baltic Military District imprisoned Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Karpets for five years and Major Vyacheslav Chernyy for four years, both in a maximum security correctional labor colony. They were victims of the

so-called Rust case. The first had alert duty on 28 May 1987 as the operations duty officer of the unit's command post, and the latter was his deputy duty officer. To be fair we will note that the military collegium of the USSR Supreme Court changed the sentences of Karpets and Chernyy, and later they were given administrative punishment.

Before reporting what they were sentenced for and what they were specifically guilty of, I will note that instances similar to the flight of the Cessna-172 have occurred in other countries as well, and repeatedly at that. In those cases the ministers of defense were not dismissed from their posts and officers of the PVO forces were not imprisoned. Light planes still make hops across borders. For example, the government of the United States is troubled by mass unsanctioned flights of light aircraft across its southern border carrying contraband drugs. According to experts, the Americans would require approximately 82 E-2c (AWACS) DRLO [radar early-warning] aircraft or 25 E-3 (Hawkeye) aircraft to cover the 25,000 km of the southern border. Presently there are no funds for that. By 1992 there are plans to ensure the seizure of only 25 percent of the light aircraft. In short, the border is not closed, and no one considers that a tragedy. Of course, the southern border is not Washington. But there have been instances when light aircraft almost collided with the President's helicopter in Washington.

[20 Mar 91 p 2]

[Text]

IV

After Rust's flight there was an investigation, and then a trial. From the verdict of the Baltic Military District military tribunal:

"Having received by telephone at 1429 and then through the automated command system at 1431 information on this unidentified target, which was later assigned combat number 8255, Karpets has exhibited unconcern and acted indecisively. Having in his possession information on the target (azimuth, distance, speed, altitude, and direction of the flight) Karpets grossly violated the procedures...did not immediately report target information to the duty officer of the higher level command post...Colonel Voronkov, as well as to his commanding officer and the staff commander, and delayed by 16 minutes transfer of information on the target.

"At the same time Chernykh also received information on this unidentified target, but, in violation of the regulations...did not report it immediately to the formation's operational officer on duty and thus did not ensure the transfer of the first data on the target to the higher level command post."

How does Lieutenant Colonel Karpets himself explain the events?

"I tried to sort things out and to identify the sudden target," says I. Karpets. "I did not want to pass vague information to the higher level command post. The formation services demand clear reporting on detected targets..."

An interesting detail. Lt. Col. Karpets graduated from the Boeing-747 "school." In September 1983, he served on Sakhalin as a command post commanding officer. Of course, he remembered the scandal that broke all over the world. This four-year old experience affected his actions in regard to an unidentified target. In those short minutes he did not know that the Cessna would make it to the capital; that the pendulum of public opinion would swing in the opposite direction from the one in 1983. And about the five years...

What is amazing is not a five-year prison term, but the events (true metamorphoses) that took place later. On 9 July 1990, the city of Batumi was "visited" by another West German flier in a Cessna, who left flowers and a touching note wishing everybody peace, and flew back with impunity. And... nobody was punished. Why? Because by then it had finally sunk in that it was not possible to make our border completely impenetrable by sports planes, and therefore nobody should be held responsible. Then why was there an investigation in 1987? In my opinion, it was done in order to prop up a political decision. Remember the CPSU Central Committee Politburo resolution? It was determined that the Cessna-172 inflicted political damage on us, and—the repercussions went "all the way." Over 100 people were disciplined; two were convicted—the military tribunal had enough grounds for that.

"What is bad is that nothing has changed since then," says Colonel Vladimir Chartsov. "We are told: Act in accordance with the law. What kind of law is it if it is interpreted this way yesterday and that way today. There is a lot of incongruity that can be found in our documents..."

Let us now interrupt Vladimir Chartsov and note this: We have now arrived at the most painful point, something that troubles command post commanding officers, the people who are entrusted with the right to make decisions on the intruder planes—the legal shortcomings.

"We have a clear picture in regard to civilian aircraft," say command post officers Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Belyakov and Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Shanalin. "There is an unbreakable rule—to not open fire on passenger and transport airplanes, but to render assistance and to force them to land at the nearest airfield. But what about military planes? The documents say how we are supposed to act, but nobody knows what will be the public reaction to the actions of the PVO teams, and to what degree we will be held responsible. Let us give you an example.

"Let us say we shoot him down. A scandal from the left is possible: Our military, they will say, is increasing

international tension. If we let it through far enough, we face an attack from the right—what kind of professionals are they, cannot shoot a plane down. Then we will have to wait to see the main angle of the investigation... Let us suppose that a combat plane crossed the northern border and for a variety of reasons reached Leningrad. We will be prosecuted for this in accordance with the law 'On the USSR State Border,' which clearly says that in case the intruder does not obey the commands, PVO forces destroy it by any firepower at their disposal.

"Now let us suppose a different situation: The plane is shot down. The investigation produces another document, which clearly says that it is far from always that we have a right to shoot a combat plane down, only under certain circumstances: if it threatens air traffic safety; if it is falling on a densely populated area; 'et cetera.' We have people with guts serving here. We will go by the law 'On the USSR State Border' and by this vague 'et cetera.' We remember all too well the opinions floating after the Rust affair.

"As to low-speed small aircraft—their flights may be terminated if they present a danger to USSR interests. But these are civilian airplanes; we are not permitted to shoot them down, especially after we have joined the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation. At the same time, if they do represent a danger to the USSR interests... How are we to determine whether they represent danger or not?.. Do not think that we are complaining. It just hurts us, both for ourselves and for the Armed Forces. Since we are in such dual legal situation, any incident in the air can easily expose the Armed Forces..."

"We are required to thoroughly train the officers who are assigned combat duty at the command posts, and especially operational officers who have the power to make decisions to open fire," says Colonel A. Movsha. "We train them, of course, but not without difficulty... The same operational officer on duty is surrounded, both in a direct sense and figuratively, by orders and instructions, some of which have serious discrepancies... Do you know which leadership figure has the most prestige among the formation's command post officers? Talk to the people, and you will find out..."

I did find out and can share it with readers: Ronald Reagan. Why? Remember the events that took place in the Persian Gulf zone on 3 July 1988? Reagan said then that the ship commander, Rogers, had taken a correct action and had opened fire to defend the ship from potential attack. The President took a clear position and stayed with it to the end, although the A-300 passenger plane with 298 passengers was shot down thousands of kilometers away from the United States and, of course, did not present any danger to the destroyer, and even less danger to the United States territory. I heard many times: "Over there, the President takes the responsibility; here, as a rule, the little man gets the blame." The command post specialists say that they are ready to take

responsibility for violations of the combat duty rules, but then the rules themselves should be well defined.

One can understand the officers. On both 1 September 1983 and 28 May 1987, the PVO warriors acted in accordance with both the spirit and the letter of the law. But in both cases stones were cast at them. Even though at that time there were none of the legal ambiguities that are typical of today. It is time for the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or, better still, the Supreme Soviet, to clear it up. So, what are the suggestions?

Summing up officers' suggestions and proposals, I offer the following for the readers' judgment. To publish guideline documents that do not allow ambiguity in interpretation and that contain clear-cut rules for the combat work of command post teams. "All our activities should be determined by the letter of the law, and the evaluation of the quality of our work should be based on how well we carry out the stipulations of the same law and should not, under any circumstances, depend on decisions of political leadership, a whim of some high-ranking military brass, or fickle public opinion." This is a dream of those who protect our airspace borders. This is the first point.

Second, the Code of Rules for PVO specialists on duty must correspond to the norms of international law. This proposal is all the more timely since we are building a law-based state. The USSR has already taken upon itself a number of international obligations, and now they should be tied in with other normative acts.

In June 1989, the USSR and the United States Governments signed an agreement on prevention of dangerous activities. This agreement stipulates the rights and the duties of PVO duty crews, for instance, when United States combat airplanes enter our air space under Act-of-God circumstances, not as a result of deliberate actions of their flight crews...

In May 1990, the USSR Supreme Soviet ratified a special protocol by adding Article 8b to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation. The substance of the article is as follows: The convention member-countries agree, in the circumstance of intercepting a foreign airplane that violates the border or veers off its route, to act in such manner as to not endanger the life of persons on board the airplane and the safety of the aircraft itself. Moreover, the participant countries agree to refrain from the use of arms.

Active work is underway in working out a 23-country agreement—including the USSR—on "open skies." This means new duties for the PVO duty specialists.

It seems that it would be logical for the world airline services and for the foreign air forces general staffs to know what the crews of their airplanes can expect if they enter Soviet air space. This would prevent many air incidents and would make it easier for the air defense crews to calculate their actions.

Specialists believe that there is a need now to make changes to the law "On the USSR State Border." Some of its clauses now contradict the norms of international law, with which the Soviet Union is obligated to comply since it signed the above-mentioned documents.

Carrying out this law's stipulation on decisive termination of any attempts to violate the state borders is only feasible to a certain degree. I was told at the PVO General Staff Headquarters that if we set for ourselves the task of assured and timely detection and termination of flights of Cessna-class aircraft on all parts of our borders—of the 64,000 kilometers of which only one half is on land—the combat personnel of the PVO will have to be increased two- to threefold. The measure would require approximately 530 more radar stations, and about 25,000 more specialists. The cost would be about 6 billion rubles.

Our state does not have such money. To try a 100-percent prevention of border violations by foreign aircraft is profligate and senseless.

Does this mean that we should let all these "bumblebees" and "bees" fly over our border with impunity?

The pilots of intruder planes should be subject to substantial fines," Air Force Colonel General V. Tsarkov suggested in the conversation with me. "They should also pay the costs of bringing additional defense capabilities into combat readiness by the antiaircraft defense units. Also, we should establish a line, beyond which we would have the right not only to identify the "bees" but also to take more decisive actions. The ardor of those who like to play games around our borders would cool substantially."

PVO Aviation Chief, Lieutenant General O. Anisimov, noted that fighter-interceptors have no—and never had any—problems in terminating the flights of low-speed aircraft; these are the simplest targets to destroy. The same goes for ground-based antiaircraft missile defense units. What is needed are clear legal norms...

The people who carry out their daily combat duty must have full clarity as to the use of modern missiles and interceptor planes. Then, I think, there will be no incidents of the kind that happened with the Boeings and the Cessna. Assuming, of course, the good will of foreign professional and amateur pilots.

Civil-Military Conflict Over Skrunda Radar Construction

91UM0420A Riga CINA in Latvian 5 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by L. Ozolins: "They Played a Dangerous Game"]

[Text] Order No. 308. Adopted 21 November 1990. Authored by the executive committee of the Kuldiga rayon Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The chairman of this committee is Aleksandrs Lange, deputy to the Latvian

Supreme Soviet. Without his blessing and signature, this "historical" document—full of words such as "prohibit," "suspend," "cease," and "restrict," in various grammatical forms—could not have come into existence. Just what is this severity of Mr. Lange and his subordinates directed against?—The Army unit stationed in the vicinity of Skrunda, the garrison that operates the radar station. This station and the people who operate it—just as in capitalist countries such as the USA, England, France, and the like—vigilantly follow movements in the airspace, and are ready to promptly detect and avert the threat of missile attack.

Although peace has reigned in [our] vast airspace for 45 years, there is no peace on land. Especially in the last year and last few months, the attitude of the Kuldiga rayon municipal government toward the Skrunda garrison has heated up to the point of incandescence. All the more so because the high command of the Soviet Armed Forces plans to replace the old radar station, which has served out its days, with a new one to be built to correspond to world standards. The capacity of the new station will exceed the current one by ten times. This, of course, is not an arbitrary action by the Army, for in 1985, through its decrees, the government of the Latvian SSR accepted its construction and designated appropriate areas of land accordingly.

Construction is proceeding at full pace. Every day, about 2000 workers are employed, and several tens of millions of rubles have already been spent or will be allotted to complete construction. On the basis of supposedly increased electromagnetic field potential, pollution of the environment, and many other factors, a session of the rayon deputies adopted a decree—with a deadline—on 20 November, on the suspension of construction work at the construction site.

The conflict was reviewed at the committee level of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, but no accord was achieved. Then came Order No. 308 of 21 November, signed by Aleksandrs Lange. This was undoubtedly spurred by the decree on measures to be taken with regard to USSR Armed Forces and special task units, passed on 14 November by the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet. In a categorical tone, members of the local municipal government issued orders to the postal and communications offices, and the consumer cooperative association and its subordinate stores, not to serve customers dressed in soldiers clothing; and to the internal affairs department and its traffic service to detain vehicles carrying construction materials to the site of construction of the new radar station—as well as other prohibitions—which were dutifully reprinted in the "independent" rayon newspaper KURZEMNIEKS.

From behind thick stone walls, that "most courageous" of all radio journalists, Peteris Tabuns, poured oil on the fire and increased the political tension over this whole affair by encouraging youths and men to take up truncheons and join the "holy war" against the "occupiers."

How nice that more and more, parliamentarians and my journalist colleagues are protesting against this contrived—and even chauvinistic—nationalistic farce, so harmful to the peoples living in our republic, including, of course, the indigenous nationality. In the article, "May the Parliament Submit an Ultimatum to the Army?" in the 27 November issue of the new periodical DIENA, commentator Aija Calite says, "It is not difficult to understand in what direction public opinion is being led, nor for what end it is being prepared. And this is stated quite unambiguously: Prepare to advance against the bayonets with your bare hands!"

And just what happened with the ultimatum, submitted by the Kuldiga rayon municipal government to the Army garrison stationed in the Skrunda vicinity, on the suspension of the operation of the radar station and construction of the new, modern one?

On 28 November, we were at the garrison's [officers] club, where a very authoritative committee had assembled, with Colonel General B. Kraskovskiy representing the command staff of the Armed Forces. The committee included multibranch specialists from several institutes: Radiologists, physicists, biologists, and people working in the fields of medicine and ecology. It also included the chairman of the Kuldiga rayon council of deputies, Uldis Ante; the chairman of the executive committee, Aleksandrs Lange, and local specialists in medicine and conservation.

The "debut" of Ilmars Bisers, first deputy to the chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers, as deputy to the chairman of this committee, attests to its significance.

The session's chair named people to the Main Committee and to the three subcommittees that will work independently in scientifically and practically divisible areas of investigation. He also established the fundamental principles for the work and the dates of plenary sessions, and forecasted the completion of the investigation by 25 March 1991.

Promising not to begin an economic blockade, the gentlemen of the rayon municipal government requested that construction of the object be "frozen" until the above mentioned deadline. Debates, debates. For and against. Nevertheless, the majority voted for continuation of construction and for condemnation of any blockade as an inhumane act for the civilized world, especially if it is dictated less by ecological concerns than by political motivations.

It is reason that has won out—the consideration of the real internal and external political situation, the very situation that only a few days ago the "hotheads" did not wish to mention. Yes, reason won out, and this to some extent guarantees that regardless of nationality, or religious or political persuasion, people will continue to develop a democratic society and, individually, their own personal well-being and happiness.

Critique of Photo Reconnaissance in Support of Bombing Missions

91UM0459A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel M. Ponomarev: "Did Reconnaissance Report Correctly?"]

[Text] The upcoming sortie to the range was not particularly difficult, especially since the element leader, flight commander Captain N. Belov, had already performed many such combat training missions, delivering bombing strikes on air defense assets of the "adversary." He therefore had no doubt of success.

Now the aircraft were set on their target run. After breakoff the pilots could see the black dots of explosions against the background of the snow-covered earth. They appeared to be in the very center of the assigned target, so they called in the report: "Target destroyed."

However after analysis of the bombing results it was found that the pilots had missed by six hundred meters. What is more, they had bombed the wrong target. Need one describe the feelings of the flight commander?

Although... Was it all so unexpected? This was not the first such incident in the unit. It happened that even more experienced air warriors, master-rated pilots, had gotten lost at the range and figuratively speaking had struck out at random.

In its investigation of the last bombing, or more precisely, the air near-accident incident, the commission concluded as follows: "Accuracy of the bombing exceeded a five-fold deviation due to pilot ignorance of the range zone and the impossibility of becoming acquainted with the site of the upcoming operations." Thus it would appear the aviators were not guilty after all. It was the targets—they had not studied them. They had not even glanced at the photomap plotting board before the sortie. How then could they correctly calculate and analyze everything?

However, to be frank, photomap plotting boards acceptable to us fighter-bomber personnel often are not available. Aerial reconnaissance personnel do not adapt the photos for the missions which we are to accomplish. Particularly in terms of altitude, since most often they make the aerial photo from a "height" at which we do not operate. Or they provide old aerial photos of the range which are "detached" from the season. For instance, the exercises are in the winter and the photomap plotting board which the fighter-bomber personnel use to prepare for the bombing or missile launch shows summer.

The fact is that aerial reconnaissance personnel perform their missions and take aerial photographs of the terrain for their own training sessions and not especially for us. So our targets do not always agree with respect to aspect angle of approach, altitude, etc. But the fact remains that

expensive munitions go "down the drain" and the people's money is squandered due to the lack of the necessary photomap plotting boards.

This is also demonstrated by an exercise in which we recently participated. For instance, the bombs dropped by Senior Lieutenant I. Pechenkin wound up eight hundred meters from the target, and the error of his more experienced comrade Captain F. Gnevyshev was beyond the thousand-meter target return, even though he had already flown over the range before.

Experience tells us that successful delivery of an assault requires painstaking study of the terrain from the photographic materials of aerial reconnaissance. The experience of the Great Patriotic War also testifies to this. After all, at that time not a single planned strike by bombers or ground-attack aircraft took place without preliminary photography of the target. What is more, efforts were made to take the photos right before the start of the operation in order to distort the picture of the ground situation as little as possible. In order to save time, containers with the photographic materials were dropped by the reconnaissance pilots right at the airfields where the bombers were based and were immediately brought to the photo lab. It often happened that along with their maps the navigators also carried photographs of the targets against which the strike was to be delivered.

This experience is by no means out of date. It may be boldly applied in training not only fighter-bomber personnel, but also helicopter pilots. One need only establish coordination between air components and plan joint training sessions of fighter-bomber and reconnaissance personnel, for example. At exercises they should work against the same targets. I have no doubt that the effectiveness of range sorties would improve immediately. In short, senior officers have something to think about.

SAM Troops Train-Firing In Arctic Conditions

91UM0300A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel M. Osipenko, staff officer of an Air Defense Forces Combined Unit, by Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev: "In The Interests of Combat Alert Duty: Experiment in the Polar Region"]

[Text] Here in the polar region, people have become accustomed to the streaking flashes of missiles in the skies over the garrisons.

This new type of combat training for surface-to-air missile crews—firing from their permanent deployment sites—is exactly three years old. How successful has the experiment initiated in the combined unit been?

Colonel M. Osipenko, a staff officer in a combined Air Defense Forces unit, discussed this in a conversation with our correspondent.

"For purposes of clarification, I should say that the first firings were conducted on June 4, 1986," said Mikhail Arsenyevich, beginning our discussion. "It is a historic date for us, since before that time no such thing existed in the practice of the surface-to-air missile troops. The firing has been done on a regular basis for three years now and has become a good component of our professional training. We have dozens of firings under our belt from the icy rim of the ocean, so to speak. In simplified form, the firings go like this. A ship (or plane) from the Northern Fleet goes out to sea and puts up targets. Our divisions open fire on them. We act just as if we were in a combat situation, for we have to be prepared from our "position" to repel potential aggression. This form of training has its advantages."

[Dokuchayev] And it also has a fair number of drawbacks. I compared individual firings from the permanent deployment site and from a state firing range. The air situation is sharply different in terms of many parameters, and especially density of air attack. The comparison did not reflect well on your brainchild.

[Osipenko] After we had carried out two or three firings, we calculated that going to the state firing range would entail the waste of millions of rubles and two to three weeks of time. Now a year has gone by, and I, like my fellow officers and missile specialists Colonel A. Maydanyk, Colonel A. Yemelyanov, and Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Nekoz, remain proponents of firings from permanent deployment sites, though our view of their role in the training of missile troops has changed. For the time being, we are unable, despite our cooperation with the Northern Fleet combat training directorate, to create in the coastal zone the same kind of air attack density as at a firing range. The latter have special subunits that work with the target situation. We handle all these tasks ourselves.

[Dokuchayev] So each subunit needs to alternate firings from its deployment site with firings at a firing range.

[Osipenko] I would put it differently. We need to alter the ratio of training missions performed "at home" and at the firing range. Life itself compels us to do so. How did we begin? The division is on site and awaiting an air attack. Naturally, it isn't hard in these conditions to hit the target, even the most maneuverable one. But it is quite difficult to fire in the setting created for the division commanded by Lieutenant Colonel K. Stolbov. The missile crews get the equipment ready and then have a 300-kilometer march. To make such a trip along our impassable northern roads is a feat in itself. The division takes up position while on the move and enters into a mock engagement with live missile firing. So is it necessary, for example, to work on march training at a state firing range?

Or take the results of the past training year. Each firing carried out in the polar region entailed some sort of innovation in the training of our subunits' crews. The divisions headed by Major A. Ovcharenko and S.

Orekhov fired for the first time on targets the interval between which was exactly the same as at a firing range. The crew led by Major V. Malykhin fired at a target flying at low altitude, pushing the equipment's capabilities to the limit.

Needless to say, we will not have occasion to decline the firing range's services in the next few years. Let me cite just one example confirming this. The men under Major Yu. Korneyevets did some good firing in the polar region. But they failed to fully demonstrate their capabilities in a monitored firing. Of course, the quality of command and control on the part of the unit command post took a toll, but that doesn't alter the situation. Nevertheless, we now see the role of the firing range in a completely different light.

What is entailed in going to the firing range? First, there are the lengthy preparations for the trip of several thousand kilometers, loading and unloading operations, and the transfer of various supplies and gear. Once we arrive, we have to set up the equipment. In short, a lot of time is wasted. The combat training at the firing range takes about a week. But in the polar region, every day is worth its weight in gold for us, especially in summer. We have our combat work as well as preparations for winter. Especially since our summer is short; before we know it, winter's back.

[Dokuchayev] Do you have some specific proposals?

[Osipenko] Yes I do. We believe that all the initial combat training could be done on site, and that a crew should travel—or fly, to be more precise—to the firing range, for a brief period and without all kinds of technical support, for the combat firing stage. We would thereby save a great deal of time and millions of rubles in public funds.

[Dokuchayev] And what is the view of the Air Defense Forces command?

[Osipenko] The Air Defense Forces Main Staff supports our initiatives. And this year we have been instructed to refine the firing from permanent deployment sites, which is what we are doing, incidentally. We have already determined our top-priority tasks for the current training year. The paramount task is to carry out field firings from all types of surface-to-air missile systems in adverse target and jamming conditions. We will also practice firing in the course of surprise combat readiness inspections.

Another innovation is field firing in conjunction with ships of the Northern Fleet. As for exercises at the firing range, here we have not been authorized to depart from the old methods as yet. Therefore, we're firing from our deployment sites and going to the firing range. Here our proposals have not been supported.

I would like to get more concrete help in obtaining targets for the combined unit. The Northern Fleet in the person of Rear Admiral V. Moskalenko, chief of air defenses, is providing assistance. But the sailors often lack the targets we need, and we even have difficulties with the widely known LA-17. And what are we to do, for example, about fire observation and adjustment? We need instruments and specialists...

If the Air Defense Forces and the Navy Main Staffs would help us, we could set up a good training site for ourselves as well as for navy air defense forces. This would be a real contribution to the reform of combat training.

Kirov Development Highlights Spending Cuts

91UM0498A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 1st Rank A. Pilipchuk under rubric "Our Defense Arsenal": "The Kirov, Frunze, Kalinin... And Others?" First paragraph is box insert.]

[Text] The names in the title belong to nuclear powered guided missile cruisers. These notes will discuss the people who created them and certain problems of domestic shipbuilding and naval development.

Two ships came together in the Mediterranean in early 1984: the U.S. battleship New Jersey and the Soviet nuclear powered guided missile cruiser Kirov, a dreadnought of prewar construction and a dreadnought which was commissioned right at the end of the 20th century. Figuratively speaking, two gigantic visual aids on the history of development of U.S. and USSR shipbuilding were side by side, attesting to the different and at the same time interrelated approaches of oceanic powers toward building their fleets.

Having experienced a second youth after demothballing and supermodernization, the U.S. Navy battleship was shelling Lebanon with the main battery's almost one-and-one-half-ton projectiles. The Soviet Navy's first nuclear powered surface ship was participating in a tactical exercise of Mediterranean Squadron ships and was delivering what were conditional missile strikes against a conditional enemy. This too contained its allegory: since World War II the U.S. Navy had put its fists into action more than once in various corners of the oceanic ring, and the Soviet Navy was staying in athletic shape by shadow-boxing. A conversation about the creation of Kirov-Class ships and about our preeminence in some matters and backwardness in others probably would be incomplete without a consideration of these differences in the two states' geopolitics and their understanding of the role of navies.

The location of the main Soviet ship anchorage in the Mediterranean traditionally bears the names of commanding officers of the squadron task force based here. In 1984 it was commanded by Rear-Admiral V. Selivanov (now a Vice-Admiral and the Commander of the Leningrad Naval Base), and the anchorage was dubbed "Selivanovka." The appearance of the cruiser Kirov in the squadron could be compared with the erection of a gigantic skyscraper in a small hamlet. As a participant of the first combat patrol duty aboard the Kirov, I had more than one occasion to glance over the "Selivanovka neighborhood" from her upper story, the control center. At that time, in addition to the Kirov, the formation included patrol ships and large ASW ships of various designs, including the patrol ships known in the fleet as "poltinniki" [50-kopeck pieces] and gas-turbine powered large ASW ships, which had been given the poetic name "singing frigates" for the characteristic bird song of the turbines. It did not even occur to me that one and the

same designer had a hand in creating the "poltinniki," the "singing frigates," and the firstborn of nuclear powered surface shipbuilding.

And then, seven years after the Kirov's first lengthy deployment, I crossed the threshold of the planning and design bureau within whose walls almost all designs of our Navy's surface ships were created. The first Soviet combatant ship was designed here under the leadership of talented designer Vladimir Aleksandrovich Nikitin.

Today the planning and design bureau is headed by Vladimir Yevgenyevich Yukhnin, Nikitin's apprentice and a hereditary shipbuilder who takes his origin from Arkhangelgorod pomors. His father, Hero of Socialist Labor Yevgeniy Ivanovich Yukhnin, designed motor torpedo boats during the war. After completing the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute, his mother, Lidiya Filippovna, worked for long years in a bureau that created civilian vessels. Vladimir Yevgenyevich himself arrived in the planning and design bureau in 1960. He has been the bureau chief for 12 years now, and has been elected to this position by the collective for the last two years. Vladimir Yevgenyevich's older son serves aboard the nuclear powered guided missile cruiser Kalinin in the engineering department and his younger son is studying in a higher naval engineering school. Our conversation was about creation of the cruiser Kirov.

"We began designing the nuclear powered ship in '68," says Vladimir Yevgenyevich. "And the yard began developing the first hull sections five years later, in the summer of 1973. The Kirov was commissioned in 1980 after comprehensive trials.

"The Kirov's chief designer was Lenin Prize Laureate Boris Kupenskiy, now deceased. He is remembered as a charming, profoundly decent, sociable person. He found a common language both with workers and with ministers of the shipbuilding industry (by the way, three ministers were replaced during the time the Kirov was being designed and built). But Kupenskiy's greatest merit was his enormous technical erudition and ability to track new directions in world shipbuilding. When he was chief designer of the gas-turbine powered large ASW ship, I was leading designer in the planning department and was working on the general layout and architecture of the 'singing frigate.' I sat on the other side of the partition from Kupenskiy. When the conceptual design of the Kirov began, he said to me: 'Move into my office.' This is to say he suggested that I become a deputy. We shipbuilders have an age-old tradition that the chief designer works in the same room with his deputies. Shipbuilding is an area where information probably is the most valuable thing, and it is best absorbed first-hand. Kupenskiy believed that his entire team had to be identically informed.

"And the chief designer's team was substantial. While representatives of 10-12 specialties took part in

designing a destroyer, for example, 20 years ago, representatives of over 80 take part in creating a modern ship now.

"Hundreds of studies, full-scale experiments, and large-scale tests were conducted in creating the Kirov. During construction, orders from more than 200 basic suppliers had to come together at the yard according to the network schedule. All this was a heavy burden on the shoulders of the chief designer, but Kupenskiy and his team handled this gigantic load. Kupenskiy had a generally difficult but happy creative career. He breathed life into two designs which will leave their imprint on domestic and world shipbuilding. When the first Soviet gas-turbine ship was created, she became a world leader of that type and carried our preeminence onto ocean expanses. And take the Kirov, Frunze, and Kalinin. No one has such propeller shafts, each of which grinds out on the order of 70,000 hp. Foreign specialists recognized the superiority of the Soviet cruiser over foreign analogues in seaworthiness, weapon saturation and certain other specifications and performance characteristics."

The second meeting in the planning and design bureau was with its chief engineer, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Terentyev. He came to work in the bureau after completing a shipbuilding teknikum in 1947, and at the same time he studied at the Shipbuilding Institute. He began in the power engineering department, was sector chief, department chief, chief designer of ship systems, and deputy to Kupenskiy, chief designer of the "singing frigate." He has been the planning and design bureau's chief engineer since 1974.

"Many ships which were later the basis for introduction of missile weapons have received life within the walls of this bureau. For example, the design of the Groznyy-Class guided missile cruiser, in my view the most successful combat unit of that time, and the gas-turbine powered Krasnyy Krym-Class large ASW ship appeared. But it is my deep conviction that as a direction of development of combat equipment, the surface fleet at one time received a crushing blow from N. S. Khrushchev.

"The idea of creating a nuclear powered ship with great endurance capable of breaking off from supply assets, with good attack weapons, and with reliable antiaircraft and antisubmarine systems appeared. A prototype of a ship based on the 'singing frigate' appeared as the first rough design. The main power plant was a nuclear reactor, two steam turbines and thrust-augmenting turbines for developing full speed. The main missile system consisted of 6-8 missiles with a range up to 150 km... Inspired by the idea, Kupenskiy and I rushed to Moscow to see Boris Nikolayevich Zubov, then chief of the Main Surface Ship Administration of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry. We also dropped in on our own minister. Then we turned to the CinC Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov. Sergey Georgiyevich must be given credit for knowing how to listen. After familiarizing himself with our studies, he

said: 'Lads, you know, this is interesting, but not what is needed. This is weak. This again is the cruiser Groznyy, only nuclear powered. Put in some more work.' We knew from supporting information that the military institutes also were working in this direction. The CinC Navy gave the command to give us access to these materials. There began a joint study of the preliminary specifications; planning and research work; and development by kinds of armament. This was the beginning of the approach to the Kirov..."

"It seemed to everyone then that she would have a maximum displacement of 8,000 tons. We stumbled here and lost much time. Realizing the existing ideas of creating a ship with effective attack missile weapons, an air defense system capable of repelling attacks by massed offensive air weapons, and an ASW system for detecting and killing submarines required at least 20,000 tons of displacement. But what was the power complex for such a ship to be like? We could solve the problem by installing 4-6 nuclear reactors, but this meant six reactor cores, which was very cumbersome, difficult to control, and dangerous. True, the Americans had followed this path in creating the carrier Enterprise, but they did not return to this idea again in designing other ships. This problem was successfully solved for us: a design bureau for development of nuclear power plants found an elegant solution. As of today the Kirov's nuclear power plant has no equal among transport reactors.

"Missile weapons for the Kirov were designed by Academician Vladimir Nikolayevich Chelomey, now deceased, and the ship with a displacement of 24,000 tons is capable of using these weapons with large sea states..."

Rear-Admiral Aleksandr Sergeyevich Kovalchuk, the first commander of the Kirov and now chief of the Higher Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze, recalls:

"In October 1976 the Northern Fleet Military Council was to consider my candidacy for the position of chief of staff of a brigade of surface ships. When I entered and introduced myself, the CinC Fleet, Admiral of the Fleet G. Yegorov told me that the CinC Navy had ordered consideration of my candidacy for the position of the first commander of the nuclear powered guided missile cruiser Kirov and asked my consent. Of course I gave it. A Minister of Defense Order on my appointment was signed in November of that same year. The Commander-in-Chief's direction came: form the first group of 27 officers and be ready to leave for training..."

"The first meeting with Gorshkov took place in 1978. The cruiser already had been launched and the crew was taking part in her further construction. The Commander-in-Chief congratulated me on the appointment and then went the rounds of the entire ship. From that point in time Sergey Georgiyevich visited the cruiser every half-year. This was explainable: the Kirov was opening up a new stage in our Navy's development.

"CinC Northern Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin, now CinC Navy; Chief of Navy Combat Training Admiral P. Bondarenko (now deceased); Deputy CinC Navy for Shipbuilding Admiral P. Kotov; and Academicians Anatoliy Petrovich Aleksandrov and Vladimir Nikolayevich Chelomey spent time aboard back in the period of construction and then trials of the Kirov. I remember the arrival of Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov. By this point in time the ship had performed unique combat exercises and was completely battle-ready. The Minister gave several narrative instructions connected with the inspection: at his command the missile silos were opened, launchers were trained, and communications was established with Moscow. This was prior to the first combat patrol duty which lay ahead of the Kirov.

"Along with aircraft-carrying cruisers, such ships as the Kirov are a serious tool of defensive doctrine..."

I met with Deputy CinC Navy for Shipbuilding and Armament Admiral F. Novoselov after his return to the planning and design bureau from TDY. Fedor Ivanovich Novoselov finished the Pacific Higher Naval School imeni S. O. Makarov in 1951. He served aboard cruisers in gunnery departments. He completed the Naval Academy in 1962. He was appointed Deputy CinC Navy for Shipbuilding and Armament in March 1986.

"Great importance always has been attached to cruisers in our Russian Navy," says Fedor Ivanovich. "Armored cruisers are a domestic invention of preeminence. There was higher attention to them in the Soviet Navy as well. Much of what had been laid down back in the tsarist time was completed after the Revolution. The cruisers—Maksim Gorkiy, Kirov—were successful... There was a large series after the Great Patriotic War—Sverdlov, Murmansk, Chkalov, Chapayev, Ordzhonikidze... In the late 1950's many of them, including those not yet completed, went under the cutting torch. There later appeared the Grozny-Class and Sevastopol-Class guided missile cruisers with antiship missiles. In the first stages they were planned as patrol ships and ASW ships. At that time U.S. Navy nuclear powered submarines were armed with missiles with a range of 2,500 km, and so our surface fleet basically developed as an ASW fleet. In the 1960's the Americans built nine nuclear powered cruisers, but at that time there were no attack weapons on them. Such weapons later appeared in the U.S. Navy both during construction of new ships as well as during modernization. Attack systems now also have appeared on our ships, but I emphasize that they are equipped only with antiship missiles.

"Speaking of such ships as the Kirov, Frunze and Kalinin, they actually personify the might of our surface fleet and serve as a factor of its combat stability..."

The guided missile cruiser Kirov, firstborn of nuclear powered surface shipbuilding, already is 11 years old, almost half of the ship's life. The Frunze is seven years old and the Kalinin is younger, three years old. The nuclear

powered Yuriy Andropov will be commissioned after awhile; she will be turned over by Chief Designer Vilior Aleksandrovich Perevalov, who made a great contribution to the creation of these ships. The fifth hull laid down at the yard was cut up for "needles" not long ago under the eye of television cameras.

Admiral F. Novoselov told me that expenditures for shipbuilding dropped by 9-10 percent in 1990 and by 23 percent in 1991 compared with 1989. And this is in prices alone, as they say, without counting inflation processes. The Navy has to compensate industry for around R13 million, for orders already placed. And once again about the figure "four"—it is from this figure that the classic curve of the cost of ships as a function of their number drops.

Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Terentyev expressed it even more specifically: "They say: 'Why are you nervous? The United States will begin reducing its fleet soon.' Well, this is a Manilovism [smug complacency]. The United States has 12 carriers and is planning construction of another three nuclear powered carriers, one of which already had been launched, and of nine nuclear powered cruisers... This is a colossal force. The Americans are creating their Navy as an integral system and will not forgo a single one of its links if this threatens their national interests. But we are as frightened of the phrase USSR state interests as the devil is of incense. I think such interests nevertheless exist for such a large power..."

Vilior Aleksandrovich Perevalov: "I was a cadet at the Higher Naval Engineering School when almost-ready cruisers were cut up. This was a bitter picture. When the yard accepted the order for the Kirov, they had had almost a 20-year interruption in the practice of building ships. The working class and engineering-technical personnel were assembled bit by bit and the technology was adjusted. Now we again are threatened with the loss of scientific-technical potential. Such a firm as ours—you can count them on your fingers—will not disappear. We will go into the market and then come out with a different product, but we will lose those subunits of the planning and design bureau which are needed by the Navy and by national defense..."

Admiral F. Novoselov: "If you look, you will see that all naval programs in the United States are implemented regardless of who is in power—Republicans or Democrats, Ronald Reagan or J. Carter. That approach can only be called a state approach."

A state approach... Apparently a market economy, free enterprise, private ownership of land, a multiparty system and a liberal press is not yet quite a state without the Armed Forces. Will we ever understand this? I hope so.

Original 'Komsomolets' Findings Confirmed

91UM0312A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 3rd Rank Yu. Gladkevich: "A Moratorium on Fruitless

Discussions: USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Working Commission Declares Debate Cessation”]

[Text] In October of last year, the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Affairs of Youth sponsored a round table discussion that included certain USSR and RSFSR people's deputies, former submarine commanders, other reserve officers, and representatives of the Minsudprom [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry], design organizations, and planning organizations. The round table participants requested that the Defense and State Security Committee organize an additional and in-depth investigation into the causes and circumstances of loss of the “Komsomolets” nuclear submarine on 7 April 1989 in the Norwegian Sea.

Why was such a request made? After all, the governmental commission investigating the circumstances of the accident had already completed its work and distributed the final report.

Round table participants, USSR people's deputy A. Yemelyanenkov and Vice-Admiral Ye. Chernov (Reserve) in particular, while maintaining that they were not casting any doubt on the competence of the governmental commission members, did nevertheless state that the document that had been published by the commission does not present sufficient information on all the causes of the occurrence and on the lessons to be learned from the tragedy. However, they failed to realize that the document, which was written for a wide circle of people, was not intended to provide detailed professional answers to all questions, but rather to furnish information on the major findings reached by the commission. The necessary details are presented in numerous documents prepared by the governmental commission.

A working commission headed by committee Deputy Chairman Yu. Samsonov was tasked by the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee to honor the request by analyzing all materials associated with the Norwegian Sea disaster. The commission closely examined all aspects of design, construction, and operation of the submarine; the level of the “Komsomolets” crew's training; and the depth of investigation carried out by the governmental commission. Naval high authorities reported to the working commission members on progress made in implementing the measures related to accident prevention in the Navy.

After completing thorough and painstaking work, on 16 January of this year the working commission's members arrived at the conclusion that they place trust in the findings reached by the governmental commission that looked into the causes and circumstances dealing with the loss of the “Komsomolets” nuclear submarine and see no grounds for casting doubt on its work. The commission's thorough investigation into the causes and circumstances of the submarine's loss predetermines the absence of usefulness of further investigation prior to raising the submarine and obviates the need for forming

under parliamentary committees a group of various independent experts, the latter being another demand made by participants of the round table discussion.

The conclusion reached by the committee's working commission drew objections during the session on the part of Vice-Admiral Ye. Chernov (Reserve) and USSR People's Deputy A. Yemelyanenkov. It is their opinion that failure to call immediate parliamentary hearings on the “matter” of the nuclear submarine “Komsomolets” may lead to useless spending of funds allotted the Navy and industry to preclude similar accidents in the future. Thus, Vice-Admiral Ye. Chernov (Reserve), who continued to insist that the major cause of the submarine's loss is attributable to lack of professionalism on the part of the crew (this in direct opposition to the findings reached by the governmental commission), expressed his conviction that a large portion of the allotted funds should be applied not to assurance of greater design reliability or to scientific research and improvement of the industrial base, but instead to reorganizing crew training. He does have a right to his own opinion, of course, but the commission's findings are backed up by the opinion of dozens of competent specialists eager to find a general approach to resolving the problem.

A lively discussion was generated by Ye. Chernov's “Analysis of Damage Control Actions Taken by the Crew of the ‘Komsomolets.’” The reserve vice-admiral claimed that the statement the Navy appended to his document for circulation in the fleets in fact disavowed everything presented in the document.

It seems to me that the latter item—the same as Ye. Chernov, who has been criticizing the Navy from all rostrums possible—also can express a point of view relative to professionalism and accuracy of investigations carried out by Chernov. Incidentally, this is not the time to impose one's opinion on persons who have an opportunity to become familiar with differing points of view. There is an acknowledgment in the fleets of Chernov's having accomplished a piece of work that is substantial and not without merit. However, Chernov in basing his analysis virtually exclusively on excerpts from the “Komsomolets” log, which he partially distorted, did ignore the accounts provided by surviving crew members, who supplement to a great extent our understanding of what occurred aboard the submarine on that tragic day with results of tests and experiments. The governmental commission subjected all those accounts to close scrutiny, thus enabling it to formulate a more realistic appraisal of the crew's actions, design shortcomings of the vessel, and many other factors.

“Yevgeniy Dmitrievich Chernov is also wrong,” stated Admiral V. Zaytsev, Navy deputy commander-in-chief for maintenance and repair, “in his claiming that Naval authorities failed to attach any importance to his analysis. It has been carefully studied by the Navy, and, in addition, has served as the basis for taking concrete measures. Much of what Chernov has stated is generally

not new to us, since we are also professionals and employ a professional approach to resolving urgent problems."

Judging from the plan of measures being taken in the Navy after the "Komsomolets" tragedy, that is where the matter now stands. Implementation of many measures that Ye. Chernov suggested in his analysis was initiated long before February of 1990, the time when Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich submitted his document. In general, of the 20 lessons that Vice-Admiral Ye. Chernov (Reserve) claims should be learned from the Norwegian Sea tragedy and which he set down in his analysis, Naval authorities rejected only two. The reasons were highly valid. The author in listing them ignored elementary physical laws. All the remaining suggestions he made are either in the implementation stage or under development in research and design organizations, directorates, and Main Staff of the Navy, as being in harmony with the plan drawn up by the governmental commission and the Navy. For this reason, Ye. Chernov's attempts to inflame passions with his document are hardly in accord with the interests of the matter. In our view, the struggle for truth has become one of self-interest.

In the opinion of Yuriy Grigoryevich Samsonov, the time has come to declare a moratorium on fruitless debates on the causes and circumstances of the "Komsomolets" loss. The Navy and the Minsudprom should be permitted to act calmly, without the distraction of discussions, to carry out the decisions rendered by the country's government by implementing the measures that have been mapped out to improve the state of affairs of shipbuilding and the Navy.

Compendium Published on 'Komsomolets' Controversy

91UM0312B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko: "The 'Komsomolets': Tragedy and Fate"]

[Text] An unusual book has been printed by a high-circulation newspaper published in a submarine unit of the Northern Fleet. The title is "The Last Cruise of the 'Komsomolets': Tragedy and Fate". The cost of printing the book, which was ordered by the Council for Honoring the Memory of the "Komsomolets" Nuclear Submarine Crew, was covered by private contributions. The printing, producing 300 copies, places on the list of rare books this volume, which is intended primarily for relatives of deceased and surviving crew members.

The book is priceless, both in the literal and the figurative sense, as it were. Included in it are all the principal materials that have been published by the central and local press both immediately following the occurrence and in the course of the investigation into the causes and circumstances of the vessel's loss.

The book is also unusual in that the compilers attempt to correct—by means of footnotes that in some cases

occupy up to half a page and more—accidental or intentional errors and inaccuracies made by writers of articles; and in that they include comments made by the surviving submariners and others on the writings of journalists. As a result, the reader is provided an objective picture—as far as that is possible—of the occurrence.

The concept of publishing the book originated with journalist Captain-Lieutenant Aleksandr Savvov. Working in collaboration with Yelena Artemyeva of the editorial staff, he was responsible for accomplishing most of the compilation work. Much assistance and support in preparing the compendium was rendered by Rear Admiral A. Stepanov.

A second part of the book, entitled "Fate," is being prepared for publication. The compilers and authors of the second part request that friends and relatives—primarily seamen—of the fallen submariners send in documents, materials, and memoirs related to the deceased.

Naval Rescue Service Deep Diving Experiment

91UM0406A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Feb 91 Union Edition p 6

[Interview with Vice-Admiral R. Dymov, chief, Naval Search and Rescue Service, by V. Kocherov; date not given: "A Record-Breaking Dive: Soviet Seamen Perform a Dive to a Depth of 500 Meters."]

[Text] This became possible due to new diving methods, which our country was first to develop and test. There is no comparison anywhere in the world for the scope of research and testing carried out during this experiment. What were the goals pursued by this experiment? Vice-Admiral R. Dymov, chief of the Naval Search and Rescue Service, tells us about it.

[Dymov] "We had both economic and military missions," says Rostislav Leonidovich. "It is known that the mastery of the depths of the world ocean has become a top priority for many countries. For example, the total budget allocated to these goals in the USA is nearly as great as the amount allocated to space, and it increases by over 10% each year. This interest is explained by the belief of scientists that there are 150 billion tons of oil in the sea, compared to 70 billion tons of oil reserves on land."

And now, as to the military goals of the experiment. They are self-evident: Research on ways and means to rescue people at sea, including rescue from damaged submarines and manned underwater vehicles. Our work was also spurred on because of the loss of our nuclear submarine, Komsomolets. The course of the experiment was totally controlled by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

[Kocherov] What specific tasks did the researchers have?

[Dymov] They may be tentatively divided into four groups. First, they were able to verify the parameters of the gaseous medium and microclimate, as well as compression and decompression schedules at depths of up to 500 meters. Second, they tested the working ability of a human organism at increased pressures of up to 50 atmospheres. Third, they determined the safe parameters of the microclimate in diving apparatuses and the composition of artificial gas mixtures for underwater work. Fourth, they developed medical and technical requirements for new deep-water diving equipment.

[Kocherov] Was all this research conducted only by the Navy?

[Dymov] No. Scientists from the USSR Academy of Sciences, institutes of the USSR Ministry of Health, and other government departments actively participated in this experiment.

[Kocherov] What kind of equipment was used in these experiments?

[Dymov] Generally, equipment that was manufactured in our country. These were hydrographic systems with the aid of which various physiological research and technical experiments were conducted under increased pressures and with underwater depths of 300 to 500 meters. By the way, according to evaluations by Soviet and foreign experts, the technical equipment and living conditions of our hydro-decompression systems conform to world standards, and in a number of parameters they are better than similar hydro-decompression systems in foreign hyperbaric centers.

We also used foreign equipment.

[Kocherov] How much time did the aquanauts spend under this great pressure?

[Dymov] It varied. Under pressures of 35-45 atmospheres, up to 25 days; 50 atmospheres—up to 15 days.

[Kocherov] What would have happened if one of them there under water had needed serious medical attention. Would you have been able to give it?

[Dymov] I doubt it. Help from the outside would not have come in time because of the long duration of decompression schedules: at least 21 days for a working schedule and 30 days for a medical schedule. But it was precisely for this reason that doctors were a part of the aquanaut groups.

[Kocherov] I imagine that even for the stanchest persons these long stays at such great depths were probably a great trial, were they not?

[Dymov] They do not hand out high government awards for nothing. Indeed, for courage and heroism while accomplishing a special mission Captain Third Rank A Vatagin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union; and Colonel of Medical Services V. Semko—Hero of Socialist Labor. Orders of the Red Banner were

awarded to Major of Medical Services V. Zyuban and Midshipmen V. Neznayev and R. Nikitin; Order of the Red Star to Midshipman A. Savin; Order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," III Degree, to Captain Second Rank Sh. Parazyany and Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Services A. Povazhenko; and Order of Merit to our employee O. Bardysheva.

Conversion, Problems With Ship Obsolescence

91UM0302A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Correspondent, Captain 3rd Rank V. Maryukha: "The Fleet Today and Tomorrow: Conversion, the Market, Ship Repair"]

[Text] The longevity of ships and ship equipment (and ultimately total expenditures for them) depends not only on their skillful operation but also on prompt technical checks, regularly scheduled maintenance, and modernization. However, the realities of navy life today are such that nearly 20 percent of the Navy's ships are going without prompt and regularly scheduled technical maintenance.

In practice, this means that dozens of warships fail to enter the shipyard at the intervals specified in their technical documentation, that engine operating times between overhauls are extended so much that it is sometimes necessary to do major overhauls instead of intermediate maintenance, and that the work is stretched out for so long that ship repair deadlines are missed, with the result that the next ship takes the same path as its predecessor, wearing out its machinery and equipment to the limit. In other words, a vicious cycle arises in which ships "grow old" and "die" prematurely. Incidentally, the current index for ship maintenance services is the highest in the Navy's history.

And what awaits the fleet tomorrow?

Against the backdrop of the overall reductions in defense expenditures, the percentage of funds available for "ship repairs" is undergoing significant cuts—after all, the Navy has to pay for ships, weapons, equipment, and sets of spare parts and accessories that are already on order. Under market conditions, the costs of supplies will inevitably increase as well (many suppliers are already refusing to conclude contracts under the previous terms). The funds that remain will cover only 50 percent of necessary outlays for ship maintenance—and this at a time when enterprises under the Main Shipyard Directorate are literally begging for an opportunity to make some money and navy ships are gradually falling into decay without proper upkeep.

Captain 1st Rank V.N. Uryvskiy, chief of the Navy's Technical Directorate, told me that according to the directorate's figures, naval shipyard orders are down by 1.5 billion rubles [R]. This in turn has led to low wages (the workers are demanding a 50% to 100% wage increase), the departure from the yards of the best

specialists, and the loss of vocational skills. It could also entail possible cutbacks in the number of employees, which would ultimately result in unemployment—especially in areas where the shipyard is the sole industrial enterprise. For example, one yard in the polar region that has serviced our submarines for more than 20 years has been forced to curtail its operations in view of the specialized nature of its services. And what will become of the people who were initially lured there by high wages and whose services are now unnecessary? In more "civilized" areas the picture is somewhat different. In the first 10 months of last year alone, the Kronshtadt Shipyard lost more than 800 people—they can earn more in cooperatives and at civilian enterprises. And those who left were not the worst or the "mediocre" workers; rather it was the first-class specialists—those who upheld the shipyard's reputation—who left the yard that was doomed to simply vegetate.

That a hard lot awaits the Kronshtadt Shipyard and others like it can be judged by the following figures. In 1990, the Kronshtadt shipyard workers' plan for consumer goods production amounted to just R240,000. In 1991, plans call for state consumer goods orders valued at R3.2 million.

"And we haven't gotten anything with which to fill those orders," said Captain 1st Rank O. Zhemchuzhnyy, the shipyard's deputy director for production. "We have to come up with the raw materials, create the additional production space, and study and operate in the market on our own. Meanwhile, we could use the money it will take to produce these goods to repair three to four fishing trawlers a year—and the fishermen are waiting in line for ship repairs. These are vital services and vital profits. And yet we are being forced to convert production."

Indeed, common sense suggests that by "curtailing" the maintenance of naval ships, the shipyards could use their accumulated potential to maximum benefit and advantage for themselves to repair civilian ships, especially as finding customers is hardly a problem. Of course, in an atmosphere of panic buying and empty shelves, there will be a demand even for the hardware items to be produced at Kronshtadt. However, has anyone given any thought as to just what this kind of production conversion is going to cost? Sooner or later the market will be saturated with consumer goods. Won't we then have to rebuild the shipbuilding industry? We're hardly going to give up our naval, fishing, and merchant marine fleet at some point, and this kind of "conversion" is going to completely deprive us of not only production capacity but also specialists and, ultimately, our own fleet.

It has already been said repeatedly and much has been written about the fact that we are going about conversion, like many other things, in a haphazard manner and without thinking about the future. But no one is in any hurry to rescind the adopted decision. For example, the Kronshtadt shipbuilders have gone all the way up the chain of command, from the Leningrad soviet to the State Planning Committee, and have never received an

answer. Yet the fact is that conversion could be carried out differently, with due regard for both present and future needs.

To prove this, I will cite just two examples of "sensible" conversion from foreign and Soviet experience. In the United States, people began thinking about conversion long before the end of World War II and in 1943 began planning a two percent annual increase in consumer goods production. In our country, by contrast, the jump was more than 10 times that much at a single shipyard—and by no means the shipyard with the highest capacity.

Some might object to this, saying that's how "they" do it, over there. But the fact is that we have such experience as well. It was reported in the press not too long ago that a military plant that has been producing MIGs will in two years assimilate the production of the Il-114 passenger plane. Not irons or hardware items, mind you, but output in line with the plant's purpose—aircraft. And not tomorrow, but two years from now.

Unfortunately, the drawbacks of conversion are not the only thing that is putting the Navy's shipyard industry into a desperate situation. Nor does the market—which some see as a panacea for all troubles and which others, on the contrary, are using in an effort to scare people—hold anything good in store as yet. The shipyards will enter the "regulated" interplay of market forces literally with their hands tied.

Contractual relations—something that officials both at the shipyard and in the technical directorate told me are one of the most important market mechanisms—are absent between the customer and contractor, the price schedule for various services remains unchanged, and the tax on the wage fund impedes its growth. The shipyard management is especially worried by the enterprises' lack of hard-currency accounts, which prevents them from entering the international market. The transfer of earned funds to a pooled foreign-currency account in the Defense Ministry's Central Finance Directorate holds little promise for the enterprise in question, since nothing trickles down from the common "money-box" even for production modernization. And yet the Kronshtadt Shipyard has offers from foreign firms for millions of dollars—money that the country badly needs. If it had its own account and sensible taxation arrangements (including the transfer of some of the foreign currency it would earn to the Defense Ministry fund), the shipyard could supply its own needs and at the same time not stint the government. Moreover, if the proposed deals were to be concluded, it wouldn't even be necessary to convert production—the orders would be in keeping with the shipyard's basic line of work—not to its detriment.

As the shipyard workers attempt to sort out this pile of "conversion-market" problems, the Navy is daily losing

sizable sums of money on account of missed repair deadlines. The very funds that conversion is intended to save are being thrown to the wind.

"The CG Admiral Zozulya has been undergoing repairs since 1985," said Captain 1st Rank G. Shkirin, commander of a formation of ships undergoing repairs, sharing his problems with me. "The latest deadline for the ship to leave the shipyard has now passed, and there's still lots of work to be done. The situation with the Marshal Timoshenko, a large antisubmarine ship, is the same. And what are conditions like for the crew while its ship is undergoing repairs? There are gaping holes cut through the ships' hulls, and hatches and doors have been removed. Maintaining a constant temperature is out of the question. Gas levels in the quarters exceed allowable norms by 15 to 20 times. And the sailors are supposed to not only survive under these conditions but also perform a good deal of the repairs themselves. We need a floating barracks for the men, and dormitories for the officers and warrant officers who are separated from their families for years."

The indirect losses incurred by the fleet include the fact that virtually the entire crew is replaced during the lengthy repair periods (the Admiral Zozulya, for example, has had four different executive officers alone, and a total of 65 officers have come and gone—more than the prescribed manning level). By the time the ship leaves the shipyard, the crew has lost its essential navigation skills, making it likely that the ship will soon return for further repairs—and by no means regularly scheduled ones.

The "decay" of the ship repair industry is characteristic of not only naval shipyards. True, my attempts to learn more about the problems, for example, of the Baltic Shipyard have been unsuccessful—the management was clearly disinclined to advertise its difficulties. And understandably so: Given the impending shift to the market, the prudent manager is not going to speak at length on his insolvency. But one thing the shipyard officials could not hide was the "help wanted" signs: "Wanted, wanted, wanted..." The primary need is for workers trained in the basic ship-repair and shipbuilding specialties. The same is true of the Northern Wharf Shipyard (the former Admiralty Shipyard), whose help wanted signs are two steps away from those of the Baltic shipyard.

It is quite possible that against the backdrop of the overall economic crisis, the situation in the shipyards is not the worst. But this is little consolation. For at issue is not just the shipyards but also the preservation of our Navy, which, despite the urging of certain "champions" of sovereign interests that it be written off as scrap, we nonetheless continue to need for the time being, if only because the United States has no intention as yet of reducing its own navy.

Mistreatment of Crew of Retired Nuclear Submarine

91UM0291A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Senior Lieutenant A. Bystrov, Northern Fleet: "The Status of a Nuclear Submarine ... in a Shore Unit."]

[Text] "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" has written more than once about the problem of nuclear submarines that have served out their time. A new twist to this subject was given by a letter received in the editorial office from members of a crew of one of these decommissioned nuclear submarines.

The huge mass of steel berthed at a ship repair plant is barely reminiscent of a one-time mighty nuclear submarine. The conning tower has been cut off and the upper deck is snowswept. I suppose that only the wound up starting cables show us that what is in front of us is a ship, even though stricken from the active list.

A small crew—many have been transferred to other ships—comes daily to the submarine, as before, in time for raising the Navy flag, although there is no longer even a flag. Several generations of military seamen were proud to serve on this nuclear submarine. And they were proud for a reason: It was this ship which was first among all our nuclear submarines to win the Order of the Red Banner for its Arctic voyage and for surfacing amid all the ice at the North Pole on September 29, 1963. And now this ship has begun its last voyage. And what about the ship's crew?

"Dear editor! In September 1987 our ship was taken off the combat list of the fleet. In July 1988 the active cone was removed without removing the reactor and its security systems. There was no improvement in the radiation level after the removal of the active cone."

"Prior to May 1990 the question of additional payments for special duty conditions [OUS -osobyye usloviya sluzhby] did not come up. In May, the finance service of the military unit, referencing higher financial organizations, reached a decision:

1. The crew should not receive additional payments for OUS.
2. The officer and midshipmen personnel would not receive preferential prolonged meritorious service for duty aboard a nuclear submarine with its nuclear power apparatus intact."

"Because of the above, an unfortunate situation developed with regard to providing payments to officers and midshipmen."

In meetings with the submarine commander and members of the crew, after having become familiar with the situation on board the ship and around it, the following was clarified: The submariners, in their letter, were silent

about many other problems that have come up in connection with decommissioning the submarine.

Judge for yourselves. Two years ago, the crew—together with workers of the ship repair plant—began to prepare the ship for destruction. Because the vessel was in an open dock, the reduced crew had to work in rain and in cold, and be on guard duty for several days at a time in freezing compartments. But no one complained about the difficulties, understanding the importance of the task. There was, however, something to complain about.

Take just the housing question. As long as six years ago the submariners left their garrison and went to a ship repair yard for the ship's regular repair and maintenance. But inasmuch as the repair and maintenance turned into preparing the ship for decommissioning, the crew's absence from the garrison, with its established living conditions and comfortable quarters, was prolonged.

Captain-Lieutenant I. Volkov (one of the few) was able to rent a flat in the unfamiliar garrison, for which he pays a rather tangible amount monthly. Captain Third Rank V. Petrenko was a bit luckier: His wife received quarters in the oblast center. Of course, Petrenko has to spend several hours a day going home and back, but they both take this as an insignificant inconvenience compared to the lifestyle of other officers and midshipmen.

Midshipman S. Korochkin, did not manage to wait out the solution to his housing problem. He decided he would be happy in moving with his wife and two children into a half-basement nine square meters in area; and he stayed there for several years. And as for those who were not fortunate enough to rent even a corner or a basement, they have to travel several hundred kilometers to their old garrison to see their families. These trips cost each person nearly 100 rubles every month.

The submariners also cannot have enthusiasm for their work because of the total uncertainty about their future.

In the two years since the decision was made to decommission the ship, no representative from any cadre or other organization has met with the officers and midshipmen to inform them of their service prospects.

Is it any wonder, then, that after all these foul-ups the news about stopping additional pay for special duty conditions—that is, in effect transferring the nuclear submarine to the status of a shore unit—had such a devastating effect? All the more, because no explanations at all were received from the fleet finance service.

I decided to obtain these explanations myself and went to Colonel G. Sukhanov, Chief of the Fleet Finance Service. As it turned out, the directives which determine the payment norms simply had not foreseen "our" situation... And, if one goes by the letter of the law, additional payments for the crew's special duty conditions should have been stopped two years ago when the ship was stricken from the combat list of the fleet. So we even have to thank the finance people for continuing these payments to May of last year on their own responsibility and at their own risk.

While preparing this material, I found out that the question of money—after the ship's commander had written a letter to the commander-in-chief of the fleet—had finally been resolved at the Minister of Defense level. Recently the submariners again began to receive payment for special duty conditions. Really, just like on a diesel submarine.

The first Soviet nuclear submarine was commissioned more than thirty years ago. Today, the lifecycle of many nuclear submarines has come to an end. This means that utilizing retired nuclear submarines and storing the nuclear reactors that have used up their power have become full-blown problems. And amidst the global importance of these tasks, we should not forget about such "trivia" as the fate of the crews of these retired nuclear submarines. After all, ships go away, but people remain...

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Reviewer on
Future Army Reform

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in Russian No 2, 16 Jan 91 p 7

[Article by Vladislav Yanelis, *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* reviewer: "What Kind of Army Don't We Need?"]

[Text] In answering the question, "What kind of army do we need?", it is now possible to formulate a definite answer: a different kind. But exactly what kind? Should we copy the Americans who long ago forgot about problems with the draft and are concerned only with the qualitative parameters of their armed forces? Should we introduce a mixed concept of recruiting, as practiced in Germany, or preserve the military obligation in its present form, making only cosmetic changes, so that—at least for the time being—the vigilance of the radicals will be lulled.

I envy with all my heart the conviction of some of our young reformers who know what to do with our army and how in order to have it conform to world standards.

I am also attracted by many of their proposals and I am all "for" our armed forces, built on a contract basis, in other words, professional basis. But before speaking about details of the impending reform, I think that the main issue should be discussed. Namely, what commonwealth of nations or republics would our army be protecting in the future?

Well, for a minute let us imagine this scenario. The parliament of the RSFSR decides not to send Russian military contingents beyond the borders of the republic, which is now already occurring in Moldova, Georgia, the Baltics, Armenia, and partly in the Ukraine and so forth. And soon this decision automatically frees Lithuania or even Moldova from the presence of a part of the all-union army. Garrisons are vacated, firing ranges, training centers, and airfields become deserted. Then Russia, which for all practical purposes does not have a common border with states having a pro-NATO orientation, announces that it is necessary to drastically cut its Armed Forces or that it intends to stop subsidizing all-union army programs. What next?

Does the all-union Ministry of Defense, in the best case, turn into a coordinating body for the activities of fifteen, or even thirty republican armies? It is possible that the ministry will reserve for itself (if the sovereign republics agree to it) the Strategic Rocket Forces, space units, a part of the navy, and strategic aviation. The republics and only the republics will decide the rest: How many infantry and other units should there be within its borders and what principle will be used to recruit them?

Do you believe that this is impossible and that Russia will never take this kind of action? But who could have imagined just a year ago that a People's Deputy of the USSR, having been barely elected to the All-Union

parliament, would today be signing the decisions of his own parliament which in effect repudiate presidential decrees?!

Well, let us suppose that for a certain period of time the Union, and consequently its army, preserve the status quo and are faced with the necessity of implementing military reforms. And now I am comparing two military proposals. One is presented by Yazov, the USSR Minister of Defense, and the other is signed by Lopatin, a major in the reserves who just half a year ago was a virtual unknown People's Deputy of the USSR. For the sake of truth it must be said that both are backed by teams of experts.

First impression: The official version of the reform presents little that is new and protects more the existing army structures rather than the interests of the country and the society. All innovations listed are stretched out in time and its formulations are exceedingly diffuse. What would it cost them, for example, "to define more precisely the internal structure of military districts and the system of military- educational institutions"? But even this proposal is scheduled only for 1994-1995. Well, in the first place, what is meant by "define more precisely"? In Russian, it is simpler to say, "to reorganize." But it would appear that the minister is not prepared to reorganize. For him, "to define more precisely" was already enough.

Who is ready to give the military minister four or five years to get moving? The army, just like society, is being torn apart by conflicts. The commissar corps, having successfully survived, tells the military personnel over and over again about maintaining loyalty to the Warsaw Pact, even though, as a point of fact, the Pact no longer exists. Party organs, as before, conduct quick trials of those who dare to doubt the propagandistic dogmas about the only correct socialist path of development.

Continually speaking about the necessity for strengthening the country's defensive capability, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is stubborn in not recognizing that the army's combat capability is decreasing day by day. Why is this so? Our pilots are not allowed to fly their aircraft in order to economize on fuel. The soldiers are begrimed an extra ten bullets for training. Gunners of infantry combat vehicles [BMP] are doled out such a minimum amount of ammunition that some, when demobilized, still have not learned how to hit a target. And rocket gunners can go through their entire enlistment without having gone through a single combat training session.

What is a four million man army doing anyway, other than wearing a military uniform? Except for very modest combat training, the army is guarding innumerable military sites. Infantry officers have to go on guard duty nearly every other day and personnel do not have time to sleep enough after these regular duty details.

The army, about which a lot has been written, is literally crushed with housekeeping duties: it is building barracks

for itself, drill fields, hangars, clubs, dining halls, warehouses, and so on. The army is thrown into the breach when there is no one to unload railway cars, transport the harvest, or drag furniture from one building to another. And this is all at the expense of combat training, because these housekeeping duties are being done not by just anyone, but by regular cadre units.

It should not be this way. Any diversion of combat units to fulfill functions not normal to them gives rise to a disequilibrium among the troops and a psychological discomfort, and places them in a humiliating position before society. How does a soldier feel if an officer orders him to steal lacquer that is in short supply from an army-sponsored factory, because the lacquer is needed to renovate the Lenin room? Finally, how does a soldier feel when he has to spend months to renovate a personal dacha belonging to his division commander who is long used to seeing a free and uncomplaining workforce in his personnel? In general, I am against the over-inflated rosters of our senior commanders, military district and army staffs, and various services where ordinary paperwork is done by generals and colonels. Count up the total square meters in buildings now occupied by the Ministry of Defense in Moscow. This is a city within a city! Never mind the Pentagon, where for decades they do not go beyond the walls of their tetrahedron [sic]!

And the minister, in his proposal, is planning to decrease the commanding staffs by only 15-20 percent, leaving the army with a total of 3-3.2 million men. Is this really conceivable under conditions of sovereignty for the republics and the coming market economy? Who is going to pay for these expenditures—the center, Russia, Moldova, or the Baltics that are impetuously going through a change?

The program proposed by former officer Lopatin, despite a certain pretentiousness and politicization is nevertheless significantly more realistic. It takes into consideration the overall world tendency to decrease the fear of a military catastrophe, makes a point in favor of technical improvements in armament, and strongly emphasizes, excuse my cliche, the meaning of the human factor in the army. This is not an optimal proposal, but it is nonetheless elastic, open to additions and corrections, and does not pretend to be a final version. This is because its very spirit is democratic.

Once I was witness to a training skirmish between two professional warrant officers and six soldiers in their second year of duty. Both groups were paratroopers. The warrant officers scattered the enlisted men like so many kittens, then showed what they could do at a firing range, piling up twice as many points as the young enlisted men. Then they masterfully manipulated combat equipment on the tank gunnery range and demonstrated various other wondrous things. And this did not surprise anyone. They were professionals! Why, then, is it so long and so arduous for us to reach a decision that would be natural for a normal society? And included in this are decisions with regard to our Armed Forces.

Draft Statute on Status of Officers

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[Draft Statute on Military Service and Service in the Reserve of the USSR Armed Forces by Officers]

[Text]

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. This statute determines the procedures of military service and of service in the reserve of the USSR Armed Forces by officer personnel¹.

Military service by officers is a special form of state service by citizens of the USSR in fulfillment of their universal military service obligation in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces prior to attainment of maximum age, or in time periods established by the USSR law "On the Universal Military Service Obligation and Military Service" and stipulated by contract, and in wartime, until special orders are issued (demobilization).

Service of officers in the reserve entails attendance of courses of study and the fulfillment of the procedures and rules of call-up for military service in peace and in wartime.

Officers are defined as USSR citizens awarded the rank of an officer.

2. The USSR law "On the Universal Military Service Obligation and Military Service" establishes the following officer ranks:

| Troop | Ships Personnel |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| Junior lieutenant | Junior lieutenant |
| Lieutenant | Lieutenant |
| Senior Lieutenant | Senior Lieutenant |
| Captain | Captain-Lieutenant |
| Major | Captain 3d rank |
| Lieutenant-Colonel | Captain 2d rank |
| Colonel | Captain 1st rank |
| Major-General | Rear-Admiral |
| Lieutenant-General | Vice-Admiral |
| Colonel-General | Admiral |
| General of the Army | Admiral of the Fleet |
| Marshal of the Soviet Union | |

In regard to officers possessing a medical or legal education on active duty in the medical or legal service, the words "of the medical service" or "of justice" are added to their ranks respectively (Lieutenant of Medical Service, Major of Justice). The rank "Marshal of Aviation", equivalent to the rank of "General of the Army" is established for senior-grade officers serving in aviation.

Distinctive Guards ranks, which are formed by adding the word "Guards" before the corresponding rank (Guards Senior Lieutenant, Guards Colonel) are established for officers serving in Guards units, on ships and in combined units and large strategic formations.

3. Officers are subdivided:

- a) in relation to the universal military service obligation:
 - into officers on active duty;
 - into officers in the reserve—reserve officers;
 - into officers in retirement—retired officers;
- b) in relation to ranks:
 - into junior-grade officers (from Junior Lieutenant to Captain inclusively);
 - into senior-grade officers (from Major to Colonel inclusively);
 - into general and flag officers (from Major-General to Marshal of the Soviet Union inclusively).

Officers retain their officer rank for life. Officers in the reserve add the word "reserve" to their rank (Captain (reserve), Lieutenant-Colonel (reserve)), while officers who are retired add the word "retired" to their rank (Colonel (retired), Lieutenant-General (retired)).

Officers may be stripped of their officer rank on the basis of the grounds and in accordance with the procedures foreseen by articles 24, 83 and 94 of this statute.

NOTE: In this and subsequent articles of this statute, references to troop ranks of officer personnel also imply ranks equal to them as foreseen in Article 2 of this statute, unless otherwise stipulated.

4. Officers on active duty are subdivided in relation to time of service:

- a) into cadre [regular] officers;
- b) into short-term service officers.

Cadre officers include officers who have voluntarily selected military service as their profession, who have accepted the Officer's Code of Honor and who are serving in accordance with legislative acts of the USSR and on the basis of a signed contract for a term of not less than 10 years.

Short-term service officers include officers who have been accepted for military service on the basis of a contract for a term of not less than 3 years, or who are called up from the reserve for military service for 2 years in an officer's position, subject to be filled by junior-grade officers.

5. The cadre officer corps is formed out of cadets of military educational institutions², who are awarded their first officer rank after graduating from military educational institutions or during their time of study in them, on the basis of an individual contract signed by them with the USSR Ministry of Defense concerning service as an officer in accordance with existing law.

When additional demand exists, the officer corps is also supplemented by reserve officers slated for military service.

In the event of need, the officer corps is also supplemented by awarding officer ranks:

- to warrant officers on active duty;
- to compulsory service privates, sergeants and senior NCOs corps;
- to women on active duty in private, sergeants and senior NCO corps positions.

6. The reserve officer corps is formed out of officers dismissed from military service into the reserve.

This corps is replenished by awarding officer ranks:

- to persons who had completed a military training course under the reserve officer program in civilian institutions of higher education;
- to persons of the privates, the sergeants and the senior NCO, and warrant officer corps dismissed from military service into the reserve;
- to persons with a military service obligation and to women who have graduated from civilian institutions of higher education in a specialty kindred to a corresponding military specialty;
- to persons with a military service obligation who have attended reserve officer training courses.

7. Officers remain on active duty and in the reserve until the following maximum ages:

| Ranks | Maximum Ages | | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | On Active Duty | In the First Category Reserve | In the Second Category Reserve | In the Third Category Reserve |
| Junior-grade officers | 43 | 45 | 50 | 55 |
| Senior-grade officers: | | | | |
| majors, lieutenant colonels | 45 | 50 | 55 | 60 |
| colonels | 50 | 55 | - | 60 |
| Senior-grade officers: | | | | |
| major-generals, lieutenant-generals | 55 | 60 | - | 65 |
| colonel-generals and above | 60 | - | - | 65 |

Reserve officers recognized for health reasons by a military medical board to be suited to limited military service or unfit for military service in peacetime, or to be suited for limited military service in wartime, are carried in military records as being in the third category reserve.

Female officers are listed in the third category reserve irrespective of their officer rank. Their maximum age in the reserve is set at 50 years.

II. PERFORMANCE OF MILITARY SERVICE

Chapter 1. Awarding a Rank, Reduction in Rank, Loss of Rank, Restoration of Rank

8. Officer ranks are awarded personally to individuals on active duty. Military or other special training, prior service and the presently occupied position are taken into account when determining the form of rank awarded to an officer.

The ranks of officers are subdivided into initial and promoted depending on the sequence in which they are awarded.

The initial officer ranks are awarded to persons certified as officers.

Promoted officer ranks are awarded when the rank to be awarded corresponds to the rank foreseen by the official position occupied, and upon expiration of a set time of service in rank.

Officer ranks are awarded strictly by the rules of subordination.

9. The initial officer rank of "Junior Lieutenant" is awarded:

- a) to students of military medical faculties of civilian medical institutes, students of the Military Veterinary Faculty of the Moscow Veterinary Academy imeni K. I. Skryabin upon their graduation to their second year, and as regards those of them who had served set terms of compulsory military service prior to enrollment in these faculties, at the time of their enrollment in the indicated faculties;
- b) to cadets of military educational institutions offering a six-year course of studies—upon commencing their sixth year, and as regards those of them who had served a set term of compulsory military service prior to admission to military educational institutions—upon commencing their fifth year;
- c) to servicemen who complete junior officer training (with the exception of persons indicated in Paragraph "d", Article 10 of this statute).

10. The initial officer rank of "Lieutenant" is awarded:

- a) to cadets—upon graduation from a military educational institution (with the exception of those indicated in Paragraph "a", Article 75 of this statute);
- b) to warrant officers, extended-service servicemen and women serving in private, sergeant and senior NCO positions who have graduated from correspondence studies at military educational institutions;

—c) to warrant officers, extended-service servicemen and women serving in private, sergeant and senior NCO positions assigned in accordance with the established procedure to officer positions and who have successfully fulfilled not less than 1 year of their obligation at these positions, if a need for officers of the given specialty exists;

—to those possessing a higher civilian education and having passed examinations without course work under an established program;

—to those having graduated from civilian institutions of higher education in a specialty kindred to a corresponding military specialty;

—d) to servicemen possessing a higher education who graduated from a junior officer training course;

—e) to women who have graduated from civilian institutions of higher education in a specialty kindred to a corresponding military specialty, and are accepted for military service to fill an officer position, if a need exists for officers of the given specialty.

11. Persons who possess special ranks of middle- and senior-grade command personnel of internal affairs organs and who do not possess officer ranks and are transferred to military service for use at officer positions or are appointed to these positions are awarded the initial officer rank equal to the special rank they possess.

Note: Middle- and senior-grade commanders include:

- middle-grade commanders—persons awarded special ranks from Lieutenant of Militia and Lieutenant of Internal Service to Captain of Militia and Captain of Internal Service inclusively;
- senior-grade commanders—persons awarded special ranks from Major of Militia and Major of Internal Service to Colonel of Militia and Colonel of Internal Service inclusively.

12. The initial officer rank is awarded by the USSR Minister of Defense.

13. Promotion officer ranks are awarded to officers personally, in successive order, when the rank to which the officer is promoted corresponds to the rank foreseen for the official position he occupies, and upon expiration of a set period of service at the prior rank.

Officers serving out disciplinary punishment are not considered for promotion. This includes officers who have received a warning that their performance is sub-standard or who have been demoted, and officers against whom criminal proceedings are under way.

14. The officer ranks that may be awarded to officers on the basis of the officer positions they occupy are foreseen in the tables of organization of the military units. In this case, the ranks of general and flag officers are awarded for positions which the President of the USSR qualifies as positions to be filled by general and flag officers.

15. The following terms of service at particular officer ranks are established for officers on active duty:

| Rank | For Flight Crew Officers and Submarine Officers (as per List of Positions Stated in the Order of the USSR Minister of Defense) | For All Other Officers |
|--------------------|--|------------------------|
| Junior Lieutenant | 1 year | 1 year |
| Lieutenant | 1 year | 2 years |
| Senior Lieutenant | 2 years | 3 years |
| Captain | 2 years | 3 years |
| Major | 3 years | 4 years |
| Lieutenant-Colonel | 4 years | 5 years |
| Colonel and above | Not established | |

NOTE: The term of service in the rank of Lieutenant is set at 1 year for officers who have graduated from military educational institutions with a course of study of 5 years or more, and for officers accepted for military service voluntarily on the basis of a contract for a term of not less than 10 years after graduating from civilian institutions of higher education.

Time served in a particular rank while in the reserve is counted in the time of service in an officer rank for officers appointed to active duty from the reserve.

Time of service in an officer rank is calculated from the day the order awarding the corresponding rank is signed. Time of service in a particular rank is calculated for officers recertified for an equal rank from the day the order awarding them the rank they possessed prior to recertification was signed.

Time served as criminal punishment is not included in time of service in an officer rank.

16. Junior- and senior-grade officer promotion ranks are awarded as follows to cadre officers attending military educational institutions, doing graduate work in a military school in residence, participating in doctoral programs or completing their education (training):

—up to Lieutenant-Colonel inclusively—upon serving the set time in the corresponding ranks;
—Colonel—upon serving the set time in the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and when the rank to be awarded corresponds to the rank for the official position which they occupied prior to beginning their education (training), without regard for changes (increases or decreases) in the rank required for this position by the table of organization, made after initiating such education (training).

Officers with the rank of Junior Lieutenant who have completed correspondence studies in military educational institutions or who have passed examinations without course work in a program of a military secondary educational institution, or who received a specialty kindred to a corresponding military specialty after graduating from a civilian institution of higher education, are promoted to the rank of Lieutenant irrespective of the time of service in the rank of Junior Lieutenant.

17. Promotions in rank are awarded to officers:

- a) up to Captain inclusively—by army and flotilla commanders, and by other commanders (chiefs) as determined by the USSR Minister of Defense possessing the disciplinary authority of an army (flotilla) commander in accordance with the USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations;
- b) up to Major inclusively—by district and fleet troop commanders, and by other commanders (chiefs) as determined by the USSR Minister of Defense who possess disciplinary authority of a district (fleet) troop commander in accordance with the USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations;
- c) up to Lieutenant-Colonel inclusively—by USSR deputy ministers of defense, the commanders-in-chiefs of the branches of the USSR Armed Forces, the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, the Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and the first deputy USSR ministers of Defense;
- d) up to Colonel inclusively—by the USSR Minister of Defense.

18. Junior- and senior-grade officers who have displayed high moral and combat qualities in the defense of the USSR, in serving combat duty or in executing other responsibilities of military service, or who have fulfilled their military duty in exemplary fashion may be promoted in rank to up to Lieutenant-Colonel below the zone.

Only officers serving as acting regimental and division commanders who possess the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel may be promoted below the zone, if prior to this they had not been promoted below the zone.

A rank is awarded below the zone after not less than half of the set terms of service at the given military ranks are completed, and when the awarded rank corresponds to the rank foreseen for the official position occupied, but not more than twice during the period of military service (once as a junior-grade officer and once as a senior-grade officer).

Officers who have attained high indicators in combat training, in reinforcement of military discipline and in mastery of complex military equipment, or who have fulfilled their responsibilities in exemplary fashion in their assigned area may be promoted to a rank of up to

Lieutenant-Colonel inclusively, one step above the rank foreseen for the official position occupied.

A promotion to a rank one step above that foreseen for the official position occupied may be awarded, but not more than once during the period of active duty:

- upon serving the set time in a given military rank—to officers possessing an academic degree;
- upon serving not less than two set periods of service in a given rank—on the basis of a list determined by the USSR Minister of Defense.

Officers dismissed from military service due to age, health or reduction in forces who have served 20 years or more, calculated preferentially, may be promoted up to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, inclusive:

- a) one step above the rank foreseen for the position occupied—under the conditions indicated in this article;
- b) one step above the rank awarded—after serving the set time in the given rank, to officers who have performed international duty, who participated in the recovery from the aftermath of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident, or who were transferred to a lower position for health reasons in accordance with a resolution of a military medical board, and to officers with the rank of Captain.

19. Promotions below the zone one step above the rank foreseen for the official position occupied and one step above the awarded rank are awarded by the USSR Minister of Defense.

20. General and flag officer ranks are awarded by the President of the USSR to servicemen who successfully carry out duties subject to be filled by general and flag officers.

The rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union is awarded for outstanding service in leadership of the USSR Armed Forces.

21. Officers of the USSR Armed Forces are recommended for general and flag officer ranks by the USSR Minister of Defense, officers of military law enforcement organs are recommended by the USSR Procurator General, the USSR Minister of Justice and the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court respectively, as coordinated with the USSR Minister of Defense, and other categories of officers are recommended jointly by the USSR Minister of Defense and the chiefs of the corresponding ministries and departments.

22. In order to ensure the timely promotion of officers, the documents required in support of promotions are drawn up ahead of time, in such a way that they may be submitted for examination to the commander (chief) possessing the right of awarding the corresponding rank by the day of expiration of the set time in rank.

When junior- and senior-grade officers who have served the set time in grade are recommended for appointment

to a position qualifying them for a promotion to Colonel inclusively, they are concurrently considered for such promotion.

Candidates for promotion to an officer rank below the zone to one step above the rank foreseen by the table of organization for the position they occupy, or one step above the rank they possess, are recommended for promotion with regard for the opinion of an Officers' Assembly. A recommendation to award such ranks is examined by one of the military councils of the appropriate chain of command of a large strategic formation of the given branch of the USSR Armed Forces.

Recommendations to award a general or flag officer rank are examined by military councils of the appropriate chain of command, up to the military council of the branch of the USSR Armed Forces, and by the Higher Efficiency Rating Board of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The decisions of military councils examining recommendations on awarding a rank are brought to the awareness of interested persons.

Recommendations for promotion of officers of military law enforcement organs to an officer rank below the zone and one step above the rank foreseen for the position occupied in the table of organization, or one step above the rank currently held are examined by the Collegium of the Main Military Procuracy, and at meetings of permanent efficiency rating boards of the Military Tribunals Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Justice or the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court respectively.

23. Upon petition by an officers' comrades' court of honor, junior- and senior-grade officers may be demoted one officer rank (in the chain of command of the military units) by order of a commander (chief) granted the right by the USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations to impose the disciplinary punishment of demotion in rank upon officers.

Junior- and senior-grade officers who are demoted in rank are restored to their previous rank, irrespective of the official position they occupy, not earlier than 1 year after the day of demotion, in the event of their exemplary behavior and conscientious attitude toward service, by orders of the commanders (chiefs) who had effected the demotion, and by orders of commanders (chiefs) of equal and higher rank.

Senior and flag officers are demoted and restored to their ranks by the president of the USSR.

A second demotion in rank is not permitted prior to restoration of an officer to his prior rank and his promotion.

24. Officers who had committed misdeeds despoiling the honor of an officer and incompatible with membership in the officer corps may be deprived of their rank together with simultaneous demotion to private or seaman:

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- junior- and senior-grade officers—by the USSR Minister of Defense;
- general and flag officers—by the President of the USSR.

The issue of bringing an officer up for forfeiture of his rank is examined by an Officers' Assembly.

Officers who have committed crimes may be deprived of their rank by the sentence of a military tribunal (court).

Chapter 2. Appointment to a Position, Transfer in Service

25. Officer positions subject to be filled by officers are foreseen in the tables of organization of the military units on the basis of special lists.

The list of officer positions subject to be filled by junior- and senior-grade officers is approved by the USSR Minister of Defense, while the list of officer positions subject to be filled by general and flag officers is approved by the President of the USSR at the recommendation of the USSR Minister of Defense; lists of certain categories of officers for which a different approval procedure has been established by law are an exception.

26. Officers graduating from military educational institutions and appointed to active duty from the reserve or transferred in service are assigned to T/O officer positions by orders of commanders and chiefs in accordance with a procedure established by the USSR Minister of Defense.

Officers are assigned to the positions of army and flotilla commander, to positions equal to the former and to higher positions, and they are transferred from such positions by the President of the USSR on the basis of a recommendation of the USSR Minister of Defense.

27. Officers are transferred in service:

- to higher positions;
- to equal positions;
- to lower positions;
- in connection with release from the position occupied for assumption of studies, and after completion of such studies;
- to other work—in connection with election to an elected position.

Service transfer orders indicate the kind of position (higher, equal, lower) to which the officer is transferred, and the grounds for such transfer, as foreseen by articles 28, 29 and 31 of this statute.

An officer position is said to be: higher—if the table of organization foresees an officer rank for this position that is higher than the rank for the currently occupied position, and when the ranks foreseen are equal, if the pay is higher; lower—if the officer rank foreseen by the table of organization for this position is lower than the rank for the currently occupied position, and when equal ranks are foreseen—if the pay is lower. In the event that

tables of organization foresee two ranks or pay rates ranging from minimum to maximum, the senior rank or maximum pay is considered.

28. Officers are transferred to higher positions in the course of career advancement.

In transfers to higher positions, the working and moral qualities of the officers, their professional training, the results they have attained in their assigned areas, presence of capabilities for carrying out the responsibilities of the higher position, and the opinion of an Officers' Assembly are taken into account. Officers listed as being in the reserve of personnel for advancement are recommended for assignment to higher positions on priority.

In order that officers could be practically prepared for carrying out their future service responsibilities, transfer to a higher position may be preceded by apprenticeship or study in the corresponding curriculum.

Officers recommended for assignment to the position of regiment commander or to an equal or higher position are reviewed by military councils prior to recommendation for assignment or assignment.

29. Officers may be transferred to equal positions:

- a) as a result of a reduction in forces or in connection with organizational measures;
- b) when replacements are made in locations with set times of service;
- c) for more suitable use in a specialty, or with regard for work experience;
- d) when it is necessary to fill positions;
- e) for reasons of health—at the officer's request;
- f) due to family circumstances—at the officer's request.

30. Fixed times of continuous service of two years, three years, five years and 10 years are set for officers on active duty in locations of the USSR with severe climatic conditions. The list of locations for which fixed terms of service are set for officers is determined by the USSR Minister of Defense.

Officers in locations with fixed terms of service may be:

- transferred prior to expiration of the fixed term of service—when appointed to higher positions, when assigned to school, and when transferred due to family and other circumstances;
- retained upon expiration of a fixed term of service—in accordance with the officer's own wishes, as well as in the event of need—in accordance with a procedure determined by the USSR Minister of Defense.

A fixed term of service for officers may be set by the USSR Minister of Defense in locations stricken by natural disasters or accidents under extraordinary situations.

The procedure for replacing officers in locations with fixed terms of service is determined by the USSR Minister of Defense.

31. Officers may be transferred from higher positions to lower ones:

- a) as a result of a reduction in forces—when transfer to an equal position is impossible, and with the officer's consent;
- b) when the working qualities of the officer, as determined by an efficiency rating board, are inconsistent with the position he occupies;
- c) as a disciplinary punishment imposed in accordance with the USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations;
- d) in response to a petition of an Officers' Assembly or an officers' comrades' court of honor;
- e) for health reasons—in accordance with a resolution of a military medical board deeming the officer unfit for flying, underwater navigation or performance of other duties of the officer position occupied, with the officer's consent;
- f) at the personal request of the officer—in connection with family and other circumstances.

Officers are transferred to lower positions on the basis of grounds indicated in paragraphs "b", "c" and "d" of this article by an order of the commander (chief) granted the right by the USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations to impose reduction in position as a disciplinary punishment upon officers.

Officers transferred from higher positions to lower ones as a result of a reduction in forces are placed into the reserve of personnel for advancement.

32. Election of officers to elected positions is announced by orders of the corresponding commanders (chiefs). Orders concerning service transfers or separation from military service of officers occupying elected positions are published after they are released from the responsibilities of their elected positions by the established procedure.

After completing their work in elected bodies, officers who had earned a positive performance report are assigned to officer positions that are not below those occupied prior to their election.

33. The following conditions are observed when officers are assigned to positions and transferred in service:

- a) Officer positions are filled by officers on active duty. When it is impossible to fill these positions by officers, other categories of servicemen and civilian employees may be assigned temporarily to these positions by orders of commanders (chiefs) having the right to assign officers to the positions on the condition that such appointees not have officers directly subordinate to them.

In accordance with a procedure determined by an order of the USSR Minister of Defense, servicemen and civilian employees may be appointed by an order of the military unit commander as acting officials in officer positions that are or are not vacant;

- b) when officers are appointed to a position and when they are transferred in service, there must be assurances that they would be used in their main or a kindred specialty, or with regard for their work experience, and there must be a policy of alternation of their service in different geographical regions and in military units with full and reduced strength. When it is necessary to use officers in positions requiring a specialty new to them, assignment to this position must be preceded by training in accordance with a procedure determined by orders of the USSR Minister of Defense;
- c) upon graduating from higher and secondary military educational institutions or upon being assigned to active duty out of the reserve, officers are assigned to vacant officer positions in the troops and naval forces in correspondence with the specialty they have acquired.

Officers with a higher military education are assigned to positions subject to be filled by officers with this level of education, in accordance with a list of positions determined by an order of the USSR Minister of Defense. Assignment of officers with a higher military education to other positions is permitted as a means for them to acquire practical experience.

Female officers are assigned to officer positions in accordance with a list of positions determined by an order of the USSR Minister of Defense.

Officers are assigned to positions at the following times:

- those placed at the disposal of commanders (chiefs) upon graduating from military educational institutions—upon their arrival in the district (fleet) or army (flotilla);
- those assigned to active duty from the reserve—not later than a month's time from the day they leave for their place of service, as indicated in the military commissariat's assignment order;
- d) the preferential right for advancement in service is possessed by officers in the reserve of personnel for advancement, as well as officers who are not in this reserve if they displayed high moral and fighting qualities and organizational capabilities in combat operations in defense of the USSR, or in the execution of other responsibilities of military service, officers serving other duty (combat duty), officers serving in military units at full strength, and officers transferred to lower positions due to a reduction in forces.

Officers promoted to a rank one step above the rank foreseen for the authorized position they occupy are considered, when possible, as candidates for advancement in service.

Officers who had formerly been transferred from higher to lower positions are advanced in service with regard for the requirements of Article 28 of this statute. In this case officers who had been transferred to lower positions as a disciplinary punishment or in response to a petition of an Officers' Comrades' Court of Honor may be

advanced in service after the disciplinary punishment imposed on them is remitted or after measures of social influence are remitted (cleared);

—e) as a rule, officers are transferred in service without being placed at the disposal of commanders (chiefs) possessing the right of assignment to positions. Officers placed at the disposal of commanders (chief) must be assigned to a position within 2 months after being placed at the disposal of a commander (chief). Time at the disposal of a commander (chief) does not include periods of prescribed leave (except child care leave), time spent in treatment (examination) in therapeutic institutions (subunits), time of temporary utilization in vacant officer positions, and by decision of the USSR Minister of Defense, other periods of service during which the official status of these officers is not promptly determined for reasons out of their control. Officers transferred in service must leave for their new place of service after surrendering their affairs and positions, within deadlines established by the USSR Armed Forces Internal Service Regulations and orders of the USSR Minister of Defense, but not later than a month after the military unit receives a written order (notification) assigning the officer to the new position, except in cases where the officer is on routine leave or undergoing treatment;

—f) when the fitness of an officer for military service is recognized to be limited for reason of health by a military medical board, and the officer has not attained the maximum age for active duty, the need for transferring him from the position he occupies to another position, carrying responsibilities which he is able to fulfill with regard for his health, training and work experience, is determined by an immediate supervisor from the military unit commander and higher, and on the basis of the officer's personal wishes. In this case officers whose fitness for military service is deemed to be limited are not assigned to command positions in the troops and naval forces.

When, for reason of health, officers are deemed unsuitable for flying, for service aboard submarines and surface ships, in airborne troops and in special facilities, or for work with radioactive materials and sources of ionizing radiation, but have not attained the maximum age of active duty, and are fit for military service or of limited fitness for military service for reason of health, they are assigned to officer positions not involving such work (service), while officers of the airborne troops are transferred to other branches of the USSR Armed Forces, arms and services.

In the event that it is impossible to transfer officers recognized to be fit for service in other than line units to vacant positions carrying responsibilities which they are able to fulfill with regard for their health, the indicated officers are recommended for separation from military service.

The procedure of medical certification of officers to determine their fitness for military service, as well as for flying, for service aboard submarines and surface ships,

in the airborne troops and in special facilities, and for work with radioactive materials and sources of ionizing radiation is determined by an order of the USSR Minister of Defense;

—g) officers requiring a change in location of service (residency) for reason of their own health or for reason of the health of members of their families, and who are recognized to be fit for military service or of limited fitness for service, and who have not reached the maximum age of active duty are transferred in service to another location on the basis of a resolution of a military medical board.

The procedure of medical certification of officers and their families for the purpose of determining if their health will allow them to perform military service (reside) in locations of the USSR with severe and unfavorable climatic conditions and in foreign countries with a hot climate is determined by an order of the USSR Minister of Defense;

—h) officers with close ties of kinship or relationships by marriage (parents, spouses, brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, as well as the parents, brothers, sisters and children of spouses) are prohibited from performing military service in the same military unit and in the same combined unit and large strategic formation, up to the district (fleet) inclusively, or in the same main or central directorate, if such service would require one to be subordinated or under the supervision of the other;

—i) assignment of an officer to an officer position as an additional duty is not permitted, except in the case of educational and scientific research activity, if permission for such combination of positions is granted personally by the USSR Minister of Defense or his deputies.

In certain cases officers may be granted permission personally by the commander of a military unit to serve additional duty in state and public enterprises, institutions and organizations involving scientific, pedagogical, invention, expert assessment and other activity.

34. Officers are assigned to officer positions:

- a) in military commissariats and in military and naval departments of civilian educational institutions—in accordance with a procedure established by the USSR Minister of Defense;
- b) in military procuracies—in accordance with a procedure established by the USSR law "On the USSR Procuracy" and the Statute on the Military Procuracy;
- c) in military tribunals, in the Directorate of Military Tribunals of the USSR Ministry of Justice and in the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court—in accordance with a procedure established by the USSR law "On the USSR Supreme Court" and the USSR law "On Military Tribunals."

35. Officers may be detached for further military service:

- a) from the USSR Armed Forces to the USSR Committee for State Security, the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Railroad

Troops and the Civil Defense Troops, as well as paramilitary formations created by decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet;

—b) to the USSR Armed Forces from the USSR Committee for State Security, the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Railroad Troops and the Civil Defense Troops, as well as paramilitary formations created by decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

An officer is assigned detached duty personally and with his consent. When a military unit is transferred, officers go to the new place of service as part of this unit, in accordance with its actual strength.

Officers are assigned detached duty by mutual agreement between the USSR Ministry of Defense and the corresponding ministries (departments) and formations, by orders of the USSR Minister of Defense.

36. Officers may be detached to civilian ministries, departments and organizations while remaining on active duty in order to carry out defense-related work and other special responsibilities.

The rights, privileges, advantages and responsibilities which are established by USSR legislation for officers on active duty in the USSR Armed Forces are retained by officers detached to civilian ministries, departments and organizations while remaining on active duty.

Officers are detached to civilian ministries, departments and organizations by an order of the USSR Minister of Defense, the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Cadres or the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, within the limits of their rights of assignment to positions occupied prior to detachment. Detached officers are assigned to positions and transferred in service by orders of the directors of civilian ministries, departments and organizations in accordance with the goals of detaching these officers. These ministries, departments and organizations are obligated to send written communications concerning assignment of officers to positions and their service transfers to the Main Cadres Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and as concerns military-political personnel, to the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces.

Officers detached to civilian ministries, departments and organizations receive promotions in correspondence with the requirements of this statute upon recommendation by the corresponding ministries, departments and organizations:

—as regards officer ranks:

—up to Lieutenant-Colonel inclusively—by the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Cadres or the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces;

—Colonel—by the USSR Minister of Defense.

Officers detached to civilian ministries, departments and organizations are dismissed from military service at the recommendation of these ministries, departments and organizations:

—with ranks up to Lieutenant-Colonel inclusively—by the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Cadres or the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces;

—with ranks of Colonel and above—in accordance with Article 63 of this statute.

Verification of compliance with the established procedure of service by officers detached to civilian ministries, departments and organizations is maintained by the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Cadres, and over service by military-political officers—by the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces.

All forms of authorized pay and housing space are provided to officers detached to civilian ministries, departments and organizations by the ministries and departments in which they serve.

Officers who are people's deputies released in accordance with the Law on Fulfillment of Service Obligations as a result of their election to the USSR Supreme Soviet, to the supreme soviets of union and autonomous republics, to local soviets of people's deputies and to permanent commissions, committees and other bodies formed by these soviets, and who do not announce a desire to be dismissed into the reserve, are detached to the corresponding soviets while remaining on active duty status.

Officers are detached by orders of the USSR Minister of Defense, the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Cadres or the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces on the basis of decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the supreme soviets of the union and autonomous republics or local soviets of people's deputies releasing the people's deputy from his service obligations. An officer is detached to the USSR Supreme Soviet and to the supreme soviets of the union and autonomous republics also on the basis of similar decisions adopted by permanent commissions of the houses or committees of these soviets.

Officers are detached for a period determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet, by the supreme soviets of union and autonomous republics or by local soviets of people's deputies, as well as by permanent commissions of the houses or committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the supreme soviets of union and autonomous republics.

Officers serving as people's deputies who are detached to soviets on active duty status are awarded promotions in rank:

—up to Lieutenant-Colonel and ranks equal to it, inclusively—by the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Cadres or the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces;

- Colonel and ranks equal to it—by the USSR Minister of Defense;
- ranks of general and flag officers—in accordance with the established procedure.

Promotions in rank to Colonel inclusively are awarded upon expiration of a set time of service in rank, when the rank to be awarded corresponds to the rank required for the last authorized position which the officers serving as people's deputies occupied prior to detachment to a soviet, without regard for changes in the rank required by the table of organization for this position, made after detachment. Delaying promotion of detached officers serving as people's deputies to up to Colonel inclusively, in accordance with the last authorized position they occupied prior to detachment, is prohibited. An officer is promoted to Colonel inclusively below the zone or one step above the rank foreseen for the last authorized position occupied prior to detachment in accordance with the procedure established by this statute.

Officers who are serving as people's deputies and who are detached to soviets on active duty status are not subject to efficiency rating.

Officers who are serving as people's deputies and who are detached to soviets while remaining on active duty status, and their families, retain the rights, privileges and advantages granted by existing law to officers on active duty in the USSR Armed Forces, and to their families.

Officers who are serving as people's deputies and who are attached to soviets while remaining on active duty status requiring improvement in housing conditions retain the same positions on the waiting lists for housing space and for room in children's preschool institutions which they possessed at the former place of residence or place of service. They and their families may continue to use medical services, children's preschool institutions and Pioneer camps associated with their former place of service. In the event that officers who are people's deputies are sent for subsequent military service in other military units, services, military educational institutions, enterprises or organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense after expiration of their term of office in a soviet or its bodies, their housing conditions are improved with regard for the time they had been on the waiting list for improvement of housing conditions at their former place of service.

Officers who are people's deputies and who are detached to soviets while remaining on active duty status receive pay in an amount established by the corresponding soviet. If the pay provided by the soviet is less than the amount received prior to detachment (with regard for increases in pay after detachment due to promotions in rank and due to an across-the-board increase in officer pay), the corresponding difference is covered by the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The USSR Ministry of Defense also provides officers who are people's deputies and who are detached to soviets while remaining on active duty status with

clothing and other forms of authorized support. In this case, officers may be paid monetary compensation instead of all authorized articles of clothing.

When they finish their term of office in soviets or their organs, officers who are people's deputies and who are detached to soviets while remaining on active duty status are placed at the disposal of the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Cadres or the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces for further service in accordance with the procedure established by law.

Chapter 3. Efficiency Rating

37. Officers are subjected to efficiency rating in order to ensure proper selection, placement and education of officer personnel. The periodicity, the specific times and the procedure of efficiency rating of officers are determined by the USSR Minister of Defense.

38. During efficiency rating, the working and moral qualities of each officer are objectively assessed, his fitness for the position he occupies and the prospects of his use in service are determined, and a reserve of personnel for advancement and for training is revealed.

39. A permanent efficiency rating board is set up in the military unit with composition determined by an order of the military unit commander in order to examine efficiency reports and make conclusions on them. In the course of its activities, the Officers' Assembly actively examines questions concerning preparations for efficiency rating, its course, and implementation of its results.

The Higher Efficiency Rating Board of the USSR Ministry of Defense is created with composition determined by the USSR Minister of Defense in order to examine efficiency reports on USSR Armed Forces executives and to resolve other matters concerning work with officer personnel.

40. Immediate supervisors must require officers to correct shortcomings noted in efficiency reports, and ensure implementation of efficiency report conclusions and timely assignment of deserving officers to higher positions and their timely employment.

Chapter 4. Leaves

41. Officers on active duty are granted:

- a) regular leaves;
- b) supplementary leaves:
 - for service in hazardous conditions;
 - for the special nature of service;
- c) sick leaves;
- d) short-term leaves;
- e) leaves in connection with studies in a military educational institution;
- f) creative leaves;
- g) maternity and child care leaves.

Leave time is counted in days. National holidays established by USSR legislation as days off are not included when determining leave time.

Nor is travel time to and from the leave location accounted for in leave time; this includes cases when a leave is divided into two parts and when an officer is recalled from leave.

When days off associated with national holidays are postponed, these days are added to a regular leave.

When regular and supplementary leaves are granted in proportion to time served, their time is determined by dividing the total amount of each of the indicated leaves by 12 and multiplying the result by the number of complete months of service.

42. Officers are granted regular leaves of the following time depending on total years served and on the features and conditions of their military service:

—a) time in military service less than 10 years—30 days; from 10 to 20 years—35 days; from 20 to 25 years—40; 25 or more years—45 days.

Years of service used to determine regular leave time are computed in accordance with rules established for computing calendar years of service for the purposes of awarding pensions to servicemen;

—b) flying officers and officers serving aboard submarines and surface ships—45 days. The list of positions, service in which gives officers the right to regular leave of 45 days, is determined by an order of the USSR Minister of Defense;

—c) officers serving in locations in the USSR with severe climatic conditions where a fixed term of service is set for officers, in regions of the Far North and locations equal to them, and in locations of the USSR with unfavorable climatic conditions—45 days.

The list of locations in the USSR with unfavorable climatic conditions in which regular leaves of 45 days are established for officers is approved by the USSR Minister of Defense;

—d) officers working abroad as military advisors, specialists and other associates—the time established for employees of Soviet institutions abroad, but not less than the leave time established by this article, depending on years of service;

—e) in exceptional cases, other groups of officers requiring longer rest in connection with especially complex conditions of service, or with exceptional circumstances—45 days, by decision of the USSR Minister of Defense.

The time of regular leave granted to officers depending on the features and conditions of military service does not depend on their total years of service. The time of regular leave granted to officers who had not used up regular leave prior to their assignment to a military unit in which another time is established for regular leaves is determined in proportion to the time of service in the current year at the previous and new place of service.

Officers of scientific research institutions, postgraduate students, officers in doctoral programs, instructors in military educational institutions and in the military and naval departments (areas of study, departments) of civilian educational institutions who are on active duty status are granted regular leave of duration established by this article.

The time of regular leave granted in the year of appointment to active duty to officers appointed to this duty from the reserve is computed in proportion to the time they have served, on the basis of their years of service and the features or conditions of their service. If the officer so desires, such leave may be attached to the next year's regular leave.

In this case officers appointed to active duty from the reserve immediately after graduating from a civilian higher or secondary educational institution are granted a 30-day regular leave in the year of their appointment to active duty. Such a leave must be used before officers are sent to their place of service.

43. Regular leave is granted to officers at any time during the calendar year, with regard for the need for staggering leaves and ensuring maintenance of the constant combat readiness of military units and correspondence with the regular leave plan.

A regular leave is granted as desired, in summer or any other convenient time, to the following categories of officers:

—to officers who were wounded, contused or maimed in defense of the USSR or in the performance of other responsibilities of military service;

—to participants of the Great Patriotic War and solder-internationalists;

—to female officers with two or more children up to 14 years old or a disabled child up to 16 years old;

—to single-parent officers raising one or more children up to 14 years old.

Regular leave is granted to officers whose wives are on pregnancy and childbearing leave, with regard for their wishes, during the time of the wife's leave.

44. The leave of officers who fall ill during regular leave, including leave granted prior to the military unit's receipt of excerpts from orders of separation from military service into the reserve or retirement, are extended, upon recovery, by the corresponding number of days of sickness during leave. Leave is extended by the garrison military commandant (military commissar), who must inform the unit commander or the commander (chief) granting the leave of this, on the basis of an appropriate report certified by the attending physician and chief (senior physician) of the therapeutic institution. Moreover, regular leave of officers who have arrived for regular leave from another garrison may be extended by the garrison military commandant (military commissar) for a period of up to 7 days in the event of the death or serious illness of members of their families (father, mother, wife, children, brothers and sisters) or other

persons under their care, as well as in the event of any misfortune befalling the families of these officers; the commander of the military unit from which such officers had come must be immediately informed of such an extension.

Regular leave is not extended if the officer on leave falls ill after the military unit receives the excerpt from orders of separation from military service into the reserve or retirement orders. Nor is an extension granted to the leave of an officer who is subsequently stricken from the military unit's personnel rosters in connection with separation from military service.

In exceptional cases, when granting leave in the current year may have an unfavorable effect on fulfilling the obligations of military service, or when other extenuating circumstances exist, regular leave may be postponed to the following year by decision of a direct superior from district troop commander, his equal and above. In this case leave from the previous year must be granted in the first quarter of the new year, and if the officer is dismissed from military service, it must be added to the leave for the new year.

45. Supplementary leave for service in hazardous conditions is a privilege, and it is granted to officers for the purposes of disease prevention. The right to supplementary leave for service in hazardous conditions is possessed by officers whose service is associated with unfavorable influence of harmful physical, chemical, biological and other factors on human health.

The time of supplementary leave for service in hazardous conditions is determined in application to the time of supplementary leaves for work in harmful and heavy working conditions, established by USSR legislation.

The procedures and conditions of granting supplementary leave to officers for service in hazardous conditions are established by an order of the USSR Minister of Defense. In this case supplementary leave for service in hazardous conditions is granted to officers in its full amount on the condition that their entire time of service throughout the whole calendar year is in positions determined by a list. In other cases the time of supplementary leave is determined in proportion to the time of service in hazardous conditions in the course of the current calendar year.

46. Supplementary leave for special service is a privilege, and it is granted to certain categories of officers with the purpose of creating conditions for them to fully restore their occupational performance.

The right to supplementary leave for special service is possessed by officers whose working conditions are not hazardous but are associated with elevated nervous, emotional, mental and physical stress and other unfavorable factors.

Supplementary leave for special service is granted for up to 15 days to officers constantly on combat alert (combat duty).

The specific time of supplementary leave for special service, the list of officer positions and the responsibilities which earn the right to this leave, and the procedures and conditions of granting this leave are established by the USSR Minister of Defense.

47. Supplementary leaves are added to regular leave, and they may be granted simultaneously with it, or separately.

Officers having the simultaneous right to supplementary leave for service in hazardous conditions and for special service are granted supplementary leave on the basis of only one of the forms of leave, at their choice.

48. If they so desire, officers serving in regions of the Far North and in locations equivalent to them, on the territory of the Far Eastern and Transbaykal districts, and in the Pacific Fleet may take 2 years of regular and supplementary leaves together. In this case the total leave time must not exceed three months, including travel time to and from the leave location. In the event that authorized leave exceeds this time, the days of leave remaining unutilized are added to the following year's leave. When such persons undergo a service transfer to another location, the previous year's unutilized regular leave is added to the regular leave for the current year, granted at the new place of service, and if the needs of the service so require, it may be granted separately, upon issue of troop travel documents.

Officers working abroad as military advisors, specialists and other associates are permitted to add together regular leaves accrued during their time abroad. Upon returning to the USSR, they are granted their unutilized leave in accordance with the procedure foreseen by this article.

49. A regular leave granted separately or together with supplementary leaves for a total of 40 days or more may be divided into two parts if the officer so desires. In this case one of the parts of the leave must be not less than 30 days.

Officers are not subject to recall from leave, except under extreme official circumstances. In this case they may be recalled from leave on the basis of written permission from a direct superior from district troop commander, his equal and above. The part of the leave that is not utilized in this connection may be granted to the officer at another time in the course of the given calendar year, or it may be added to the leave for the following calendar year.

50. When officers fail to appear for service without good reason, the regular leave and supplementary leave for service under harmful conditions or for special service granted for the current or following year is decreased by

the number of days of failure to report. In this case regular leave must not be less than 20 days.

51. When officers fail to use up leave for the year in which an order for separation from military service into the reserve or a retirement order is signed prior to receipt of excerpts from such orders by the military unit, leave is granted to them following surrender of their affairs and position, and after subsequent removal of their names from the personnel rosters of the military unit.

Regular leave is granted in this case:

- to officers dismissed due to age, illness, reduction forces and impaired health—for a time established by Article 42 of this statute;
- to officers dismissed on other grounds—for a time calculated in proportion to time served in the year of separation. Supplementary leave for service in hazardous conditions or for special service is also granted for a time calculated in proportion to time served in the year of separation.

Regular leave for officers who have used up leave for the year in which the order for their separation is signed but whose names are removed from the personnel rosters of the military unit in connection with separation in the following year, is granted for a time calculated in proportion to the time served in the new year.

52. Sick leaves are granted on the basis of the findings of a military medical board to those officers who for reason of health are unable to fulfill the obligations of military service (service obligations) after being released from treatment in a therapeutic institution.

Sick leave is granted for a time of up to 30 days. In certain cases of wounds, contusions, mutilations and illnesses and depending on their nature, sick leave is granted for a time of up to 45 or 60 days. In the presence of medical indications, sick leave may be extended, but for not more than 30 days.

When officers are dismissed from military service, sick leave is not granted.

Sick leave is not counted as part of regular leave.

53. Military unit commanders may grant officers short-term leaves, of up to 10 days in each case, in order to resolve urgent social and personal matters, associated primarily with preserving health, fulfilling parental duties and other reasons.

Short-term leaves are not counted as part of regular leave.

54. Officers attending military educational institutions in residence are granted the following leaves:

- a) winter vacation—14 days;
- b) summer vacation—30 days;
- c) upon graduation from the military educational institution—for a time established by Paragraph "a" of Article 42 of this statute.

Officers attending military educational institutions with school-related debts are granted vacations after they are paid off, within the limits of the vacation time allowed by training programs. In this case summer vacation must be granted for a time of not less than 15 days.

Leaves foreseen by articles 42, 45, 46 and 55 of this statute are not granted to officers who are students.

Leave in connection with graduation from a military educational institution is granted before officers are sent to their place of service, and it is counted as part of regular leave.

55. Creative leaves are granted to officers, except those engaged in graduate studies in residency or pursuing a doctoral program, for the purpose of completing their dissertation work, writing textbooks and for other reasons foreseen by USSR legislation.

The time and conditions of granting creative leaves and funding them are established in accordance with a procedure determined by USSR legislation.

56. The following leaves are granted to female officers in connection with maternity:

- a) pregnancy and childbearing—with retention of pay and allowances;
- b) partially paid child care—as desired, without retention of pay and allowances;
- c) supplementary child care leave—at request, without retention of pay and allowances.

These leaves are granted for a time established by USSR legislation on blue and white collar maternity leaves. The time of these leaves is included in time of service in rank, and to years of service in officer positions for the purposes of extra pay for years of service, extra pay for continuous service in remote and high-altitude locations of the USSR, and in years served toward a pension.

Pregnancy and childbearing leave is not included with regular leave. Female officers are granted their regular leave for the current year prior to pregnancy and childbearing leave or immediately after it.

In the year in which child care leave ends, regular leave is calculated in proportion to served time.

Chapter 5. Separation From Military Service

57. Officers who have attained the maximum age of military service are subject to separation from military service.

When there is special need, certain officers possessing academic degrees or titles and recognized honors in the theory and practice of military organizational development, invention and discovery, who are engaged in educational and scientific work, who possess rare specialties and who bear the honorary titles of specialists, may be retained in military service with their consent and with regard for the opinion of an Officers' Assembly,

in subordinate military units for a period of up to 5 years and from 5 to 10 years as follows:

- junior- and senior-grade officers—by USSR deputy ministers of defense, by the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the USSR Armed Forces, by the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, by the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by USSR first deputy ministers of defense;
- general and flag officers up to Lieutenant-General inclusively—by the Minister of Defense;
- general and flag officers from Colonel-General and higher—by the President of the USSR at the recommendation of the USSR Minister of Defense.

Decisions to retain general and flag officers of military law enforcement organs in military service are made in response to a joint recommendation by the USSR Minister of Defense, the USSR Procurator General, the USSR Minister of Justice and the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court respectively, and in relation to some other categories of officers, in response to a joint recommendation by the USSR Minister of Defense and the directors of interested ministries and departments.

Officers retained for military service beyond the maximum age of military service may be separated prior to the expiration of the time for which they were retained.

Officers who have reached the maximum age of military service, but who do not possess the right to receive a pension may be retained in military service until they acquire such a right, except in the case of those who are subject to retirement.

Separation of officers prior to their attainment of the maximum age of military service is permitted with regard for their health, their own wishes, the existence of family and other important circumstances, and a reduction in forces, as well as if they are unfit for military service, if they have committed misdeeds discrediting the high honor of a Soviet officer, or if they are condemned by a military tribunal (court) for a crime.

Cadre officers are separated from military service on the basis of one of the grounds foreseen by articles 59-62 of this statute.

58. Officers are separated from military service:

- a) into the reserve, if the officers being separated have not attained the maximum age in the reserve and if they are fit or partially fit in regard to health for peacetime military service;
- b) into the retired category, if the officers being separated have attained maximum age in the reserve or if they are deemed unfit for military service for reason of health by military medical boards, and dropped from the military rolls;
- c) from military service, if officers being separated for a crime are sentenced to confinement or to a suspended term of confinement coupled with mandatory labor.

Prior to being recommended for separation from military service, officers are sent for certification to a military medical board in order to determine their fitness for military service as regards their health; the resolutions of such boards are considered in determining the grounds of separation. Medical certification may be carried out in or out of a hospital.

59. Cadre officers may be separated from military service into the reserve:

- a) for reason of age—upon attaining the maximum age of military service.

In addition the following may be separated for reason of age:

- junior officers with a term of service of 20 years or more (calculated preferentially) and who have 3 years or less before attainment of the maximum age established for military service, while with regard for their wishes upon attaining this age—irrespective of years served;
- officers who are serving or had served in jet and turboprop aviation and aboard atomic submarines and surface ships, and who have accrued 20 or more years of service (calculated preferentially), and who have 5 years or less remaining before attainment of the maximum age established for military service, while with regard for their wishes upon attaining this age—irrespective of years served;
- b) for reason of illness—on the basis of a resolution of a military medical board that the officer is unfit for peacetime military service (in wartime—limited fitness, second degree);
- c) upon a reduction in forces—when it is impossible to use the officer in military service in connection with a reduction in forces or organizational measures;
- d) for reason of impaired health—on the basis of a resolution of a military medical board that the officer is of limited fitness for military service, when it is impossible for reason of health to perform the responsibilities of the position occupied, and in the absence of a possibility for a service transfer to a position with responsibilities that the officer can fulfill with regard for his health;
- e) when incompatible with service—by decision of the command, with regard for the opinion of an Officers' Assembly or efficiency report conclusions concerning the unsuitability of further use in peacetime military service;
- f) upon fulfilling a term of service—officers who sign a personal contract for military service as an officer for a term of not less than 10 years after graduating from a military educational institution;
- g) due to family and other important circumstances—at the officer's request: When family circumstances prevent his use in military service; when elected to elected positions in state bodies of government and administration or in public organizations, and when detached by decision of the USSR Minister of Defense for work in civilian ministries and departments or institutions subordinated to them, at enterprises and

in organizations, without retention in military service (in the absence of other grounds for separation). In this case family circumstances are defined as tragedies befalling a wife or children, or conditions under which the parents of the officer or his spouse would require that he provide constant care to them.

Family circumstances may also depend on other causes in regard to female officers;

—h) in response to the officer's wishes—when the officer has served in officer positions for not less than 10 calendar years, with regard for the opinion of an Officers' Assembly, and when an abrupt drop in the military unit's combat readiness is ruled out.

60. Officers may be retired:

—a) due to age—upon attaining the maximum age in the reserve;

—b) due to illness—on the basis of a resolution of a military medical board stating that the officer is unfit for military service, together with his exclusion from military rolls.

61. Officers may be separated from active duty into the reserves or retired for committing misdeeds that discredit the high honor of the Soviet officer—by decision of the command and with regard for the opinion of an Officers' Assembly, or in response to a petition of an officers' comrades' court of honor.

62. Officers convicted for a crime (without forfeiture of rank) are separated from military service:

—a) from military service in connection with sentencing to confinement—if they are sentenced to such a punishment or if they receive a suspended sentence to confinement coupled with mandatory labor;

—b) into the reserve or retired in connection with sentencing to punishments not involving confinement—if they receive a suspended sentence or if serving the sentence is postponed, as well as if they are sentenced to confinement but released from punishment by amnesty.

By decision of direct superiors from the district commander, those equal to him and higher, with regard for the opinion of an Officers' Assembly, officers indicated in Paragraph "b" of this article (except those released by amnesty from serving a punishment taking the form of confinement), may be retained in military service, as a rule for use in officer positions for which the table of organization does not foresee directly subordinated servicemen. When a decision to separate such officers is taken subsequently, their separation is accomplished:

—on the basis of Paragraph "b" of this article—if the probation period or the period for which execution of the sentence was postponed has expired;

—on the basis of Paragraph "a" of this article—if a military tribunal (court) made the determination to reverse a suspended sentence or postponement of execution of a sentence and to direct the convicted officer to serve out his punishment in the form of confinement;

—on the basis of grounds foreseen by articles 59 and 60 of this statute—if the probation period or the time of postponement of the sentence's execution has expired; prior to expiration of the probationary period of a sentence's postponement—if the officer fell ill or was wounded, contused or mutilated in the course of official duties, and if he had served military duty faultlessly for 25 calendar years or more.

63. Cadre officers are separated from military service in subordinate military units and within the limits of the right of making position assignments:

—a) on the basis of grounds foreseen by paragraphs "a" (for reason of age), "b" (for reason of illness) and "f" (upon fulfilling the term of service) of Article 59, paragraphs "a" (for reason of age) and "b" (for reason of illness) of Article 60, and Article 62 (in connection with conviction for a crime) of this statute;

—ranks up to Major inclusively—by district and fleet commanders, and at the direction of the USSR Minister of Defense, by commanders (chiefs) exercising disciplinary authority over the district (fleet) commander in accordance with the USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations;

—b) on the basis of grounds foreseen by articles 59-62 of this statute:

—ranks up to Lieutenant-Colonel inclusively—by USSR deputy ministers of defense, by the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the USSR Armed Forces, by the Chief of the USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate, by the Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and by USSR first deputy ministers of defense;

—ranks up to Lieutenant-General inclusively—by order of the USSR Minister of Defense;

—ranks of Colonel-General and higher—by the President of the USSR at the recommendation of the USSR Minister of Defense, and as regards officers of military law enforcement organs—on the basis of a joint recommendation of the USSR Minister of Defense and heads of interested ministries and departments.

64. Officers who have died, were killed, who are missing persons or who forfeited their rank, as well as officers missing in action are excluded from the officer corps.

The procedure of excluding officers from the officer corps is determined by an order of the USSR Minister of Defense, together with an indication of the causes of exclusion. In this case officers who are missing persons and officers who are missing in action during peacetime are excluded from the officer corps by an order of the USSR Minister of Defense not later than 3 months after information of the officer's absence is received, on the basis of the results of an investigation into the causes and circumstances of the absence.

When resolution of property and other civil law disputes is required, an officer is recognized to be a missing person or declared dead by an act of the court in correspondence with existing USSR legislation.

65. Officers who had performed military service 20 years or more, calculated preferentially, and who are separated into the reserve or retired by orders of commanders (chiefs) possessing the authority of separation, are granted the right to wear the military uniform, except in the case of persons separated from military service on the basis of Paragraph "e" (due to incompatibility in service) of Article 59, on the basis of Article 61 (for misdeeds discrediting the high honor of the Soviet officer), and on the basis of Article 62 (in connection with conviction by a military tribunal (court) for a crime) of this statute.

The right of general and flag officers separated from military service by the President of the USSR to wear the military uniform is determined by the USSR Minister of Defense.

Chapter 6. Military Service by Short-Term Service Officers

66. Short-term service officers are assigned to positions, promoted in rank, advanced in service, efficiency-rated, deprived of their rank, demoted and restored in rank in accordance with the procedure foreseen by this statute.

After short-term service officers are assigned to positions, they undergo instructor training.

67. Regular, supplementary, short-term and sick leaves are granted to short-term service officers in accordance with the procedure foreseen by this statute for cadre officers.

In this case the time of leave in the year of separation from military service is determined in proportion to the time served in that year.

When such leave is granted, the officer's name is subsequently excluded from the military unit's personnel rosters in connection with separation from military service.

Leaves foreseen by articles 54 and 55 of this statute are not granted to short-term service officers.

68. The term of military service of short-term service officers may be extended on the basis of a new contract for a term of not less than 3 years, if this is in keeping with the interests of the service and the desire of the officer. The term of service of short-term service officers is extended by district and fleet commanders, by commanders (chiefs) exercising the disciplinary authority of a district commander in accordance with the USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations, and by their superior commanders (chiefs).

The procedure for extending the term of service is determined by an order of the USSR Minister of Defense.

69. Short-term service officers may be reclassified as cadre officers if they have expressed a desire to serve until attaining the maximum age established for military

service, if their efficiency ratings are positive, if they have served for not less than 1 year in officer positions, and if a need exists for officers of the given specialty. In this case female officers are reclassified as cadre officers upon completion of the term in which they expressed their desire to serve.

With the exception of military-political officers, officers are reclassified as cadre officers by the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Cadres, while military-political officers are reclassified by the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces.

70. Short-term service officers are separated from military service into the reserve:

- a) upon completing their term of service—upon expiration of the term of service stipulated by a contract or established by law;
- b) for reason of illness—on the basis of a resolution of a military medical board recognizing the officer to be unfit for military service in peacetime (as of limited fitness for military service in wartime);
- c) due to a reduction in forces—when it is impossible to use the officer in military service in connection with a reduction in forces or organizational measures;
- d) due to health restrictions—on the basis of a resolution of a military medical board recognizing the officer to be of limited fitness for military service and unable to perform the responsibilities of the position he occupies for reason of health;
- e) due to service incompatibility—by decision of the command, with regard for the opinion of an Officers' Assembly or efficiency report conclusions that subsequent use in military service in peacetime is unsuitable;
- f) for reason of family circumstances—in accordance with the procedure and under the conditions established by Paragraph "g", Article 59 of this statute.

Short-term service officers who commit acts unbecoming the high honor of a Soviet officer or who are convicted of a crime (without forfeiture of rank) are separated in accordance with articles 61 and 62 of this statute.

71. Short-term service officers recognized by military medical boards to be unfit for military service, and who are excluded from military rolls, are retired from military service for reason of illness.

72. Short-term service officers are separated from military service in subordinated units:

- on the basis of grounds foreseen by articles 61, 62 and 70 (except for separation on the basis of Paragraph "c") and 71 of this statute—by army and flotilla commanders and by commanders and chiefs exercising the disciplinary authority of an army commander in accordance with the USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations;
- on the basis of Paragraph "c", Article 70 of this statute—by USSR deputy ministers of defense, by the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the USSR

Armed Forces, while officers of military units not subordinated to them, except military-political officers, are separated by the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Cadres; military-political officers are separated by the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces.

III. SERVICE IN THE RESERVE, RETIREMENT

73. Reserve officer ranks are awarded personally to individuals rated in the officer corps with regard for their military and special training and other conditions foreseen by this statute.

74. An initial reserve officer rank of "Junior Lieutenant" is awarded:

- a) to persons who have undergone the entire military training course under a reserve officer program in civilian institutions of higher education and who have passed the required examinations, with the exception of the persons indicated in Subparagraph "b", Article 75 of this statute;
- b) to reservists who have not served compulsory military service and to women who had graduated from civilian higher or secondary special educational institutions in a specialty kindred to a corresponding military specialty;
- c) to reservists who have a secondary education and who underwent reserve officer training in the course of compulsory military service;
- d) to reservists who have a secondary education and who served at positions subject to be filled by warrant officers for 5 or more years.

75. An initial reserve officer rank of "Lieutenant" is awarded:

- a) to cadets separated from military service immediately after graduating from a military educational institution;
- due to illness—when recognized by military medical boards to be unfit for military service in peacetime (of limited fitness in wartime) under circumstances not associated with fulfillment of the obligations of military service (service obligations);
- due to family circumstances;
- in connection with detachment for work in civilian ministries and departments of the USSR without remaining on active duty status;
- in connection with organizational measures;
- b) to persons who have completed compulsory military service and the entire military training course under a reserve officer program in civilian institutions of higher education, and who have passed the required examinations;
- c) to reservists who have completed compulsory military service and graduated from civilian institutions of higher education in a specialty kindred to a corresponding military specialty;
- d) to reservists who possess a higher education and who underwent reserve officer training during their period of compulsory military service;

- e) to reservists who possess a higher civilian education and who have completed compulsory military service, and who have undergone reserve officer training while on reserve status;
- f) to reservists who possess a higher civilian education and who have served at positions subject to being filled by warrant officers for a period of 5 or more years.

76. The initial reserve officer rank is awarded by the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Cadres.

77. Junior- and senior-grade reserve officers are promoted in rank upon expiration of the set time of service in the prior rank, and in the presence of a positive efficiency rating. In this case reserve officers are promoted to ranks from Captain to Colonel inclusively on the condition of their successful completion of training associated with the position corresponding to their promoted rank. Reserve officers who have not undergone training in the period of their current rank are promoted to ranks from captain and above if they possess the necessary work experience in the national economy in specialties kindred to their military classification specialties, or work experience in officer positions, with regard for the positions which they will be required to fill in the event of call-up to active duty.

78. The following terms of service at officer ranks are established for reserve officers:

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---------|
| In the rank of Junior Lieutenant | 2 years |
| In the rank of Lieutenant | 3 years |
| In the rank of Senior Lieutenant | 4 years |
| In the rank of Captain | 4 years |
| In the rank of Major | 5 years |
| In the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel | 6 years |

A reserve officer's time in grade is reckoned from the day the order awarding this rank is signed.

79. Reserve officers are promoted in junior- and senior-grade officer ranks:

- up to Major inclusively—by military district and fleet commanders;
- up to Lieutenant-Colonel inclusively—by USSR deputy ministers of defense, by the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the USSR Armed Forces, by the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, by the Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and by USSR first deputy ministers of defense;
- up to Colonel inclusively—by the USSR Minister of Defense.

80. Promotions in officer ranks are awarded successively.

In regard to certain reserve officers who possess extensive training and considerable work experience in a specialty employed in military service and who are called

up for active duty or appointed for wartime, as an exception, the USSR Minister of Defense may award a rank to an officer one to three steps above his current rank, irrespective of time and rank foreseen by Article 78 of this statute, but not above the rank foreseen by the table of organization for the position to which he is to be assigned.

81. Junior- and senior-grade reserve officers may be demoted in rank by one step by order of the USSR Minister of Defense for committing misdeeds staining the military honor and merit of the rank, if previously implemented measures have not justified themselves.

82. Reserve officers reduced in officer rank but who have proven themselves in productive or other socially useful work may be restored to their previous rank with regard for the opinion of the military commissariat's auxiliary committee:

- junior- and senior-grade officers—by order of the USSR ministry of defense, but not less than 3 years following reduction in rank;
- general and flag officers—by the President of the USSR.

Reserve officers restored to their previous rank are granted:

- when demoted during active duty—rights and privileges that had been granted to them at the time of their separation into the reserve or retirement;
- when demoted while on reserve status—rights and privileges they enjoyed prior to demotion in rank;

83. Reserve officers who had committed misdeeds incompatible with membership in the officer corps, and who had stained the honor of the rank may be deprived of their rank and simultaneously demoted to private or seaman, with regard for the opinion of the military commissariat's auxiliary committee:

- a) junior- and senior-grade officers—by the USSR Minister of Defense;
- b) general and flag officers—by the President of the USSR.

Reserve officers who had committed crimes may be deprived of their rank by sentence of the court (military tribunal).

84. Persons deprived of an officer rank who recommend themselves to be worthy of restoration of their rank through conscientious participation in productive or other socially useful labor and through exemplary behavior may be restored to officer ranks, including those held previously, with regard for the opinion of the military commissariat's auxiliary committee:

- a) junior- and senior-grade officers deprived of their rank—by the USSR Minister of Defense;
- b) general and flag officers deprived of their rank—by the President of the USSR.

Persons deprived of their rank by a sentence of a military tribunal (court) are restored to rank after their conviction is reversed (their sentence is served).

85. Reserve officers may be called up for training of a duration determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet in order to upgrade their military proficiency.

The procedure and time of training sessions are determined within the limits of the established duration by order of the USSR Minister of Defense.

86. When reserve officers commit misdeeds staining the military honor and merit of the rank, they may be deprived of the right to wear the uniform by the commanders (chiefs) who granted them such a right upon their separation from military service, but not lower than a by USSR deputy minister of defense, the commander-in-chief of a branch of the USSR Armed Forces, the Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy ministers of defense, with regard for the opinion of the military commissariat's auxiliary committee.

In the event of faultless behavior, reserve officers deprived of the right to wear the uniform may be restored to the right of wearing the uniform by orders of commanders (chiefs) of equal or higher rank possessing such a right, with regard for the opinion of the military commissariat's auxiliary committee.

87. Reserve officers may be called up for active duty:

- a) voluntarily on the basis of a contract for a term of not less than 3 years—from among persons who have not attained the maximum age of active duty;
- b) on the basis of a 2-year call-up—from among persons not more than 28 years of age who have not completed compulsory military service or nonmilitary service.

Female reserve officers are not called up for active duty in peacetime. They may be appointed to active duty voluntarily for 3 years in accordance with Paragraph "b" of this article.

Reserve officers recommended for voluntary appointment to active duty are subject to preliminary examination by auxiliary committees of military commissariats.

Reserve officers are appointed to active duty by orders of the USSR Minister of Defense.

88. Reserve officers are obligated to be ready to stand in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces at any moment, to persistently upgrade their military training, to justify the high honor of the Soviet officer with their labor and exemplary behavior, and to actively participate in public defense work, especially with preconscript and conscript youth.

89. Retired officers continue socially useful activity and participate in military-patriotic education of the population within the limits of their strength and capabilities.

Retired officers do not receive promotions in officer ranks. The ranks of retired officers are reduced, restored and forfeited on the basis of the conditions and according to the procedure foreseen in articles 81-84 of this statute. In this case retired officers restored to their

prior officer rank are granted the corresponding rights and privileges in accordance with the procedure foreseen by Article 82 of this statute.

Retired officers may also be deprived of the right to wear the uniform, and they may subsequently reacquire this right, on the basis of the conditions and in accordance with the procedure foreseen by Article 86 of this statute.

Footnotes

*In this and subsequent articles of this statute, for the sake of brevity officer personnel will be referred to as officers.

**In this and subsequent articles of this statute, the following definitions apply:

Cadets of military educational institutions include students of military educational institutions not possessing officer ranks, unless otherwise stipulated;

military educational institutions are defined as military schools, military institutes, military faculties of civilian institutions of higher education, and military academies, unless otherwise stipulated.

Lt-Gen Sadovnikov on Future of Military Trade System

91UM0286A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with USSR Ministry of Defense Main Military Trade Directorate Chief Lieutenant General Nikolay Grigoryevich Sadovnikov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent P. Altunin under the rubric "Timely Interview": "Military Trade: What Tomorrow Will Be"]

[Text] No, perhaps today there is no other sphere of our lives with which we have contact that is accompanied by such stormy and most often negative emotions as trade, also including military.

The editorial office is receiving dozens of letters per day from both near and remote garrisons that are filled with exclamations and questions: "None of the most needed products are in our store!", "Where can you buy a television?", "I cannot go out without uniform socks!". And as a rule the generalization follows: Where is military trade looking?

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent P. Altunin's conversation with USSR Ministry of Defense Main Military Trade Directorate Chief Lieutenant General N. Sadovnikov also began with these questions.

[Sadovnikov] The complaints are valid. I could add to them and even list by memory the articles that servicemen and their families are especially in need of today.

[Altunin] Excuse me, would it not certainly be easier to list what is available on store shelves?

[Sadovnikov] I would agree with that. Only I would immediately want to avoid hasty generalizations. Military trade has many shortcomings and I will talk about this below but unfortunately I cannot avoid reality: Everything we have is the same as what is available in the country. Empty shelves in military trade stores are part of the overall picture. And we all know the reasons, an entire two weeks discussion about them occurred at the Congress of People's Deputies. They are the economic crisis, the disruption of economic ties, the goods-money imbalance, and the consumer market.

[Altunin] Of course, military trade is part of overall trade but I would say it also has its special purpose. It is simply unjustifiable to raise the white flag and to say that it is bad everywhere and that we also cannot do anything about it. Then our garrisons will remain face to face with their needs.

[Sadovnikov] But we are not surrendering even in this desperately difficult situation. We rank sixth among republics in goods turnover. And this is occurring despite the USSR Ministry of Trade's assistance and that many suppliers have not "supplied goods" [using] the

funds allocated to us—neither primary, nor supplemental. For example, we did not receive more than 2,000 tons of meat, 2,700 tons of milk, 19 million eggs, 13,000 vacuum cleaners, 1,800 refrigerators, etc. during ten months of last year. How do we get out of this situation? We are carrying canned meat instead of fresh meat and powdered eggs instead of fresh eggs. We are purchasing commodities from local suppliers, from individuals, and from defense industry enterprises. Our workers initiative and commercial industriousness is helping. This is precisely how the Voyentorg [Military Trade System] of Kiev, Carpathian, and Leningrad military districts and the Central Department Store are operating. Annual inter-military district fairs have taken hold.

Furthermore, we are encouraging the development of our own subsidiary farms in every possible way. Last year they produced 5,000 tons of meat (slaughtered weight), six million eggs, and 500 tons of vegetables. Let us say that the Stryy Military Trade Commander N. Borisenko (Carpathian Military District): Last year, he salted and canned seven tons of cucumbers and just as many tomatoes in glass jars and he established his own sausage [manufacturing] shop. Our production enterprises manufactured more than one million articles of knit clothing (sports clothes, scarves, etc.) and more than 100,000 pairs of leather shoes....

[Altunin] Is military trade resorting to direct ties abroad? How are things here?

[Sadovnikov] Trade relations have become complicated with the countries of Eastern Europe due to the well-known events there. But we recently strengthened ties with China. Knit goods, vegetables, fruit, and canned meat are coming from there. Syria is providing us with 235 million rubles worth of goods. We received 36,000 tons of potatoes, 15,000 tons of vegetables, and more than 80,000 tons of citrus fruit, bananas, and pineapple from various countries. One million cigarettes were shipped to us from Lebanon which I think will permit us to remove the stress associated with tobacco items.

[Altunin] Nikolay Grigoryevich, frankly speaking, the current situation is no cause for joy. And what is the approaching year preparing for us?

[Sadovnikov] I will tell you just as frankly: There is little hope of increasing goods through goszakaz [state order] policy. It exists on more than 100 commodity groups. More specifically—they are meat and milk products, flour, groats, sugar, eggs, vegetable oil, margarine, and fish. In comparison with last year, there will be no growth here but there also does not have to be a reduction. The situation is the same with manufactured goods. We need to orient ourselves to the free market for the remainder.

[Altunin] But is military trade ready for this? What problems are arising here?

[Sadovnikov] At first glance, trade by its very nature is always ready for the market. Where there is supply and

demand, there is something to sell. But here we are completely dependent on goods producers. We hope that the economy will nevertheless begin to improve. But we will still have our own specific features in view of the fact that military trade equipment has been assigned to all-union property and its enterprises and organizations are not subject to denationalization and privatization. So our centralized management has been preserved although this year a goods turnover forecast and not a plan has been established for us.

[Altunin] It turns out that essentially nothing is changing in your area?

[Sadovnikov] No, much is changing. Collective contracting and leasing will be introduced everywhere. The management structures will also be changing. They will be structured based on independent management, self-financing, and profitability. Our Main Directorate will also perform additional functions: Define military trade's economic strategy, refine issues of interrelations with goods producers, and implement a system of measures to protect the interests of consumers.

[Altunin] And what will change in the military districts?

[Sadovnikov] We are creating commercial centers that operate on the basis of marketing instead of trade departments. There will not be clerk or bookkeeper positions at these centers but we already need right now knowledgeable trade personnel with a broad range of business ties and people who have initiative and who are not indifferent to their business.

Today we are counting on young, capable, energetic people. We have organized retraining courses. Last year, 1,506 people completed them. Thirty two military trade commanders and 14 experts have already graduated from the management school.

[Altunin] But obviously not everything will depend on competent and businesslike trade employees and on commercial centers that are only just now being formed. What are the most vital tasks that military trade faces today?

[Sadovnikov] I would list the number one problem that we have not been able to solve in recent years. I am talking about local attitudes toward trade. Some commanders are indifferent toward it and others, I would say, are too devoted. What do I have in mind? The indifferent commanders are those who do not offer proper locations near stores, and who do not build cafes or tearooms. In many garrisons, we have 30 to 50 percent less space in stores, storage areas, refrigerators, and at depots. For example, nearly half of the school children are deprived of hot food due to the lack of school cafeterias at Belorussian and Far Eastern military districts garrisons.

On the other hand, some of our commanders assume responsibility for distribution functions that do not belong to them, they poke their heads into military trade

facilities, and they engender abuse and conflicts through their actions. There really are committees for public control who are elected at consumers conferences. They need to be offered the opportunity to do everything honestly and justly.

A USSR Presidential Decree on workers control over the distribution of goods was recently issued and the activities of law enforcement organs have been increased—we need to establish order once and for all.

[Altunin] Nikolay Grigoryevich, judging by the letters to the editor, passions are boiling at units and at institutions surrounding car sales along with the great difficulties in supplying food and basic necessities....

[Sadovnikov] All for the same reason. There is a critical shortage of cars and the price is double or triple on the black market. Someone buys and then resells—these situations occur. But there are also violations of justice during their distribution. USSR Deputy Minister of Defense/Rear Services Commander Order No 70 1979 stipulates: the distribution of automobiles is carried out by the command authority jointly with representatives of society based on the sequence that orders (requisitions) have been submitted and certainly considering the number of cars allocated. At the same time, the nature and length of service performed, participation in combat operations, and other circumstances which provide the grounds for a man to claim a priority before others must be taken into account and they must be justly distributed. Here society must also have its say.

This order is being complied with in the majority of cases. But there frequently are also cases when glasnost and public opinion are ignored and issues are resolved secretly. Is this really the procedure?

[Altunin] Maybe we also need to rework the order and to improve distribution procedures? Really, they were formulated during the years when there was no such shortage of cars. Yes and the process of democratization in the Army has changed the situation in the collectives.

[Sadovnikov] We need to think about this.

[Altunin] You know that nevertheless there are many complaints against military trade employees themselves and the quality of service for shoppers....

[Sadovnikov] Yes, I know. And there are simply outrageous cases: hiding goods from shoppers, being rude, deceiving and cheating them when weighing goods. I do not want to explain this as being only due to the shortage which has developed in trade although, in truth, this is also a cause. The matter is the omissions of leaders in hiring personnel. Shrewd businessmen and dishonest people are becoming involved in trade. Here are some examples. Salesmen at the military trade store headed by A. Kuzmina (Military Trade Store 301, Leningrad Military District) were actually engaged in supplying themselves until they were exposed.

For example, recently OBKhSS [Department for combating the embezzlement of socialist property and speculation] discovered cases of the grossest violations of trade regulations, hiding goods, and supplying them to selected people at Kiev Military Trade Store number 62. Is it not strange that Rear Services Commander Colonel B. Melnik "organized" these violations. One day, he acquired R4,904 worth of shortage goods (on the installment plan!) at the store without informing the commission for public control.

At Military Trade Store No 312 (North Caucasus Military District), Gostorginspeksiya [State Trade Inspectorate] rejected as defective 300 kilograms of high

quality ham and 40 kilograms of "Ptichye moloko" [Bird's Milk] candy at the depot which were being stored for "needy people" until they spoiled. Of course the guilty parties have been punished and many of them have been convicted for embezzlement and theft but this is still a minus for us the commanders....

I do not think we need to count on the controlling organs alone. In our democratic time, society must become more boldly involved in the "mechanics" of trade. Really today society has been presented with more rights and there are military orders, Soviet decisions, and Presidential decrees at their disposal.

Reaction to RSFSR Plan To End Pre-Draft Training

91UM0287A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major V. Matyash: "The RSFSR Ministry of Education Has Attacked Future Soldiers by Deciding To Terminate Pre-Draft Training"]

[Text] It would seem that there is something here to philosophize about: If the states that have been confronting each other until recently disarm as fast as they can, our schools do not have to be sites for military exercises. It would be better to let our graduates enter the ranks of the fighters for peace. And in the ranks of the Armed Forces? So, maybe, they will soon enter the army voluntarily. Then what is the sense of introducing everyone to military service?

These "peace-loving" ideas, expressed in other words naturally, are set forth in RSFSR Ministry of Education Order No 62 signed on October 17, 1990 by Deputy Ministers Ye. Kurkin and V. Zavarykin. Of course, there is justification for these ideas in the document. The order states that "A study of public opinion has shown that the pre-draft training for young students that has been carried out in school and professional technical school facilities contradicts public education's true goals and tasks and causes students and their parents to have a negative attitude."

But time passes and letters, whose authors insist on retaining pre-draft training, continue to arrive at the editorial offices.

I recall that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote that, just two weeks prior to the conclusion reached above on the untenability of pre-draft training, this very same Ye. Kurkin sent a telegram throughout all Russia in which he talked about its repeal as about a decision that had already been made. There was also a recommendation in it: Pre-draft training hours could be used "at the school's discretion...."

So, the reference to the "students' and their parents' negative attitudes"—is it just the ministry leadership's attempt to create the appearance of a democratic resolution of the issue?

"Judge for yourselves," said Moscow City Committee for Public Education Inspector S. Derzhanovskiy. "One of E. Dneprov's first orders in the post of RSFSR Minister of Education was to eliminate the position of initial military training inspector in the ministry. And somewhat later, while introducing his Deputy L. Kezina to his colleagues, he set forth his own three strategic tasks. They naturally must also become ours. So here is one of them—elimination of pre-draft training. And Deputy Minister Ye. Kurkin, while speaking at the Institute for Teacher Improvement, made 'H-Hour' more precise for us—October 1st. So the telegram and the order itself are only formalizing the decision...."

The previously mentioned guiding document also orders certain other ways to implement it. In particular, the order states: "Henceforth, until repeal of Article 17 of the Law on Universal Military Obligation, carry out pre-draft training at school field assemblies and at defense sports camps at the expense of training time assigned for this training during the last two years of training at educational institutions from the schedule of 6-7 hours of training per day."

But how to execute it? First of all, the hours which are referred to in the above quote have already been recommended a bit above that for use "at the school's discretion." And second....

"As a result of the lack of a defense sports camp in our region, this will lead to the curtailment of pre-draft training," Yashaltinskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies Chairman and USSR People's Deputy A. Kozauchko, RSFSR Communist Party Raykom Secretary V. Dolgopolov, Rayon Department of Public Education Head P. Bozhinskiy, and Rayvojenkom [Rayon Military Commissariat] Major V. Krivko wrote to the editorial offices. There are also no such camps in the required numbers in both Chelyabinsk Oblast, Stavropol Kray, or in Leningrad....

The first thought that comes to mind while reading these letters is: Why not use, while the jury is still out, the pre-draft training facilities that we already have at the schools that have been developed through military instructors and students many years of work? But here the ministry order is quite categorical: "...transfer equipment and weapons to military commissariats and to specialized sports organizations. Clear militarized training equipment and visual aids from school yards...."

Yes, demolish, not build. This same S. Derzhanovskiy bitterly told me about how in many schools "demilitarization" is going ahead at full speed. Then some cooperators have already managed to get hold of shooting-ranges. What about the facilities there! Military instructors are being deprived of work and young people who are studying this specialty in almost 50 of the country's institutions today are unaware of their future fate. "Civilian" teachers are also alarmed. "A survey of middle school students showed their interest in completing pre-draft training directly in schools," Gorkom Department of Public Education Head L. Nekrasova, School Directors A. Kharvon and V. Shaferova, and many others reported. Many teachers think that eliminating pre-draft training of young people in schools is having a negative impact on the country's defense capability.

If these words belonged, say, to a Minister of Defense representative, someone could assess them as defending a departmental interest. But let the reader himself decide whose interest this is—training youth for military service.

Moscow's Lyublinskiy Rayon School No 774 Director Valentina Mikhaylovna Platonova did not even begin to

prove that "no order can repeal pre-draft training, just like the very concept of 'patriotism'." Both previously and now she together with her colleagues has been creating all of the conditions so that young men can be well prepared to carry out their military duty. We can judge just how successful this has been by the fact that last year, of 27 young men who graduated from the school, 22 entered military academies.

Teachers like Platonova, in our time that is frankly speaking no better for military patriotic education, are looking for and finding new work methods and techniques that interest young men. So, for example, classes with intense student pre-draft and physical training appeared during an experiment in the country's schools. In particular, there is a class in Moscow Khoroshevskiy Rayon School 143. The young men have selected it. What is their opinion with regard to the fact that the RSFSR Ministry of Education Order prescribes the authorization to organize pre-draft training as an elective for students who have expressed the desire to do so? What do they think about the possibility of passing a test on this subject as out-of-school education, insofar as the assessment, as the order states, "does not impact the document on education"?

"Well, first, you do not need to present us as some sort of young warriors. We study according to the same program as everyone," answered Dima Krylov. "We also study world literature, we learn to dance, to cook, to swim, calisthenics, all of this is additional."

"The army was, is, and will be," thinks Maksim Makarikhin. "And no matter what manning methods and terms of service are, I am convinced of one thing: Nothing will be done without appropriate training."

It is not at all mandatory that everyone have training like the basic training School 143 11th grade lads have. There is no way that they all must prepare to be military academy cadets. Others may not like the military profession. Although, here we can surmise: Do you like it or do you not like it? Ultimately, our Constitution states that fulfillment of the military obligation is the honorable duty of each citizen of the USSR. And if this is so, then training of young men for this profession is a nationwide task. The USSR Minister of Defense and State Education Committee Chairman Order "On the Improvement of Pre-draft Training of Young People and Students" that was published June 12, 1990 is permeated with this idea. This idea is also set forth in the recently published draft Law of the USSR "On Universal Military Obligation and Military Service": "In accordance with the Constitution of the USSR, the country's defense is the most important function of the state and is the cause of all the people." There is also an article in the law which defines the techniques and procedures to train youth to perform their constitutional duty to defend the Homeland. In particular, it states that "pre-draft training of youth, including training for civil defense, is conducted at general education schools (including at high schools, lycees, and other types of middle general educational

institutions), professional technical schools, and middle specialized educational institutions beginning with the pre-graduation class."

Time will tell if this draft becomes law. And I doubt that an attempt has been undertaken to ignore the existing [law]. Just what is the Ministry of Defense's reaction to this, which is interested, as is all of society, in insuring that healthy, comprehensively developed, and trained young people enter the ranks of the country's defenders? I asked the Ground Forces General Staff this question. This is what Colonel V. Denisov, head of the youth initial military training planning and control department of specialists for the USSR Armed Forces answered:

"We cannot understand how this decision by the leaders of the RSFSR Ministry of Education occurred that is based on an alleged poll of the teaching public on pre-draft training at schools and at PTU's [vocational and technical schools] which contradicts public education's true goals and tasks. We gathered and analyzed copies of all answers from locations to Deputy Minister Ye. Kurkin's telegram through the military commissariats. It turned out that 72 percent of Russia's republic, kray, and oblast organs of public education advocated retaining pre-draft training at schools and PTU's.

The Ground Forces Military Soviet requested that the RSFSR Council of Ministers Chairman and Main Procurator repeal the illegal order. This issue was raised by people's deputies at a November 2, 1990 meeting at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. But neither the military soviet's appeal nor the query of deputy-servicemen have yet been answered. And furthermore, on December 1st, pre-draft training had already been terminated at 58 Moscow schools. It is true that they are not hurrying to carry out Order No 62 in republics, krays, and oblasts which in and of itself reveals its popularity.

It is hard to predict how the conflict that is coming to a head between the Russian Ministry of Education and the public education organizations subordinate to it will be resolved. But meanwhile the executors who are distinguished by service zeal are demolishing the training facilities. The human fates....

I think about this and I recall the beginning of my service career. Our company was on a forced march. Our vision was obscured by the dust and the heat. My Comrade Slavik Tkachenko fell and spasmodically shaking his legs, bawled: "Shoot me, lads, I cannot go on!" We kind people carried him on our shoulders for five kilometers until our very destination. And how many of these Slaviks are there in soldiers' ranks today?

What do RSFSR People's Deputies think about all of this? What does RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman B.N. Yeltsin think about this? Lately, we hear him making statements about "understanding the problems of the army." How does this tie in with the decision of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet accountable department which is essentially attacking the army and attacking future soldiers?

1920's Conscientious Objector Alternative Service Viewed

*91UM0394A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Feb 91 First Edition p 4*

[Article by Colonel of Justice I. Vashkevich: "Alternative Service"]

[Text] It is strange how things work out here sometimes: we talk and talk, we cite indisputable arguments, finally we arrive at a definite conclusion, and... we try to do the opposite.

That is the case, for example, with respect to determining the procedures for performing civilian service as an alternative to military service. In the draft Law of the USSR on universal military obligation and military service, which was recently published on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, so-called non-troop service, although permitted, is only... for peacetime. In war such an alternative is ruled out. What is more, even those who performed non-troop service in peacetime would be called up on general grounds in time of war. It is not difficult to imagine that precisely these persons, untrained in peacetime, would prove to be the most vulnerable in battle.

The opponents of alternative service usually refer to some "tradition" of universal military obligation, allegedly born with the Red Army itself. Alas, I must disappoint the devotees of this version: it was during the period of development of our Armed Forces, and what is more, in the heat of the civil war, on 4 January 1919, that the Council of Peoples Commissars [SNK] adopted a decree which relieved from military service those persons for whom such service was incompatible with their religious convictions. It is remarkable that the justice and self-evidence of such a decree was not contested by the leadership of the RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army] until practically the end of the thirties. I believe that it would be interesting for readers to learn about certain documents in this regard.

First of all I will cite almost in full a decision by one of the people's courts of Moscow:

"On 15 July 1919, the Moscow City Local People's Court of the Voznesenskiy district, consisting of the chairman L. Podvalskiy and the assessors Solovyev and Obukhov, considered the suit of Rudolf Abramovich Klassen for release from military service for religious convictions. After considering the fact that Klassen belonged to a religious group of Mennonites, who had rejected any participation in war and the shedding of human blood, and also hearing the explanations of an expert on Soviet religious groups, the court ruled that the suit of Dr. Klassen had merit.

And guided by the appropriate decrees of Soviet authority and revolutionary law, it ordered that Dr. R.A.

Klassen, be relieved from performance of military service, which would be replaced by work treating infectious diseases in hospitals of the civilian department (Case No. 109, 1919)."

As we can see, at the dawn of Soviet authority not only was the right of citizens to alternative service proclaimed, but a procedure was developed for the realization of this right, on the basis of court decision.

In 1924 while compiling new lists of persons subject to mobilization in the event of a declaration of war, officials of the Military Medical Directorate of the Moscow Military District again pondered the legality of Dr. Klassen's complete relief from performance of military service. The officials proceeded from the fact that the known decree of the SNK "could not apply to doctors who work in hospitals easing the sufferings of soldiers."

Here again the essence of the decree was not overturned. Simply proceeding from the interests of its department, the leadership of the directorate tried to narrow somewhat the sphere of action of the corresponding law, appealing to the USSR Supreme Court. The authors of the letter inquired "would the USSR Supreme Court deem it possible to overrule the decision of the people's court (of 15 July 1919—I.V.) on review, and provide general guidelines to the effect that relief of an individual from line military service for religious convictions did not exclude the possibility of using him for non-line service in hospitals and other medical institutions."

However this departmental amendment did not become part of the decree. The USSR Supreme Court did not support it, and an official explanation was sent from the People's Commissariat of Justice to the Directorate of the RKKA: "...In accordance with the decree of the SNK of 4 January 1919 and the decree of the SNK of 14 December 1920, the court is given the right to relieve persons who out of religious conviction are unable to participate in military service, whether it be line non-line service, from their military obligation in general, replacing that with medical or other generally useful work for the period of conscription of their contemporaries.

For the reasons set forth, the decision of the People's Court of the Voznesenskiy district dated 15 July 1919 regarding the relief of Dr. Klassen from military service is correct and not subject to appeal."

There it is. Whatever one might say, they began with a respectful attitude toward legality which cannot be "Kalugan" or "Kazan," let alone departmental.

Alas over time in practice we have lost much of what we could rightfully be proud. Lost it to such an extent that we are ready to present distorted ideas of justice as traditions bequeathed by the revolution.

DOSAAF Deputy Chairman Interviewed

91UM0440A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 2, Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Col Aleksey Ivanovich Anokhin, deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and chief of the directorate for mass organizational work and military and patriotic propaganda, by A. Akishin: "Dictated by the Times"]

[Text] *Today's issue of SOVETSKIY PATRIOT is publishing the USSR DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy] Charter with the partial changes adopted by the 6th Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, which will now be used temporarily in the work of the organizations of the defense society.*

A SOVETSKIY PATRIOT correspondent met with the deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and chief of the directorate for mass organizational work and military and patriotic propaganda, Col A.I. Anokhin, in connection with this and asked him to answer a few questions.

[Akishin] Aleksey Ivanovich, what has made it necessary to rework a number of the provisions of the charter and make partial temporary changes in it?

[Anokhin] The charter that was in effect had been adopted 28 years ago by the 5th All-Union DOSAAF Congress in 1962. Changes were later made in it at all of the regular all-union congresses of the defense society.

It would be correct to submit the new changes at a congress, based on Article 18 of the charter. But preparing and carrying that out would have taken much time. And life demands that the changes be made today.

That is why, in accordance with Article 19 of the charter, the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF—which, as is well known, supervises all the activity of the organizations of the society in the period between all-union congresses—proposed the introduction of partial temporary changes at the next regular plenum.

The necessity of urgent changes in the charter was dictated by a number of serious circumstances.

First. Fundamentally new legislation and important decrees by directive bodies have been adopted of late that directly or indirectly affect the interests of the defense society and have an immediate influence on the prospects for its further development. The development of the conceptual framework for a new Union Treaty and USSR Law on the Defense of the USSR, along with a series of other legislation, is underway.

Second. The time has come to bring the regulation forms of life and activity of the defense society into conformity with the resolutions of the 5th Plenum of the USSR

DOSAAF Central Committee and the requirements of contemporary practices of the committees and organizations of DOSAAF.

Third. Regulation guarantees must be created to define the real rights and obligations of members of the society, as well as to grant the defense collectives broad freedom of action in the interests of fundamental improvements in mass defense work and the clear-cut delimitation of the authority of the center and the republic, kray and oblast organizations of DOSAAF.

[Akishin] Please comment on the principal changes that were adopted by the 6th Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

[Anokhin] The new edition of the charter has established the genuinely democratic nature of the mutual relations of the majority and the minority, the realization of which will become an important condition of the further self-development of each organization of DOSAAF and the defense society overall.

Fundamental additions have been made to the charter provision on the mandatory nature of the decisions of higher bodies for lower ones. It is being assumed that this norm will be in effect only in those cases where the decisions of the higher bodies have been made within the bounds of the authority invested in them by the lower organizations themselves.

Substantial changes have been adopted on issues of membership in DOSAAF and the payment of membership dues. The right to establish the frequency and size of the payment of entry and membership dues is being granted to the general meetings of the primary and other defense collectives. Collective membership, as well as individual, has been codified in the defense society in accordance with a multitude of suggestions. Age-related qualifications have been eliminated.

A special place in the package of partial changes has been relegated to the primary organizations of DOSAAF. It is being established, first of all, that the primary organizations independently resolve all issues of their life and activity, including the independent determination of the frequency of meetings (conferences), sessions of the DOSAAF committee etc. Second, the primary organizations of general schools and other educational institutions can unite with the primary organizations of DOSAAF at major enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Third, a new provision has been approved saying that councils of representatives of primary organizations, special-interest clubs, associations for the realization of various USSR DOSAAF programs and other forms of unification of the members of the defense society can be created and operate by initiative of DOSAAF members.

Substantial changes have also been made associated with defining the concepts of the foundation of USSR DOSAAF, which, along with the primary organizations,

will be comprised of those of school, instructional, sporting, technical, sports and other organizations.

Especial significance is assigned today to changes that are aimed at further deepening the processes of democratization and glasnost in the activity of all echelons of the defense society, expanding the rights and obligations of organizations and members of DOSAAF and delimiting the functions and authority of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the USSR DOSAAFs of the union republics and the kray and oblast DOSAAF committees. It is being emphasized in particular that during the period between congresses, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee may convene an All-Union DOSAAF Conference in order to discuss essential problems within the union and urgent issues in the practical activity of the defense society. The DOSAAF central committees of the union republics and the kray and oblast committees have been granted the right to create unified DOSAAF organizations on the territory of several urban or rural rayons. They have also been granted the right to create unified organizations on the scale of a rayon or city through the defense collectives located there (rayon committee and school and sports clubs, among others).

Changes have also occurred with regard to the overall process of democratization and the section of the charter on the funds of the society and its rights. Changes have been introduced connected with determining the property of USSR DOSAAF, along with the rights of the corresponding committees to dispose of it in accordance with prevailing legislation.

The important provision that special centralized allocations and reserves may be created by resolution of the corresponding committees for the purpose of creating the opportunity of financing all-union, republic, regional and dedicated programs for the development of the defense society has also been introduced.

In short, the partial changes in the USSR DOSAAF Charter, prepared on a broad democratic basis, create important preconditions for the decisive renewal of all the defense collectives.

Spring 1991 Conscription Announcement

91UM0518A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Mar 91 First Edition p 1

[USSR Cabinet of Ministers: "Resolution of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers of 26 March 1991, No 121, Moscow, The Kremlin".]

[Text] Resolution of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers of 26 March 1991, No 121, Moscow, The Kremlin, concerning the separation of border, internal and railroad troops from the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces into the reserve of servicemen who have served the established period of active military service and concerning the regular conscription of citizens onto active military service during April—June of 1991.

In fulfillment of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation" the USSR Cabinet of Ministers resolves:

1. to separate from the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces Border, Internal and Railroad Troops who have served the established term of active military service into the reserve during April—June of 1991;
2. during April—June of 1991 to call up for fixed term active military service in the USSR Armed Forces, the Border, Internal and Railroad Troops male citizens who have reached the age of 18 on the day of conscription and who do not have the right to deferment from conscription onto active military service, as well as citizens above the [normal] conscription age who have lost the right to a deferment from conscription;
3. to publish the Resolution in the mass media.

USSR Prime Minister V. Pavlov

Administrative Directorate of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers I. Prostyakov

**Society for Cooperation with Army Replaces
Georgian DOSAAF**

91P50127A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Was DOSAAF Now GSPA".]

[Text] As is well known, DOSAAF, in its former all-union structure no longer exists in Georgia. In its place the Georgian Society for the Assistance of the Army [GOSA] has been created. The former chairman of the republican DOSAAF Central Committee, Col V. Gudadze has become the director of the central council of the new organization.


At the scheduled GOSA plenum which was held recently, a far from optimistic atmosphere prevailed. Here is just one fact from Colonel Gudadze's report: as of today half of DOSAAF's vehicles have been stolen by the militarized group Mkhedrioni.

We will note that the discussion here concerns automobiles which belong to the Ministry of Defense and which were never transferred to the former republic DOSAAF organizations despite corresponding orders to the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District. And although the speaker spared no effort to describe all the benefits of the shift of GOSA towards the struggle "for the national

interests of Georgia," this did not produce a very deep impression. In fact the government of Georgia has adopted a decree according to which the activities of GOSA are suspended. Its bank accounts have been closed, its movable and real property are to be transferred to the national guard. After they have been inventoried, of course.

True, the participants of the plenum considered such a framing of the issue unacceptable and "undermining the defense capability of the republic." As a result they adopted an appeal to the Chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, Z. Gamsakhurdia and to the chairman of the government, T. Sigua calling for a suspension and reconsideration of the decree cited above.

The Plenum of the Central Council plans to continue its work. But hopes for a reconsideration of the decree adopted by the government are not great, inasmuch as in the table of ranks, the national guard which is being formed rates much higher than the "imperial structure" in the form of DOSAAF. The leadership of the district's automobile service, on the other hand, supposes, and not without basis, that any change in the signboard over the excessively faded facade of the defense society will hardly move its heirs, even if they happen to be national guard members, to return the illegally appropriated automobiles.



Performance, Specifications of F-117A

91UM0320A Moscow KRYLA RODINY in Russian
No 11 Nov 90 pp 30-32, No 12 Dec 90 pp 22-23

[Article by Vladimir Ilyin and Viktor Bakurskiy: "The 'Wobbly Goblin' and Other Aircraft"]

[Nov 90 pp 30-32]

[Text] The majority of U.S. combat aircraft whose series production is proposed to begin in the 1990's, including the B-2 Strategic Bomber, the ATF [Advanced Tactical Fighter], the A-12 ground attack aircraft, and others, are so-called low-signature aircraft. In importance, aircraft signature characteristics are on a par with the other most important combat aircraft tactical-technical capabilities. Countermeasures against modern radar, IR [infrared], optical, and other aircraft detection systems are the most complex technical problems whose resolution we propose achieving by combining electronic warfare systems and increasing the stealth of aircraft in the radar, optical, IR, and acoustic ranges. Stealth technology, including the series of technical solutions directed at reducing an aircraft's signature, is becoming one of the important

directions of leading aircraft firms' work. So, total appropriations for aircraft programs associated with the development of Stealth technology that are currently being carried out in the United States could reach \$200 billion according to expert assessments.

However, aircraft combat signature reduction problems which have become so "fashionable" at the present time were already in the field of vision of aircraft designers at the dawn of aviation. In 1912, Mr. P. Petroshi (Austria-Hungary) used a skin made from transparent material on the Taube aircraft. In 1913, V. Lebedev in Russia and A. Knubel in Germany were conducting similar work. However, a skin made from transparent materials performed unsatisfactorily and furthermore the aircraft's load-bearing units and aircraft engine parts, crew, and weaponry remained conspicuous. Camouflage paint was a cheaper and adequately effective method to reduce an aircraft's optical signature during that period.

The USSR once again returned to the idea of optical range low-signature aircraft during the 1930's. In 1938, an "invisible aircraft" was built based on A. Yakovlev's AIR-3 light aircraft design under the guidance of Professor S. Kozlov. A transparent skin made from organic fiber was employed on the aircraft. However, the organic

fiber rapidly tarnished and cracked and resulted in the termination of further work on the aircraft.

A larger low-signature aircraft constructed from chrome-plated tube load-bearing elements was designed but not built.

During the Second World War which laid the foundation for the use of radar, the question arose about reducing the radar signature of military equipment. Tactical techniques were developed that provided the minimal probability of aircraft detection (also including using radar)—penetration to the target at the highest possible altitude which was used by reconnaissance aircraft and heavy bombers and flight at the lowest possible altitudes which was widely used by tactical and naval aviation.

In the 1950's, aircraft appeared that had a reduced radar cross section (RCS)—the primary parameter that characterizes the size of the aircraft's radar signature. In 1955, the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance aircraft was developed at Lockheed under the leadership of K. Johnson. A series of technical solutions was realized in its design that reduced the aircraft's signature. This firm's next reconnaissance aircraft—the SR-71—(first flight—in 1964) also had a number of design elements that reduced its RCS. However, rapid improvements in radar technology required expansion of the area of Stealth application and its use in the design not only of reconnaissance but also of combat aircraft.

In 1972-1973, Lockheed's future programs department conducted complex research into the possibility of developing a combat aircraft with a reduced signature. Research encompassed the issues of aircraft configuration, their TTD [turbojet engines], BREO [onboard electronic equipment], and weaponry. Since the beginning of the 1960's, Northrop had been carrying out research in similar directions under the guidance of D. Patierno.

In the mid-1970's, the U.S. Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency asked five primary aircraft manufacturing firms to study the possibility of developing a low-signature fighter aircraft. Lockheed's and Northrop's aircraft designs competed to build an experimental low-signature aircraft and the program received the designation Have Blue. Lockheed ultimately won the competition.

Two small experimental aircraft were built within the framework of the program. The results of their testing served as the foundation for making a decision to build a full-scale aircraft. Design of this aircraft was begun in 1978 and was designated the F-117A.

Development of the little-known combat aircraft was publicly reported for the first time at a press conference on August 22, 1980. Deputy Secretary of Defense for Research and Development Perry stated that during the summer of 1977, Stealth technology had reached such a level that it had become possible to use it in various types of aircraft. In his words, appropriations for Stealth

technology research had been increased tenfold in 1977 (when the decision was made to accelerate this program).

Based on flight test results of the experimental Stealth aircraft, Lockheed began the working design of the F-117A aircraft (previously known under the designation of F-19 or RF-19) which completed its first flight in June 1981. The Air Force initially planned to purchase 100 F-117A aircraft but their number was subsequently reduced to 59 and the funds released were reallocated to more modern programs.

The first aircraft built was involved in an accident in 1979 while being flown by a Lockheed test-pilot. The pilot survived and the aircraft was damaged but was not completely destroyed. Two aircraft that had already entered the inventory have crashed: On June 11, 1986 near Bakersfield, California and on October 14, 1987 on the Nellis Air Force Base range in Nevada.


According to Program Director Colonel B. Reyter's [transliterated] statement, the Air Force supported the development of this aircraft under conditions of total secrecy and during the course of a span of time that was significantly less than is normally required for development of similar weapon systems within the framework of funds appropriated by Congress and with minimal control by the Department of Defense. "This program is the ideal example of how optimal management can operate. We rejected certain forms of reporting, carefully selected employees, and granted them independence while they worked on the program," stated B. Reyter at the beginning of April 1990. In his words, the flight of the first of 59 F-117A aircraft ordered by the Air Force occurred in 1981, just 31 months after initiation of the preliminary design. F-117A aircraft achieved combat readiness in October 1983, four years after conclusion of the first contract for their construction with Lockheed's "Skunk Works" department which is located in Burbank, California.

Just what is the first series production "invisible" combat aircraft?

It is manufactured according to a design that is close to the flying wing design and has an aspect ratio of 1.9 which has a negative impact on the aircraft's lift-to-drag ratio but which promotes reduction of the RCS under certain perspectives of [radar] illumination.

The short wingspan results in an increase in inductive resistance at low speeds and the F-117A aircraft's lift-to-drag ratio totals four while landing which is slightly higher than the Space Shuttle's lift-to-drag ratio.

The F-117A aircraft uses three approaches to insure a low radar signature. The first consists in the application of radar-absorbing materials [RAM] to reduce the overall level of radar return. The second approach provides that surfaces that form the aircraft body are angled sharply from the vertical so primary reflections are up or down, away from the enemy radar transmitter. The third approach insures that unavoidable reflections in the



plane of the radar transmitter pass through (are concentrated) along a few narrow paths.

This latter technique of creating a very "spikey" radar return is apparent when the aircraft is viewed from above. The following aircraft structural elements are aligned in one path: The right aft wing tip, the ends of the right outboard elevon, the right exhaust nozzle, a major joint panel on top of the aft right fuselage, the trailing edge of the left elevons, the serrated trailing edge of two screened engine vents, some edges of the in-flight refueling hatch, and some edges of the engine auxiliary inlet doors (See the diagram). The F-117A aircraft's low signature is mostly due to its shape. Lockheed estimates that the F-15 could reduce its radar cross section by a factor of 10 with the use of RAM coatings, but since radar signal strength is a function of the fourth power of the distance to the target, this would result in a relatively small loss of detection range (to 56 percent).

The aircraft's average RCS value is assessed as $0.0001-0.01 \text{ m}^2$. The F-117A aircraft is primarily manufactured from an aluminum alloy and the airframe is stressed for six G's. A drag chute compartment is located on the upper surface of the fuselage. The hexagonal bump on

the side of the fuselage (aft of the insignia) is recessed and is possibly a radar reflector to track the aircraft using radar during exercises.

The aircraft is painted a dirty gray which insures a minimal signature at night. The natural color of the engine inlet grid is a reddish tint which is visible only when viewed from the side because the leading edges have been painted black.

The engine inlet grid is manufactured from composite materials and its average electrical resistivity has been optimized to absorb radar waves. Auxiliary inlets which are closed during flight are located above the inlet grid.

Inlet dimensions are about $1.43 \times 0.82 \text{ meters}$ or about 1.18 m^2 which is approximately four times greater than the inlet throat area ($0.29-0.31 \text{ meters}$) for the F404 engine on the F/A-18, F-20, and A-4 aircraft. However, a more meaningful comparison would be to calculate the throat area perpendicular to the direction of the air flow. This throat area is $0.73 \times 0.55 \text{ meters}$ or 0.40 m^2 .

The inlet grid's surplus area has obviously been selected due to the need to compensate for losses caused by the inlet grid and also possibly to insure additional air enters for the internal ejector nozzle to cool the exhaust to

reduce the infrared signature and to reduce the heat load on the walls of the exhaust pipe. The auxiliary inlet doors have an area of nearly 0.39² each.

The grid makes a 15.2 X 15.2 mm mesh in the inlet's throat which is perpendicular to the direction of the air flow and totals one half the wave length of a radar operating in the X frequency band.

Joints in the radar-absorbing material over the aluminum airframe are visible below the grid. The radar-absorbing material, whose upper surface is paint, has a rough surface texture.

The aft sections of the bomb bay doors and the engine compartment access panels also have serrated edges. The engine compartment access panels are about 3.5 meters long which is adequate to remove an F404 engine.

Cylinders that may be long-range communications antennas are visible behind each main landing gear door.

The V-shaped tail has a prismatic profile and seams are visible between the RAM panels.

The aircraft fuselage is 5.33 meters wide which permits the aircraft to be transported in the fuselage of a C-5 military transport aircraft with the wing panels removed.

Continued in the next issue.

[Dec 90 pp 22-23]

[Text] The narrow slit of the engine exhaust system located along the sides of the aft section of the fuselage is 1.65 meters long and 0.1 meters high. A heat-resistant flat plate which reminds you of the Space Shuttle's coating is visible in the area of the exhaust system. The coating's normal color is black.

The aircraft is equipped with two General Electric F404-F1D2 (2 X 5,600 kgs [kilograms force]) TRDD [turbojet bypass engines] and has adequate thrust to attain supersonic speeds, however the aircraft is limited to high subsonic speeds (it has been reported that an F-117A aircraft destroyed one of the surfaces of its V-shaped tail structure while attaining supersonic speed). Cool air is mixed with the engine's exhaust and the wide nozzle insures even greater heat dispersal. The exhaust system valves that are visible in the photographs allow the broadening of the exhaust gas flame and possibly additionally screen engine components from direct surveillance. The aircraft does not have thrust vectoring. According to eyewitness reports, the aircraft emits a loud noise while the aircraft takes off and climbs which can be heard up to eight kilometers away. In this aircraft flight regime, the engine flame is clearly visible. However, some observers report that the aircraft is practically not heard when it is performing a flight at cruising speed. During daylight, the aircraft, which has a dark coating, is highly conspicuous.

A red stripe on the fuselage's rear surface designates the location of the tailhook. The aircraft has retractable

radio antennas on the fuselage's lower surface between its nose and left main landing gears and several behind the cockpit canopy's side window.

It is assumed that the aircraft must execute a combat flight under conditions of radio silence even while conducting in-flight refueling.

The F-117A has an improved digital strike-navigation system which increases combat mission execution efficiency and reduces the pilot's workload. Obviously, a combination of inertial, satellite, and correlated navigation is used on the aircraft and the aircraft pilot is equipped with a night vision device.

It has a forward-looking infrared [FLIR] system which is installed in the nose section of the fuselage in front of the aircraft windshield and a retractable [FLIR] sensor is located on the aircraft's lower surface. Both optical windows are covered with electrically resistive coatings with a pitch much finer than a radar's wave length making the screen opaque to radar but transparent to infrared. The screen has little radar reflectivity because the electrically resistive material from which it is manufactured damps out the electrical field induced by the radar wave. The aircraft windshield coating is also made electrically resistive based on the principle of damping out the electrical field. Obviously, a coating with similar properties covers the fasteners around the sensor's perimeter.

The aircraft has a one-man crew. The cockpit has a windshield and two individual windows of various sizes along both sides. A HUD [head-up display] with a control panel has been installed in the cockpit and a multi-function display is located to the left of the control panel. According to reports, a large sensor display is located under the head-up display.

Four airspeed probes in the nose section of the fuselage measure air speed and flight altitude. The bump above the cockpit is a light to illuminate the in-flight refueling system receptacle which is located behind the cockpit.

The equipment installed on the aircraft permits fixing the location and characteristics of enemy radars and also carries out transmission of information received to other aircraft using jam-resistant communications channels. The F-117A is equipped with a laser speech privacy communications system between aircraft.

Since the F-117A's wing has a large swept angle and a diamond-shaped profile that certainly creates lift force vortices whose dependence on angle of attack is not linear and a digital remote control system with quadruple redundancy has been employed on the aircraft. Obviously the F-117A aircraft has adequate maneuverability and its "Wobbly Goblin" ["khromoy karlik"] nickname given to it by the American aviation press can hardly be considered to be valid. Radar has not been installed on the aircraft. An inertial navigation system with mechanical gyroscopes is used for navigation.

A weapons compartment 4.7 meters long and 1.75 meters wide is located between the engine compartments and is capable of accommodating all tactical weapons in the air force inventory including nuclear weapons. The aircraft's typical armament consists of either 900 kg laser-guided bombs, AGM-88A HARM or AGM-65 Maverick guided missiles, CB-15 guided bombs, B61 nuclear bombs, and Sidewinder air-to-air guided missiles. Air Force representatives assert that the aircraft is capable of conducting defensive air combat.

The U.S. Air Force 37th Tactical Air Wing is equipped with F-117A aircraft and is deployed at Tonopah Air Base, Nevada. The Air Wing consists of the 415th "Night Stalker" Tactical Fighter Squadron, 416th "Ghost Riders" Tactical Fighter Squadron, and 417th "Bandits" Tactical Fighter Training Squadron. World War II night fighter squadrons originally had these numerical designators. The 37th Tactical Air Wing also has 18 A-7 aircraft which are used as trainers for flight rehearsals in the F-117A aircraft. They plan to move the 37th Tactical Air Wing to Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico in 1992.

Until April 1989, the aircraft completed flights only at night using Nellis Air Base's enormous airspace. Information about the program was fragmentary in nature and the U.S. Air Force asserts that the aircraft had not been used outside U.S. territory until the invasion of Panama in December 1989. Only about 8,000 people had access to official information about the F-117A aircraft program until October 1988. When the Air Force published an unclear photograph of the aircraft, a suggestion was made that the perspective had been deliberately selected in this photograph to distort the notion about its true configuration for disinformation purposes. The wing's sweep angle which turned out to be substantially greater was incorrectly defined.

At the present time, F-117A aircraft are being used in joint training with other U.S. Air Force and U.S. allied forces subunits. According to the Secretary of Defense, elimination of a number of secrecy measures will permit reduction of financial expenditures.

By the beginning of 1990, 175 pilots had transitioned to the F-117A aircraft.

By April 1990, there were 54 F-117A aircraft in the Air Force inventory. Three aircraft have been lost during operations. The U.S. Air Force intends to receive a total of 59 F-117A aircraft with deliveries ending in 1990. The program's total cost is \$6.27 billion and the cost per aircraft, originally assessed as \$42.6 million, had increased to \$106.2 million by 1990.

According to foreign experts, the F-117A belongs to the first generation of low-signature combat aircraft. However, flight testing is already being conducted of new

generation aircraft—the B-2 Strategic Bomber and the Lockheed F-22 and Northrop F-23 fighter aircraft which have been developed within the framework of the ATF program. The latest achievements of Stealth technology have been embodied in the design of these combat aircraft which not only reduce signature but also permit aircraft to retain high tactical-technical specifications (like the Stealth fighter, the ATF must have supersonic flight cruising speed and maneuverability which does not lag behind but even exceeds the maneuverability of the F-15, A-16, and F-18 fighter aircraft).

According to assessments of American experts, the United States currently occupies the leading position in the world in work in the area of Stealth technology, however certain other countries have also achieved definite success in this direction.

So, for example, Japan has achieved a level which allows the conduct of major work on the development of radar-absorbing material's primary components. Israel and NATO European countries are capable of conducting some work in this area which, according to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, can be a "very promising direction of joint research."

The NATO European countries are capable of conducting independent development in the area of reducing helicopter noise, reducing IR signature and combat ship noise, and also of modeling and measuring radar reflection along the surfaces of a complex shape within a broad range of characteristics. The United States, FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], Great Britain, and France have combined efforts to develop a high-energy fuel for the engines of future tactical guided missiles that promises to reduce their signature.

The Pentagon asserts that the USSR has achieved a level that is equal to the U.S. level in the area of reducing helicopter noise and has very nearly approximated the U.S. ship noise reduction level and the dynamic balancing of power plant's rotating parts. The USSR lags behind the United States in other spheres of Stealth technology. Of course, American expert assessments with regard to the level of Soviet and American aviation technology are not always adequately objective but we must admit that the United States is currently the legislator of fashion in the sphere of Stealth technology and the experience of history teaches that lagging behind in the most important tactical-technical specifications of combat aircraft (and this is precisely signature specification at the present time) can result in tragic consequences during the outbreak of combat operations. Obviously, having set the reduction of the quantity of aircraft arms and the achievement of the improvement of their qualitative parameters as our primary goal, our aircraft industry is faced with quite a lot to do in order for Soviet aircraft "not to be identifiable" in the sky in the background of foreign Stealth aircraft.

| F-117A Aircraft Specifications | |
|---|--|
| Wingspan | 13.2 meters |
| Aircraft length | 19.9 meters |
| Aircraft height | 3.9 meters |
| Wing area | 73 m ² |
| Wing leading edge sweep | 68° |
| Maximum takeoff weight | 23,800 kg |
| Weapons payload | 900 kg |
| Maximum flight speed at an altitude of 11 km | 1,200 kph |
| Combat radius | 640 km |
| Average RCS [Radar Cross-Section] (unofficial assessment) | 0.01-0.001 m ² (the latter number obviously characterizes the RCS value for the frontal projection of the aircraft) |

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U.S. Military Technology Seen as Outmoded

91UF0565A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4

[Article by V. Nadein, IZVESTIYA correspondent: "Good Missiles... But on the Whole American 'Defense' Lags Behind World Industry"]

[Text] Washington—The success of American arms in the recent war gave rise to impatient demands for transferring the successful methods and devices for creating ultra-modern technology to world products, in whose production the United States can far from always boast of success.

It started with President G. Bush. Like all American television viewers, he was enthralled by the cruise missiles, the "smart" bombs, the Stealth aircraft, and other miracles related to the highest-level combat technology. And so in his speech before Congress on the occasion of the end of the war he called for returning economic leadership to America. To win a victory not only on the field of battle but also, to use a familiar expression, in peacetime competition, but winning not over the Iraqis but over the Japanese and Europeans.

At first the task seemed quite natural and feasible. Everyone could see the excellent performance of the Patriot missiles against the Iraqi Scuds. Everyone could attest to the fact that to "hit a flying bullet with another bullet" was no longer a fantasy.

It seemed that it would be simpler after this. As Democratic Senate Majority Leader G. Mitchell exclaimed recently: "If we can make better 'smart' bombs, can we really not make better videotape recorders as well."

They think the Japanese make the best video equipment. And the best automobiles are made by the Europeans.

But the best computer programs are made by the Americans. For now. Even in this traditionally American business the Japanese are hot on the heels of the initial inventors.

For a long time the predominant view in the country was that the main thing was to work harder. It was thought that if the nation were to devote the same attention to the production of automobiles and household electronics that it devotes to missiles and aircraft carriers, the peacetime branches would quickly catch up, no matter how far behind they may be.

But a comparative analysis of the technical levels of the most modern arms, which impressed the world so much, and the modern Japanese video equipment, of which any halfway decent store here is full, produced striking results: The tape recorders are more modern and refined than the "smart" bomb. It turned out that they are all much more complicated than was traditionally thought.

The most impressive thing was that the comparison of the latest household instruments with the latest arms shows that the latter lag behind by a minimum of 10 years. "In spite of the demonstration of American weaponry this war provided, it does not seem that American commercial products will enjoy a brilliant reputation as a result," writes THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. "Many Japanese think that the technology of the American miracles from the latest arsenal is actually out of the seventies."

The beginnings of much of the latest technology actually do go back to the large military programs. For example, the American supercomputer industry evolved from the production of chips for the Minuteman missiles of the sixties. And it was only much later that the supercomputers became a commodity on the market—of course controlled but widely used in nonmilitary branches.

But the situation has changed sharply since them. While by the beginning of the sixties military production consumed about 70 percent of all the chips, today it requires less than eight percent. Peacetime production powerfully dictates its needs to the producers.

It is impossible to stay in the market today without constant updating of the assortment. Household electronics, cameras, and models of footwear and automobiles replace one another at a rate that is impossible for military products. One of the former Pentagon leaders of technology planning, speaking of the use of composite materials for arms, admitted that the latter "could not even come close to the level of perfection you can buy in any sporting goods store."

He is seconded by Robert Costello, former deputy defense minister for procurements during the Reagan administration: "Defense is by no means the leader. In many cases it does not even use the latest technology."

In this connection the military are faced with an altogether new problem that is unknown in peacetime

branches: expending additional efforts to keep outdated technology in operation. "Since the creation of a new weapon takes from eight to 15 years," writes THE NEW YORK TIMES, "the technology is frequently outdated by the time it becomes a part of the arsenal."

In light of this, one cannot be surprised that a number of companies are receiving special additional allocations from the Pentagon just so they will maintain space for outdated production. THE NEW YORK TIMES thinks that such production lines were used to create batching items for the Tomahawk and Patriot missiles which became famous during the last campaign. And the same Raytheon Corporation, at whose enterprises the Patriots which gained worldwide acclaim were created, experienced very great difficulties manufacturing a gas kitchen stove and a dishwasher with a dryer for the demanding American market.

Several reasons are given for the relative backwardness of the American defense branches. The main ones are: the lack of competition, since the arms market is not very mobile; the budget method of allocations which promotes a high-cost style of keeping accounts and obtaining profit; the low level of consumer influence on production since there is nothing with which to compare the items; and the small group of producers.

It is remarkable that in cases where the military clients are in a position close to the ordinary consumer, they are glad to make use of this advantage. For instance, during the Desert Storm operation it was learned that there were not enough short-wave radios. Those that had been manufactured on order from the defense industry weighed more than seven kilograms, they had to be carried in a carrying case, and so forth. The Pentagon purchased a large batch of radios in the stores—they cost several times less and weighed one-twelfth as much, and they fully satisfied the needs for combat activities.

To catch up in one leap with the competitors who have been specializing in the output of household equipment for a long time is difficult also because ultramodern American arms use many foreign batching items—from Japan, Germany, and Canada.

Finally, as the Japanese think, the arms producers are developing a peculiar complex of arrogance and at the same time inadequacy, which keeps them from competing successfully with world products. Engineers and designers from "defense" are not used to responding instantaneously to consumer demand and are not able to see this as the main purpose for which everything is being done. They are too spoiled by high incomes, an atmosphere of secrecy, and state attention, and therefore are not inclined to critical perception and market verification of how real their achievements are.

As THE WALL STREET JOURNAL reports, one Japanese businessman called the defense industry a "man-eating tiger"—once it has tasted human flesh this tiger is not satisfied with any other food.

Perhaps this comparison is too strong. But it is still an undisputed fact that in highly developed societies arms no longer take the prize for technical innovation. And no matter how fast the cruise missile may be, it is not likely to catch up with the simple video in the near future.

Closer French Ties to NATO Viewed

91UF0574B Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
22 Mar 91 Union Edition p 6

[Article by Yu. Kovalenko: "A Step Towards NATO: France Changes Its Military Doctrine"]

[Text] Paris has decided to take part in the work of the NATO Military Planning Committee, which is dealing with issues involving an evaluation of the potential threat to this bloc's member countries as a result of the disbanding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

This decision provided further proof that France's military doctrine is undergoing substantial changes. Since France withdrew from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1966, its representatives have not been present at Military Planning Committee meetings.

Observers note that under the new circumstances that have emerged on the European continent, Paris intends to get involved in the discussion of various aspects of NATO activities. Gabriel Robin, France's permanent representative at this organization, already participates, together with other ambassadors, in the weekly meetings of the North Atlantic Council where political problems are discussed: the future of the North Atlantic Treaty; the creation of a "European foothold" within its framework; the expediency of widening the bloc's zone of activities beyond Europe, etc.

Now France is also ready to participate in the discussion of strictly military matters. The main item on the Military Planning Committee's agenda is an evaluation of the "risk"—until recently the term used here was "threat"—related to the Soviet Union, taking into account that its army still represents a formidable military force even after the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact. French representatives declared, however, that they do not intend to participate in the work of the next phase of the Military Planning Committee, where, based on the "risk" assessment, new strategy will be developed.

According to LE MONDE, at this transitional stage of its relationship with NATO France has to resort to this kind of juggling act. On the one hand, Paris does not seem to be set on a final return to the NATO military organization yet. On the other, it is, together with Bonn, a main driving force in the creation of a "European defense," which will inevitably lead to substantial changes in the relationship between France and the North Atlantic Union.

One of the most important items is the issue of revising the very essence of an integrated military command of the North Atlantic Union. Is it absolutely necessary, as

the United States believes, to preserve NATO's unified military command, which has to be American? This is the question French specialists ask (for Washington, it is a most delicate problem, on which the preservation of substantial numbers of American troops in Europe also hinges). Should there not be, on the contrary, two independent commands—one European and one American, which will be connected by minimal liaison?

Many experts believe that France's participation in "European defense" will inevitably lead to its return, in one form or another, into the NATO military organization. It is not possible to play a key role in forming a "Eurodefense" and at the same time stay outside the bloc. This, of course, is well understood in Paris. Recently one French diplomat, in talking about the creation of European rapid deployment forces of the basis of already existing French ones, stated: Paris is ready to agree for its units to be under the NATO integrated military command, along with units from other Common Market countries.

The step taken by France in the direction of NATO was speeded up not only by the fundamental changes in the eastern part of Europe but also by the military-political rapprochement between Washington and Paris during the Persian Gulf crisis. At the same time, as the Martinique talks between F. Mitterrand and G. Bush showed, Paris continues to be against the expansion of the North Atlantic Union's zone of activities, and is against it being not only the military but also a political tool of the United States.

1952 Shootdown of Swedish Plane Recalled

91UF0574A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 23 Mar 91 p 5

[Statements by David Lando, former MiG-17 fighter pilot, recorded by A. Kartsev; date not given: "Shot Down Over Neutral Waters"]

[Text] According to Western data, 27 foreign planes—violators of our borders—were shot down between 1952 and 1984. However, we have been able to find out that at least one of them, a DC-3 Swedish reconnaissance plane, was destroyed in June 1952 over neutral waters of the Baltic Sea on special orders from Moscow. David Lando, a former MiG-17 fighter pilot, tells how it happened.

[Lando] In 1950 I arrived, together with a group of seven pilots who had graduated from the aviation school in Armavir, at my first ever service station in Latvia. Our 483rd Fighter Aviation Group of the 336th Kovel Red Banner Aviation Division was stationed at that air field then. Since both the group and the division were disbanded in 1960, I can identify these units without the risk of revealing any secrets. I was attached to the 1st Wing. Our combat task was the protection of Soviet air space in the area between Ventspils and the right tip of the Bay of Riga. To carry out this task, we had first-class, by the standards of that time, equipment: With the exception of the Moscow Military District, we were the

first ones to receive high-speed MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters. Combat air patrol and alert duty were our main tasks—actually, in reverse order, since we spent more of our time in the aircraft cockpits on the ground than in the air. An alert duty squad on priority one alert status stayed in the cockpits day and night, in any weather, always ready to take off two minutes after the order was given.

The time we spent in the air could also be divided in two parts: About one-quarter of it was spent on perfection of flying techniques and familiarization with the ground environment. The other 75 percent of flights were made to intercept a target approaching our borders. We had to scramble every time an unidentified flying target appeared in the neutral "air" (that is, in the air space over neutral waters) and was moving in our direction. Such "intercept" flights took place almost every day, although from 1951 to 1953 there were only two actual violations of the border in our patrol area. I am talking about planes, because sometimes foreign helicopters ventured into our territory, too (especially at night).

I remember very well the day when the DC-3 was shot down. I remember well that the take-off strip was dry. There were four MiG-17's on alert duty. I was in one of the aircraft, and my flight leader Shatokhin was in the other. I do not remember who was in the other two aircraft. Suddenly they are told to scramble and fly to the neutral waters. All the brass gathered at the command post, including the group commander—at that time it was twice Hero of the Soviet Union Pavel Yakovlevich Golovachev. I remember the two MiG's reporting excellent weather and visibility; then they were ordered back to the base. At that time I learned that an enemy airplane was flying deep over the neutral waters, and that it had to be shot down. From all indications it looked as though Shatokhin and I would have to conduct this operation. I remember I was really itching to take off and shoot down that DC-3.

I did not think about possible danger: The MiG-17 had the complete advantage in speed and maneuverability. Besides, my plane had three cannons—one 37-mm and two 23-mm. It was also very hard to miss the "flying shed," as we called DC-3-type planes.

At that moment, when Shatokhin and I were waiting for the "take-off" command, we heard on our radios that another plane would fly this mission. The thing is, our MiG's had regular fuel tanks, 250 liters, I think. But the group also had several planes equipped with extra fuel tanks, about 600 liters. This is the kind of a plane it was decided to send against the DC-3. I remember as if it just happened a moment ago: a short command "start," and the plane (piloted by Grigory Osinskiy) separates from the take-off strip. Osinskiy was one of our best pilots; he was attached to another wing where they took only the very best fliers. I think Osinskiy was on duty the day before, and they had brought him in from home where he was resting.

After his MiG-17 left in the direction of the neutral waters, I could no longer hear his conversation with the command post on the radio because they switched to another communications channel. But there were many officers gathered at the command post, and they later

repeated many times how this operation went; Osinskiy himself also recounted a few times how he shot down the DC-3.

It took Osinskiy only a few minutes to reach the neutral waters. His altitude was approximately between 2,000 and 3,000 meters. The radio contact was excellent. Suddenly Osinskiy's voice came through: "Target in sight!" Golovachev, who was in charge of the operation, shouted: "Kill! Kill!" However, because of the difference in speed Osinskiy overtook the slow DC-3 on his first approach, and had to turn around. There was no talk about warning shots, or about forcing the DC-3 to land on our air field. The order was clear: "Shoot it down." And this order came from Moscow. In general, Golovachev himself could not give an order for the plane to take off. Such an order could only come from the division commander or from Fedor Shinkarenko, who was then the commander of all aviation forces in the Baltics. Had the DC-3 violated USSR air space, Shinkarenko or even the division commander could give an order to shoot it down. But to send a plane into neutral waters, and not on a reconnaissance mission but to shoot down an airplane that belonged to neutral Sweden—this kind of order could only come from Moscow.

Osinskiy's turn took about two-and-a-half minutes. Suddenly he said again "Target in sight!" and again Golovachev shouted: "Kill!" Osinskiy opened fire, and the people at the command post clearly heard two bursts through the microphone. We realized later that out of nervousness Osinskiy probably pushed two buttons simultaneously—the radio and the "fire" one. Osinskiy said that he hit the DC-3 in the right engine. The plane caught fire, and Osinskiy reported that "many parachutes came out." He did not get an order to shoot at them. Many of my friends were at the command post, and if such an order did come (it is a catastrophe for an honest pilot to have to shoot at the escaping crew of a shot-down plane), I would have known about it.

The order Osinskiy received was different: Land in Riga instead of our base. From the Riga airfield he was taken to Moscow on a transport plane. Together with Shinkarenko, I think. Osinskiy stayed two or three days in Moscow and came back to our unit with an award—Combat Red Banner Order. A little later he also received a monetary bonus, with which he bought an excellent silver fox collar for his wife's coat. Grigoriy Osinskiy often talked to us about his trip to Moscow. He was especially upset over the fact that he had met the highest brass there but he himself was unshaven, in a dirty flight suit, and did not even have his service cap on.

I served with Osinskiy until 1959, when he retired from the Army. I remember that for a while he was a political officer of his wing, and that at the time of his transfer to the reserve he was the deputy group commander on political matters and had a rank of lieutenant colonel. He moved to some place in the Ukraine. I know they had three children. Osinskiy was a very decent, serious man; he never drank, was involved with his children, and devoted most of his time to his family. Everybody in the unit respected him a lot. He never tried to unload his work on somebody else, and was very conscientious about the tasks assigned to him. We were neighbors when we were stationed in the polar region.

I myself transferred to the reserve in 1960, from the position of deputy group commander, for health reasons—just before the big reductions started by Khrushchev. All through these years I have maintained contact with some of my friends from my service days. None of them knows anything about Osinskiy.

And lastly: It does not make sense to look at Osinskiy's action from the point of view of our current thinking. Any of the fliers, including myself, would have gladly carried out such order then. It was a different time, and there were different norms of what was acceptable, what was permitted and what was not, and what was good and what bad.

Ballistic Missile Designer Interviewed91UM0303A Moscow *TRUD* in Russian, 24 Jan 91 p 2

[Prof. V.M. Sobolev interviewed by O. Pozdnyakova: "Our Last Ace in the Hole"]

[Text] We look to the future with hope despite the current hard times, for our country has a still-unclaimed "golden" intellectual resource, concentrated in those branches of science and industry which competed as equals with the best foreign companies, and often even outstripped them. I am speaking of the defense industry. The West has dubbed the scientists and organizers of production from the "defense side" the "last ace in the hole of the Soviet economy." Today we are talking with the director and chief designer of the "Titan" central design bureau and vice president of the "Ritm" international company, People's Deputy of the USSR Professor V.M. Sobolev.

[Pozdnyakova] Valerian Markovich, your titles do not lessen your aura of secrecy. Indeed, your participation in an international company at the non-governmental level forces one to ask a blunt question: who are you?

[Sobolev] For 29 years I have been in the management of a large defense design bureau. I am a military designer. I personally participated in the development of the SS class missile complexes, including the SS-20s which today are being destroyed in accordance with international agreements.

However this same design bureau developed the BU-75 drilling rigs for Western Siberia, which were renowned in their day. There also the first underwater-estuarine complexes in the country for drilling oil on the sea shelves, specialized mobile cranes, and much else were produced. It is a longstanding tradition of our design bureau to perform the most important domestic economic tasks. And here, in Volgograd, in the "Barrikady" production association on whose orders we have been working and continue to work, they are also doing much in the field of heavy metallurgical and machine-building equipment, including for export. So, judge for yourself.

But I should note here that involvement in one sphere of activity, in its way a unique sphere, does not deprive people of the ability to think broad-mindedly. On the contrary, this is a necessary condition for resolving unprecedented problems. These also include our economic situation.

Now we are forced to acknowledge that the military-industrial complex militarized a significant part of industry and the economy. It was one of the vital, continuous sources of inflation and deficit spending. Such were the cruel costs of the arms race. The domestic economy was gradually bled white; labor and resources were paralyzed. A curtain of secrecy hid our best scientific and technical forces from the public. Indeed, the military industrial complex ultimately found itself in a trap, since there were no resources for the conversion

programs sent down from on high. After all, they will require tens, perhaps hundreds of billions of rubles. It is quite clear today that there is nowhere to get them by traditional methods without bringing the people to ruin.

[Pozdnyakova] But they are trying to convince us that conversion really will fill the shops with needed goods. At the same time they are telling defense that "the drowning man will have to save himself." What is the way out?

[Sobolev] The situation surrounding conversion of the defense enterprises, which everyone has had up to here, has been an example of a frivolous, ill-considered approach to demilitarization of our economy.

Promises to the public that after disarmament, closure, and refitting of its potential, the "defense side" would be transformed instantaneously into a great horn of plenty for the populace were unfounded from the start. In addition the fate of enterprises and millions of people working for defense clearly were not taken into account by the reformers either. Once again an imperious attitude toward the individual made itself felt, although it is already clear that the construction of models "from above" does not work and cannot win over the masses. And it is useless to argue that it doesn't matter to the country what it expends its intelligence, qualifications, and resources on: yesterday on missiles, today on the production of pots and sausage stuffers. This principle is typical of all of our economy, however—professionalism is more the exception than the rule, for it was not needed, was not incorporated into the command system, and was discredited. Linear, one-dimensional solutions demanded the corresponding executors. To a large extent, I believe, that is why approaches to reforms of the economy have been blocked.

[Pozdnyakova] But is this the fault of people brought up by the system?

[Sobolev] Looking for the guilty parties in this case is a fruitless exercise. We have sought different ways of unblocking things and have arrived at the idea of a self-managing cell in the state sector of the economy, one that is capable of becoming a competitive partner in a multi-based economy and which would help us painlessly to "adjust" to the market.

Multi-branch joint-stock financial and industrial structures, with joint-stock, non-governmental banks, and without subordination to the ministries, could be made up of such cells.

The next step, cross joint-stock holdings, will combine the capacities both of convertible defense and civilian enterprises. This will make it possible for different production systems to understand and recognize the capabilities of one another and to saturate the market, including the foreign market, not with ideas and raw materials as now, but with science-intensive products.

And the domestic market with high-quality new-generation investment equipment for production of consumer wares.

Thus joint-stock ownership will transform the departments working for defense needs into scientific-information centers and innovation banks which will work in forecasting, scientific-technical progress, and prospects for development. Only such a system will give everyone an economic interest in working on the final civilian consumer product.

I believe the proposed model would also help to strengthen the civilian world, since the cornerstone in its foundation would be transfer of the resources of production to the ownership of labor collectives with allowance for the well-known principle: "Those who don't work don't get." Incidentally, this will keep circles of the shadow economy out of the state sector...

[Pozdnyakova] But who can implement this program? After all, it doesn't coincide with the governmental approach to conversion.

[Sobolev] Who can? Man can. You, I, others. Persons with views similar to mine include the president of the "Ritm" company, V. Panferov, the president of the "Ekoprom" state consortium, People's deputy of the USSR A. Chabanov—there are many of them. For two years we tried to attract the attention of the public and higher levels of the leadership, Councils of People's Deputies of the USSR... Then we decided to implement our model of conversion ourselves.

Our central design bureau will become an element of a self-managing economic cell of a future economic structure. This is the company, the central design bureau "Titan."

It in turn was the founder of the "Ritm"—Russian research and technology—joint-stock company, whose members include major national enterprises in defense and non-defense branches.

And the "Ritm" company will become one of the founders of an international joint-stock conversion bank, which can serve not only our company but also other clients.

[Pozdnyakova] Valerian Markovich, are you not feeding your labor collectives on illusions of independence? After all, all your joint-stock enterprises are within ministries. They are meeting state orders and bound by contracts.

[Sobolev] Yes, they are working on defense tasks. But in joint-stock programs, all participate with capabilities being freed up as a result of conversion. That is, a market situation has arisen here: we offer products, undertake to put them in enterprises, and quickly rush them to where they are more beneficial; the customer credits us, and the public too. We anticipate that a needed item may be ordered from a catalog.

Thus the "Titan" central design bureau, for example, succeeded in putting "Ivolga" semi-automatic washing machines into serial production, and this year the first models of the automatic machine will appear. The "Kuban-III" irrigating machine has undergone successful testing. Fundamentally new and highly effective systems of electrical heating for rural homes are being tested under real-life conditions. We are offering the countryside the first light, collapsible, portable shelters, with a working area of 400 square meters, for storage of agricultural products and equipment. The latest complexes of heavy equipment for oil production have been manufactured.

Overall the "Ritm" company already has 37 conversion programs in operation, 12 of them at the allied and republic level. There are also international ones.

Finally, we are at the threshold of realizing one of the major programs of the "Ritm" company—creation of a Russian telecommunications system, one of the goals of which is to unite a branching system of stock exchange centers by so-called "electronic mail," which will mean direct access to the market infrastructure both in Russia and beyond its borders.

The project is based on the launching of first one and then a system of low-orbit repeater communication satellites. With a portable radio telephone in hand it will become possible to bypass the colossal ground network and to interact with any subscriber. We are counting on the participation of business quarters of developed countries in this project. Plans are for the work to be carried out practically without the involvement of budgetary assets.

[Pozdnyakova] The reader will probably ask: won't this undermine our defense capability and security?

[Sobolev] If one can put it so, our cooperative is aimed at conversion of the mind of society, formation of a different, non-standard view of the world.

As for security... The goal of our cooperative is to prevent a brain drain, a clearance sale of progressive ideas abroad for next to nothing, not simply to survive, but more fully to realize our capabilities for peace and creativity, rather than confrontation in the country.

Incidentally, the USSR Ministry of Defense has seen fit to grant our company missiles and other equipment for the launch of satellites, and has become one of the participants in our project. I will say more: "Ritm" is today offering potential users the chance to participate on a commercial basis in the financing of development and operation of a multipurpose space system for communication and data collection and transmission, including for the development of global information systems to be used in ecological monitoring. Leading radio-electronic and space missile companies of the defense branches will participate in this.

Matsak Comments on Conversion Show in Bologna

91UM0314A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col L. Nchayuk in the column "Conversion": "A Show in Bologna"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] As previously reported by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, plans have been laid to organize in the Italian city of Bologna the large Konversiya-91 exhibition, which will feature products and technologies created and used by enterprises and organizations of Soviet defense industries.

Organizers of the exhibit tell us about the forthcoming show of items from our defense complex.

Yu. Matsak, deputy chairman of the State Military-Industrial Commission, USSR Council of Ministers, has the following to say:

"Let me remind you that a similar exhibition was held in April of last year. That was in Germany, in Munich. It obviously impressed European business circles. It was after that that the Italians offered to organize in their country that which we have come to call 'Konversiya-91.'

"Plans call for a substantially larger exhibition in Bologna than the Munich one. This is due primarily to the experience we have acquired, and secondarily to the greater possibilities, since conversion has progressed more deeply and extensively than that at first proposed. The reductions in production of armaments and military equipment earmarked for 1988 have been exceeded by substantial amounts. Thus, production of tanks has been cut in half; infantry combat vehicles, by 65 percent; aircraft and helicopters, by 30 percent. This means that considerable resources have been made available for civilian production. How can we proceed so as to gain maximum advantage for the country and lowest costs for the people associated with the defense sector?

"The idea behind Konversiya-91 is to demonstrate the capabilities our defense sector can bring to bear on mutually advantageous commercial cooperation with foreign partners in the area of civilian goods manufacturing. All defense sector enterprises have received authorization to engage in foreign economic activities; more than one hundred of them already have ties to foreign partners.

"Along what lines do we intend to seek ways to enter the international market? Primarily by employing civilian applications of military technologies in the areas of shipbuilding, aircraft and engine construction, communications, computer technology, and electronics. Also, the defense sector was making consumer items available to the market even before conversion. They comprised up to 40 percent of the total output. It is planned to bring this share by 1995 to 60 to 70 percent.

"However, the state of our consumer market does little to stimulate raising the technical level of the following items: television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, and photographic equipment, which trail far behind foreign models. This is where foreign partners could help us enter the world market. We have something with which to elicit their interest in developing a two-sided arrangement. The following is an example. The exhibition will present attainments achieved in the course of creating the Buran space rocket system. This includes 100 new materials, about 200 new technological items, 130 types of modern equipment, and more than 400 original design solutions.

"We hope that Konversiya-91 will go beyond being interesting and useful from the informational point of view to prove to be mutually advantageous in the commercial area. We propose to organize for the exhibition trade in various kinds of articles made by defense complex enterprises: military items, souvenirs made of glass and crystal, famous Kasli castings, and other merchandise."

Senator D. Stefani, president of the autonomous society Bologna Fairs, said the following:

"Our society in organizing the exhibitions sees as the main advantage their satisfying the commercial interests of definite companies and enterprises. Participation in them in our view is the final stage of production—availability in the marketplace. For example, more than 15,000 companies showed their wares last year in specialized exhibitions held in Bologna; of them, about 3,000 companies were foreign. The expositions drew almost 100,000 specialists and business men.

"Konversiya-91 will be one of 40 exhibitions to be held this year in Bologna. We are organizing it in collaboration with the all-union association Ekspotsentr, with the cooperation of the Italian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce. I wish to emphasize that we are acting within the framework of an intergovernmental agreement on conversion reached last year. I must admit that Bologna is proud of being rendered the honor of hosting such an important and useful exhibition. We will do everything we can to make it successful, and, in addition, we intend to see to it that this kind of exhibition becomes a good tradition.

"I am sure that the conversion idea affects more than just the Soviet defense complex. This problem affects other countries in one way or another. Here in Italy we have enterprises and companies that are facing similar tasks, and some enterprises and companies have acquired experience in successfully coping with conversion. We expect them to participate in our exhibition, which should become a kind of exchange for commercial cooperation and mutual advantage."

I should point out that now, almost six months before the opening of Konversiya-91, we feel the growth in interest in the exhibition in industrial and business

circles of Italy and other European countries. This furnishes grounds for the hope that we will justify the expectations the international community holds for expanding and strengthening cooperation in the noble cause of conversion of military production for the common good.

It merely remains to add that the show will enlist the participation of enterprises and organizations of the Minoboronprom, Minaviaprom, Minobshchemash, Minradioprom, Minsudprom, Minelektronprom, Minatomenergoprom, State Committee for Computer Technology, and Main Administration of Geodesy and Cartography of the USSR.

Not yet on the list is the Ministry of Defense. But there is still time. One hopes that Konversiya-91 will not take place without the participation of military specialists and enterprises. Indeed, the time has come for them also to become part of the serious commercial experience.

Shipbuilding Concern 'Sudopromimpeks' Created for Exports

91UM0467A Moscow *PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK* in Russian No 48, Mar 91 p 2

[Unattributed article under the rubric: "Beginning of the Biography": "A Motor Ship Instead of a Cruiser"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has approved a USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry association, enterprise, and organization workers collective proposal on the creation of Sudopromimpeks Concern. More than 30 shipbuilding plants and design bureaus, including the country's largest shipyard—Nikolayevsk Plant "Imeni 61 kommunar" and "Okean," Leningrad "Admiralteyskoye" and "Baltiyskiy zavod" Associations—became part of the concern which will be founded as a joint-stock company. With the participation of the concern and Inter Maritime Management, S.A., a joint company will be created abroad to sell ships and state order has announced their construction program for export deliveries in 1991-1995.

By this decision the Council of Ministers has completed the preparatory period for reorienting shipbuilding enterprises toward production of civilian output under the conversion conditions being conducted in the sector.

We all know that the domestic shipbuilding industry is one of the world's leading shipbuilding industries but, of the 70 million tons of civilian ships built in all countries, its share is currently less than one (!) percent. And demand for vessels is growing at a rapid rate and, according to Western expert assessments, it will amount to \$300 billion during the next 8-10 years.

And so the increase of Soviet ship exports will permit us to eliminate the problem of materials and equipment and insure the solution of social programs. The concern's immediate plans are modernization of shipyards and

obtaining up to four billion hard currency rubles from ship sales during 1991-1995.

According to Inter Maritime Management S.A. President Mr. B. Rappoport, the USSR has exceptional advantages which, combined with the experience and capabilities of the company he heads, will permit the Soviet Union to rapidly become the world's leading shipbuilding and ship repair country.

Fishing Concern Seeks Access to Naval Scrap

91UM0467B Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
11 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[Article by V. Ardayev: "Cemetery of Treasures"]

[Text] This picture, recently taken by *IZVESTIYA* Photo Correspondent B. Khasyanov, has a totally specific address: Mangyshlak Peninsula, Bautinskiy Bay which is near the village of Atash. [Translator's note: Photo not included.]

The ship cemetery has been here for half a century. At one time, they even put Caspian Flotilla battleships here at eternal anchor and medium tonnage fishing vessels have been left here since 1953. Dozens of written off ships—over 15,000 tons of scrap metal—lie in this small bay today. And how many others are there like these—on the Aral Sea, on the shores of the northern seas, and on the Far Eastern coastline? The Tyumen North and BAM [Baykal-Amur Trunk Line] rayons are larded with steel and, finally, simply kolkhoz and sovkhoz fields are sown with the remains of equipment and agricultural machinery—how much of this "iron land" do we have?

A USSR Cabinet of Ministers appeal to union and autonomous republic governments, to workers collectives, and to the country's citizens was recently published in our newspaper (*IZVESTIYA*, No. 55). The government, while expressing alarm about the serious situation which has developed in metallurgy, is requesting "that they very energetically undertake organizing the collection of ferrous and nonferrous metals." In particular, it points out that at a time when the metallurgical industry is on the verge of a shutdown due to shortages of secondary raw materials, "unused resources of scrap metal in the national economy alone are estimated at over 10 million tons."

The "treasure" of Bautinskiy Bay is only a small fraction of this gigantic reserve. What is impeding their use?

"According to the logic of hauling away metal, the one who needs it must become involved with hauling it away," thinks Mangyshlakrybkolodflot Administration Chief Engineer K. Atchibayev. "However, the local Soyuztorgmet department is keeping us from cutting up the ships ourselves and from carrying the scrap metal to our own yard in the city. Moreover, these functions are not characteristic to us so they also cost us quite a bit and require equipment of which we do not have enough...."

Here is Soyuztorgmet Concern First Deputy Board Chairman A. Chernousov's opinion:

"According to procedures which have already existed for many years, our subdivision accepts scrap metal from people who turn it in. If previously we could compel them to turn over metal under the threat of fines or pressure through Party committees, this possibility disappeared with the adoption of the Law on Enterprises. The matter here is not only slovenliness. Many cooperatives and large and small state enterprises began selling metal abroad—nearly a million tons was shipped there last year alone. Right now scrap metal exports are prohibited, however, many scrap metal owners are continuing to hold their reserves for now in the expectation that the prohibition will be removed at some point.

What is the result? Those people who are accumulating scrap metal are in no way interested in turning it over to domestic metallurgists on time. The preparer, deprived of the normal administrative levers, is simply waiting by the sea for the weather to change.

As a result, open-hearth furnaces are nearly at a standstill. It is true that A. Chernousov has explained: "Right now the concern is little by little chewing up trucks and other equipment and will soon become involved in preparing scrap metal." But this "soon"—is no sooner than in two to three years... A "narrow" place? So to speak. In any case, there is a broad field of activity here for entrepreneurs and small enterprise organizers. The collection and sale of "the bread of open-hearth furnaces" to metallurgists can become a profitable business.

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